




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1866-1937

GERMAN IMPERIALISM
AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW

AUTHORISED TRANSLATION
FROM THE FRENCH

GERMAN IMPERIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

BASED UPON GERMAN AUTHORITIES AND THE
ARCHIVES OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT

BY

JACQUES MARQUIS DE DAMPIERRE,

ARCHIVISTE-PALEOGRAPHE

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS, CHARTS, AND FACSIMILES

SECOND IMPRESSION

NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

1917

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PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
RICHARD CLAY & SONS, LIMITED,
BRUNSWICK ST., STAMFORD ST., S.E.,
AND BUNGAY SUFFOLK.

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GERMAN IMPERIALISM

INTRODUCTION

IT has been the glory of the human race, from its earliest origins, to have striven, by accumulated efforts, to restrict as far as possible the uncontrolled sway of violence and brute force. The development of the paternal and then of the patriarchal authority; the agglomeration of tribes and their gradual development into organised states; finally, the welding or mutual absorption of these states into vast confederations or mighty empires—these have been the stages—blood-stained stages for the most part—in this painful striving of humanity towards peace and unity. But obstacles, geographic, economic and racial, have always arisen to impose insurmountable limitations to this process of unification, as well as to the prosperity which it had engendered. It would seem that some complex law, certain factors of which are known to us (ease of communication, improvement of military institutions, material well-being, moral energy, etc.), whilst other factors are hidden from us, ordains implacably that, when two neighbouring communities have reached a certain stage of their development, one of them shall resort to violence as a means either of absorbing or of eliminating the other. The more powerful the community becomes, the more rare become these crises, but, at the same time, the more far-reaching in their effect. From the individual struggle of primitive man, defending his own life and that of his children, war has gradually enlarged its confines, becoming successively the

conflict of two clans, two tribes, two states, two empires ; and though, in the course of evolution, the individual has experienced more prolonged intervals of peace in the bosom of his community, protected against isolated attacks and depredations by its strength and organisation, it is doubtful whether the sum of grief and privation inflicted on humanity by these periodic conflicts has been appreciably reduced ; since, while they have become more rare, they have at the same time become more formidable.

It is natural, then, that an enlightened humanity should have sought for some antidote, outside the mere play of material forces, which should neutralise the too abrupt evolution of certain powers, and limit or modify as far as possible the evils attendant upon inevitable wars. It was no longer a question of establishing among members of the same community those laws of mutual security, respect for which can be forcibly exacted by the whole community, but of establishing among communities of equal power, between which it would be impossible for any outside and materially stronger power to arbitrate, a legal code of such recognised validity as to ensure respect, even without the support of arms. It is evident that only a purely moral force could fill this rôle, and most religions have attempted to do so. We may recall that, from earliest times, temples and other consecrated places have been regarded as inviolable sanctuaries, into which the most arrogant conquerors have scarcely dared pursue the vanquished, and the profanation of which was regarded as an inexpiable sacrilege. The national character of the ancient religions rarely allowed them to intervene effectively as moderators in any conflicts, of which, indeed, they were often both cause and victim ; but, among cities professing a common faith, this right of sanctuary and this relative inviolability of consecrated buildings have from very early times been sufficiently respected for infringements of them to be branded in history as crimes.

It was even more incumbent, then, on the representatives of universal religions to make every effort to limit the evils resulting from war, and, in the case of western Europe, there can be no question that the Catholic Church has both directly and indirectly employed all the means at her disposal for this purpose. We know that for centuries the policy of the popes has been to insinuate or impose themselves as arbiters in conflicts between Christian princes. The growth of their temporal power, which sometimes enabled them to employ material force in support of their judgments, finally prejudiced their moral authority in the eyes of sovereigns who, though spiritually their subjects, became politically their rivals; and, at a later date, religious conflicts ceased to admit any arbiter. But, in the course of centuries, the Church obtained, in addition to an even greater respect for its consecrated buildings and their vast domains: (1) the limitation of the duration of conflicts by the institution of the "Truce of God"; (2) the reduction of the number of combatants by the exemption from military service extended to large numbers of men under the heading of clergy; (3) the adoption by the combatants of a certain number of humane precepts, which were known as the rules of chivalry and were imposed as a sacred obligation.

It is important not to lose sight of these remarkable results, obtained in an epoch of barbarism and violence by the continued effort of Christianity. Doubtless the Middle Ages were still darkened only too often by savage conflicts, in which every precept of morality was trampled under foot; but, henceforward, if any military leaders, under any circumstances, took the responsibility of perpetrating or of ordering the perpetration of such acts of violence as were accounted criminal, they did so in the full assurance that they were guilty of an offence against morality, for which they would have to answer not only in another world, but also, in case of capture or defeat, in this present world.

For the Church did not shrink from assuming the dreadful responsibility of authorising men, under certain circumstances, to transgress her own laws. Once a leader or a band of men had infringed the code of chivalry, it was lawful to treat them no longer as belligerents, but as criminals; and, with the approval of the Church, the whole body of Christian states constituting western civilisation, conspired to hunt down the offenders, who were excommunicated (that is to say, outside the law), as though they were dangerous wild beasts and must be destroyed.

Perhaps it is not incorrect to attribute that sense of horror which we experience in the case of violations of what is now called "International Law" to a latent inheritance of respect for Christian laws and a dread of the penalties of infringing them. As was observed recently by an eminent jurist:¹ "We are more exasperated by an act which we hold to be unjust and unhesitatingly brand as a crime than by a normal event of war, even though the latter may entail serious consequences in respect of human life and property. The summary execution by a belligerent of an unoffending civilian moves us more than the death of hundreds of soldiers in a regular engagement." The reason is that the principles of universal humanity which are the very essence of Christianity found their most noble expression in those laws of chivalry which are the moral basis of the military traditions of present-day Europe. The English, the French, the Spanish—to mention only the three chief military powers of the Middle Ages, have handed down from generation to generation this common ideal, which contains in embryo the fundamental principles of International Law as it exists to-day: fidelity to a promise once given, honesty in the means employed for injuring the enemy, respect and protection towards the weak.

¹ M. Louis Renault, in his speech at the public meeting of the Institut de France, October 23, 1914.

Moreover, these principles not only represented a moral ideal, which has gradually influenced the military customs of every army associated with Christian or western civilisation. They were more even than a species of tacit convention between the combatants. The custom once enforced by the Church was actually preserved—namely, that offenders against these principles should be punished, not necessarily at once, but on the first opportunity that presented itself for so doing. Soldiers or generals guilty of such offences forfeited *ipso facto* every right to be treated with consideration, and it was considered that their conqueror was justified by their crime in treating them as offenders against common law. One sole exception to these customs was frequently admitted: this was the case of a religious war, which therefore took the character of systematic extermination.¹ Herein possibly is to be found an explanation of the fact that the Teutons, as a result of their merciless secular conflicts with pagan and half-barbarous races, have handed down to the Prussian army, from the time of its origin, an inheritance of traditions very widely different from those of the knights of western Europe.²

It is incontestable, then, that in all those great modern states which are the heirs of Christian civilisation, or have adopted the social reforms derived from it, there subsist two fundamental ideas originating from the military code of ancient chivalry—

(1) That, in a condition of war, the end does not justify the means.

¹ Enemies who were adjudged heretics could be treated without any sort of consideration. In the Middle Ages, it was necessary, however, to obtain a special authorisation from the Pope or his legate before treating them in defiance of admitted custom. It is to be noted, none the less, that conflicts between Christians and Mussulmans have always been characterised by a remarkable courtesy.

² It may be noted, moreover, that the descendants of the chivalrous Germany of the Holy Roman Empire, whose traditions are allied to those of French, English and Spanish chivalry, have been gradually eliminated or subjugated in Germany by the brutal founders of Prussia.

(2) That any belligerent who offends against the recognised customs of war or against clauses of special conventions is worthy of punishment.

The vagueness of these general principles necessitated a revision and re-statement, which was the more indispensable because the military weapons in use at the present day of necessity rendered certain acts of mercy more difficult, and because the existing political constitution of the civilised world offered no means of punishing infringements of these principles. The Pope was no longer the universal arbiter of the Christian world, in which Protestants and schismatics now counterbalanced Catholics, while, on the other hand, non-Christian powers had been admitted to a share in the discussion of matters of international interest.¹

It was owing to the efforts of the diplomatists of the last half-century that the great Powers were induced to consecrate successively, by solemn statutes, those now clearly defined formulæ of International Law, which are founded on ancient oral tradition. For the authority of the Church was substituted universal consent; and these formulæ soon became firmly established, and culminated in the creation of a supreme court for deciding international disputes, which exercised a rôle analogous to that claimed by the Pope in the Middle Ages. One point still remained doubtful, and gave rise to discussion and even sarcasm: What if the guilty nation should refuse to accept the judgment of this court without appeal? ² Was the tribunal of the Hague to entrust some great Power with the chastisement of the criminal state or army? But, in that case, for the sake of

¹ It is only fair to mention in this connection that, at the other extremity of the civilised world, Japanese chivalry has handed down to the present day a military code of honour (Bushido) quite comparable with our own.

² It has been chiefly German authors who have vexed their minds with such hypotheses as these, witness the clumsy pleasantries of General von Bernhardi in his famous book, *Germany and the Next War* (Chapter I).

avoiding one war, we should provoke others, and, after all, would the victorious power observe the injunction to show moderation in victory?

International conferences up to the present day have not furnished any very clear solution of these important questions. But they have, none the less, maintained very emphatically the principle that any failure to respect the conventions established by international conferences necessarily entailed punishment of the offender. It is, moreover, worthy of note that this idea of the necessity of punishing any infringement of the law of nations was formulated for the first time in a solemn text, in response to a special suggestion from Germany. There is no need to retrace here in detail the elaborate discussions and negotiations, which gradually resulted in those documents which constitute International Law at the present day. It will be sufficient to recall the fact that, as early as 1780, the Empress Catherine of Russia, in her celebrated *Declaration of Armed Neutrality*, had taken the initiative in a species of codification of the laws relating to maritime warfare. In 1863 the Government of the United States of America, in its instructions for the government of the Armies of the United States in the Field, imposed on its troops a standing order, which, though one-sided, none the less presented a statement of the fundamental laws of modern warfare. The following year, the first genuinely international conference ended in the *Convention of Geneva*, which confirmed the obligation to respect the wounded and those in charge of them. In 1868 a fresh initiative on the part of Russia led to the *Declaration of St. Petersburg*, in which it was declared to be dishonourable and contrary to the laws of humanity to employ weapons which uselessly aggravate the suffering of the wounded, or render their death inevitable. After the Franco-German War, and again in response to a proposal emanating from Russia, a conference at Brussels resulted in the "Proposal for an

International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War," a preliminary draft without binding force, but designed to serve as a basis for later conventions.

It is true that the military nations had exhibited a great repugnance to making any engagements whatever in such a matter, although, in 1877, on the outbreak of war with Turkey, Russia had declared her intention of binding her armies to observe the prescriptions of the Brussels Declaration. And it was Russia again who, faithful to her traditions, had the honour of convoking the first Peace Conference, held in 1899, the chief fruit of which was the "Rules concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land," which was appended to the text of the first Hague Conference. It appeared, however, that, in spite of the very clear and definite wording of this Convention, its binding nature was not fully realised by all the signatory powers, because the 1902 edition of the German Regulations for War on Land (*Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege*) allowed only a *moral* validity to the articles of the Conventions of Geneva, Brussels and the Hague. This misunderstanding was, to be sure, of short duration; for Germany did not hesitate to take part in the International Conference, which resulted, on July 6, 1906, in the new Convention of Geneva, signed this time by the representatives of thirty civilised states. And, in order to efface completely the bad effect produced on the diplomatic world by the unfortunate phrasing of the *Kriegsbrauch*, the German plenipotentiaries at the next Hague Conference in 1907 at once took the initiative in a proposal which expressly confirmed the provisions of the Regulation of 1899.

This proposal declared: (1) That a belligerent party which violated the provisions of this Regulation would be liable to make compensation to the injured party; (2) that the responsibility for individual excesses devolved upon the State to which the offenders be-

longed. These declarations—which are profoundly important, since they constitute a solemn and unquestionable recognition of the legislative and coercive power of the Hague Conference—were unanimously adopted by the forty-four states represented at the drafting of the new Convention, of which they form Article 3, as follows—

Article 3. A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulation shall, if the case demands, be liable to make compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.

From whatever point of view it be considered, modern International Law, as set forth in the documents signed by the great Powers, has an undeniably binding character. It is impossible, in fact, to compare any of these documents with the contracts made between two nations only, the obligations of which are suspended or revoked *de plano* in time of war, whereas these international contracts, since they were drawn up with a special view to their application in time of war, cannot be annulled or suspended by war. The most that can be said is that, in respect to their application as reciprocal contracts between two belligerent nations, if any one of their clauses is infringed by one of these nations, it follows, as with all contracts, that the other nation is relieved of its contractual obligations towards the offender. In fact, we are justified in assuming that, if the Conventions of International Law were to be regarded merely as two-sided contracts, which became annulled *ad nutum* by non-observance on the part of one of the signatories, the other party could not be blamed for using reprisals, and for committing, to the detriment of its adversary, every possible infringement of the contract which the latter had violated.

But it is by no means true that the Conventions of Geneva, St. Petersburg, the Hague, are merely two-sided contracts between belligerent nations. In addi-

tion to the fact that they codify the applications of a superior moral law, which therefore remains obligatory, even on the victims of its violations, these conventions have been collectively guaranteed by the whole body of civilised nations who have signed them. At the present day, then, it is not only the belligerent nations who must pass judgment on offences against the laws which they have signed, but also and more especially the states which have remained neutral and are consequently more impartial in their appreciation of the question at issue. It is not only the right but the duty of such neutral states to take note of any instance where a belligerent nation has infringed those obligations which it has admitted and they have guaranteed. And these matters ought to engage the attention not only of governments, statesmen and jurists, but also of the nations themselves and their whole populations. For, in appending their signatures to the foot of these solemn documents, which recorded obligations affecting the whole of humanity, statesmen have not only executed an honourable formality; they have actually engaged the honour of their countrymen to respect a stage in the progress of civilisation.

If, then, as a result of local or transitory considerations, any nation, though convinced of the crime of a belligerent, should not feel justified in entering into the conflict in order to chastise the offending nation and convince her of the obligation which she herself attaches to a signature, this nation ought at any rate to express openly her condemnation of the offence, to declare it to be a crime, and to pronounce her curse upon the authors of it. In order that humanity may not yield ground in its slow and difficult ascent from the horrors of brute force to a future of more emancipated thought and more practical humanity, it is essential that the civilised world should feel a joint responsibility for the punishment of offences which may be committed collectively by any nation against laws whose triumph

is of vital interest for the whole world. If the guilty nation should conquer by brute force, then it is the duty of all the other states signatory to the contracts which have been violated to frustrate the enjoyment of such a victory. If the guilty state be defeated, it would be impossible that any other state should utter a word in her defence; and if, in the horror of the struggle, private reprisals on the part of a maddened soldiery had still further aggravated the crime against the law of nations which these states had bound themselves to protect, they should see that the opprobrium falls not on the individuals but on those who have by their method of warfare been the first to testify their scorn for all that ought to have won respect.

And with regard to the actual enactments of International Law, with regard to those "laws of war" which are a common topic of everyday speech, they are not mere vague, unstable abstractions, which it is essential to define before they can be discussed. They have been precisely and clearly formulated in a code which, like national codes, comprises documents of various dates, marking a sequence of stages of progress, but all equally binding, in so far as they are not mutually contradictory. The majority of these texts were corroborated or renewed by the final act of the second Peace Conference; and this act was signed at the Hague on October 18, 1907, by the representatives, specially elected for the purpose, of : Germany, the United States of America, the Argentine Republic, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, the Republic of Cuba, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, the Republic of the Ecuador, Spain, France, Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala, the Republic of Haiti, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Mexico, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, the Netherlands, Peru, Persia, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Salvador, Servia, Siam, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uruguay, the United States of Venezuela. At the same time the

plenipotentiaries subscribed to the fourteen following conventions—

(1) Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes.

(2) Convention respecting the limitation of the employment of force for the recovery of contract debts.

(3) Convention relative to the opening of hostilities.

(4) Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare.

(5) Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land.

(6) Convention relative to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities.

(7) Convention relative to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into War Ships.

(8) Convention relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines.

(9) Convention respecting Bombardments by Naval Forces in Time of War.

(10) Convention for the Adaptation of the Principles of the Geneva Convention to Maritime War.

(11) Convention relative to Certain Restrictions on the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Maritime War.

(12) Convention relative to the Establishment of an International Prize Court.

(13) Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Maritime War.

(14) Declaration prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons.

It is only necessary for any unprejudiced person to refer to these various documents in order to form an accurate judgment on the singular manner in which German politicians and the German Army have frequently seen fit to interpret and apply them in the course of the European War of 1914-15.

These documents are, in fact, available to every one, and it is only fair to mention that the majority of the

civilised nations have incorporated the essential provisions of them in their respective Army Regulations. For instance, the Regulations annexed to Convention 4, concerning the laws and customs of land warfare, is reproduced in full at the end of the manual on the duties of armies in the field in use in the French Army, and it has evidently influenced the last editions of the German *Kriegsbrauch*.

It is a task of peculiar difficulty for a Frenchman to pronounce a well-founded judgment on the contradictions between the official statements of the Germans and the practices attributed to them, before the termination of the war has placed events in their true historic perspective. The justification for attempting this task in the present study is that a large amount of incontestable evidence has accumulated, which affords dispassionate proof that certain events did actually occur. This evidence is afforded not only by the official documents of a diplomatic nature, published by the belligerent Powers, and by the reports scrupulously compiled after judicial investigations by distinguished Belgian and French officials concerning the sufferings of the inhabitants of the districts invaded by the Germans, but also by the testimony of distinguished neutrals, and, above all, by the spontaneous assertions of German writers—publicists, politicians, soldiers, etc., the authenticity of which is above suspicion.

Among the last named, the interesting diaries of the campaign found on the field of battle and handed over to the French Staff, together with the arms and equipment taken from German prisoners and dead,¹ merit special consideration.

¹ These notebooks are not personal and private documents, like letters, etc.; they are drawn up in conformity with a regulation, and, as such, are valuable booty for the enemy. Article 75 of the German instructions for active service declares that "Diaries of the War are useful as information concerning the entire operations of troops, and, in conjunction with reports of the actual fighting, they form a foundation for subsequent histories of the campaign. They should be kept daily" (*Felddienst-Ordnung*). Berlin, 1908, p. 25.

These private diaries of the war, the keeping of which is compulsory in the German Army—at any rate for officers and non-commissioned officers—are destined, as we learn from the German military regulations, to “serve as a basis for subsequent histories of the campaign.” Hence the importance which friends or enemies are bound to attach to such documents, forming as they do actual first-hand records, kept up to date, even under fire, sometimes at the cost of most praiseworthy efforts. Soiled, crumpled, often pierced by French bayonets, rent by bullets or bursting shells, these notebooks are truly the most sincere—sometimes the most poignant human documents. We may doubt if there exist more immediate records of any war than these lines, scribbled in haste, daily, in spite of fatigue or even wounds, by officers bent on complying at all costs with a rigorous injunction.

This military servitude is not without its grandeur; it conveys a true impression of the discipline of these obscure witnesses, obedient even to death. And, by the very fact of their discipline, they are placed beyond suspicion of partiality for the enemy, or of exaggerating the heinousness of their own acts. We may, therefore, feel confidence in basing conclusions upon the facts revealed by such documents; and these conclusions will be all the more interesting on account of their striking correspondence with the too little known theories of some famous writers and thinkers of modern Germany. These theories, which, in their most recent and aggressive form, have received the name of Pan-Germanism, laid down more or less consciously the foundation of German Imperialism, the principles of which, expressed in terms of force, were bound to result in contempt for the rights of neutrals and civilians. The fact that this contempt was extended even to works of art and the moral patrimony of the adversaries of Germanism was yet another consequence of that implacable German logic which, by a singular irony of fate, was

to lead this highly cultured nation to acts of veritable vandalism. Finally, that severely objective realism which is one of the characteristics of modern Germany seems to have produced in certain subalterns a disdain for the most respected social conventions, and at the same time in certain of the leaders of the empire an anxiety to impose on the world their own version of the facts, even in the face of actual evidence, in a manner which the most lenient judgment could only describe as cynical.

It is the object of the present work to show how these various expressions of bellicose Germanism proved to be in inevitable conflict with the humane provisions of modern International Law.

CHAPTER I

INTERNATIONAL LAW *VERSUS* GERMAN IMPERIALISM

*“Fühlt eure Macht ihr einst Teutonen
So werden ihr die Herren der Welt.”*¹

F. TETZNER.

§ 1. THE PROTECTION OF THE WEAK, WHICH IS THE PRINCIPAL OBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, IS OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO THE ESSENTIAL TENDENCIES OF GERMANISM.

THE dominant impression which results from the historical considerations which we have just set forth is that of a very distinct effort on the part of successive civilisations to secure, in the midst of the stern necessities of war, a relative protection for the weak—that is to say, of all those whom their age, their sex, a temporary incapacity, or the stipulations of special conventions place outside the sphere of actual combat. The chivalrous principle which bound the Christian soldier to protect the widow and orphan, symbolising the unarmed non-combatant, has been formulated in a series of documents, extending this protection to fresh series of groups or individuals. Various applications of this principle are embodied in the immunities vouchsafed primarily to neutral states, whether in virtue of international conventions and regarded as perpetual (for instance, Belgium, Luxemburg, or Switzerland), or in virtue of temporary declarations of non-intervention. It is evident that the first-named are placed in a position of permanent inferiority to any armed nation, and that

¹ “Teutons, when once you know your strength,
You shall be masters of the world.”

the second, having declared their intention of taking no part in a war, could only be drawn into it by the belligerents under unfair conditions in which they would be unable to defend themselves effectively.

The strict limitation of the term "belligerent" to individuals forming part of the regular army of any of the nations engaged in the conflict constitutes, for all who are excluded from this description, a further immunity, the object of which is to protect them from the personal risks resulting from a state of war. Moreover, modern International Law has aspired to defend not only the individual members of the population, but also, as far as possible, their property; for the destruction of wealth, and with it more particularly the means of subsistence, may cause indirectly human sufferings as serious as those inflicted in actual warfare. Finally, the safeguarding of the wounded and of the medical staff necessary for procuring them the attention required by their condition is an even more signally humane provision, which, like the injunction against using weapons calculated to cause superfluous suffering, reduces the actual combat to a matter of incapacitating for further conflict the greatest possible number of armed adversaries.

Thus conceived, war becomes what in fact it ought to be—the last resort for forcing a foreign and, for the time being, hostile nation to submit to the political constraint of the victorious power, owing to the military impossibility of continuing an effective resistance to the coercive measures directed against its social life. But from these coercive measures are excluded all such as would be likely to result in a destruction of human life in excess of what is absolutely necessary in order to establish the momentary supremacy of one of the armies engaged. This conception, which strives to reconcile the stern necessities of the life-and-death struggle between two rival communities with the conception of humanity which has been diffused through every civilisa-

tion for the last two thousand years is in harmony at once with the Christian doctrine of the right of the weak to existence and with the ideals held up by all those thinkers who have reflected honour on humanity. It might be presumed, then, that the principles formulated a century ago to serve as the basis of International Law would be unhesitatingly accepted by the most diverse nations, and enter, so to speak, into the international conscience, because they were in accordance with certain universal aspirations, and had won acceptance as expressions of Truth itself.

Certainly, the majority of the most cultured citizens of France, England and the United States, for instance, never dreamed that a modern civilisation, collaterally with this normal evolution, would undergo another evolution upon a radically opposite principle, according to which the weak, instead of being protected by the strong, were foredoomed to annihilation, this annihilation being regarded as inevitable and scientifically necessary for the full expansion of the invading race, whom the weaker community was unfortunate enough to have for neighbour or rival. They did not suspect that, beneath the outward show of a civilisation apparently similar to their own, it was possible at the present day that another civilisation should shape and direct the hearts and minds of millions of human beings, in accordance with principles entirely contrary to the universally accepted principles of morality, principles which they none the less continued to profess outwardly. It seemed remote from all probability that a race of human beings, while preserving officially the external practices of Christianity, should at the same time inculcate in all its members from their infancy a no less official cult of material force, and a profound conviction that their nation alone, to the disregard of all others, was marked out to exercise over the world a dominance, the predestined germ of which was contained within herself.

And it was only by the political and military actions of Germany during the last weeks of July and the first weeks of August 1914, that the world was at length disabused of its illusions on this head. Yet so sincere and convinced were the majority of the civilised nations in their absolute adherence to the formulæ and principles of International Law that, when first Germany revealed an attitude in contradiction to those principles, it was felt that there must be some explanation; that either the circumstances were not fully known, or that the blame rested with individuals, whose actions would be disavowed by the German nation. Therefore, many charitable souls, even in Belgium and France, before passing judgment on the whole German nation, have felt it incumbent on them to impute the blame in turn to William II or to the ambition of some particular party, whether military or political, whether confined to Prussia or spread through the empire. It needed the notorious manifestoes, first of the ninety-three intellectuals and then of the German universities, to awaken some doubt of the existence of this imagined moral disagreement between the various social elements of modern Germany. It might, of course, still be opined that these scholars and artists, being little acquainted with questions of politics and International Law, and without any proof of the actual occurrence of the events in question, would be the first to deplore the outrages against the weak and the useless devastations committed by their countrymen, as soon as they were in possession of the tragic details. To the astonishment of the world, far from seeking to minimise the importance of the charges brought against Germany, a series of compositions made their appearance, which had been produced for the occasion by various notabilities in the world of German scholarship and art, for the purpose of enlightening the minds of neutrals concerning the principles upon which Germany claimed to justify completely both her aggressive policy and the new and hitherto

unheard-of methods employed by her troops in invaded areas. After this, the attention of the public was at length drawn to the intellectual elements which had helped to shape the curious mentality of modern Germany, elements which until now had only been revealed in all their terrible originality by a few discerning critics.

Now, an examination of the standard works which inevitably find a place in the library of every cultivated German, will reveal in the various stages of its development a remarkable doctrine, the more or less brutal expositions of which in certain famous works have often been regarded by foreign readers as mere extravagances devoid of any real importance; yet, in reality, this doctrine forms the basis of that mentality which distinguishes the German of the present day from the representative of any other civilised nation. This mentality, which has received the name of "Imperialism"—not because it served the ends of the Emperor, but because it was directed towards the domination (*Imperium*) of the Germanic elements of the world over the non-Germanic—has this peculiar feature: that it is based upon abstract principles, which were propounded in the first instance by philosophers, and subsequently inculcated in the universities and primary schools through all the stages of the most disciplined education in the world. This doctrine has the further peculiarity of having evolved under the same discipline to a stage at which it claims to be beyond the reach of discussion, or of any impartial examination of the principles which it upholds, principles which the German accepts, simply because they have been instilled into him from infancy by a series of sternly disciplined instructors. Therefore, before enumerating the principal points of fact and law in which Germany violated the precepts of International Law in 1914, it has seemed necessary to recall here, in the actual words of the leaders of present-day Germany, the guiding principles which were

moulding her national life. For it is from these principles that every German draws inspiration for all the daily tasks of his life, both political and private; it is by these principles that the whole of Germany is controlled, in her relations with every nation or individual outside the various Germanic entities united under the sceptre of the German Emperor.

§ 2. GERMANIC IMPERIALISM IS THE FRUIT OF GERMAN EDUCATION AND OF PRUSSIAN DISCIPLINE

If we wanted to express in one clear, concise formula all those principles of Imperialism, which every German accepts as articles of faith, nothing could serve the purpose better than the three first words of the famous hymn: *Deutschland über Alles*. This elevation of Germany, in the double character of the Fatherland and the symbol of all things Germanic, above every other conception or consideration in the world, in itself sums up the whole morality, policy, philosophy, science and aim of existence of present-day Germans. And it is not a mere outburst of patriotism, expressing a legitimate and even praiseworthy preference. No, it has become (and this is its strangest as well as its most dangerous feature) a kind of consecrated formula, expressing a profound conviction of general, absolute, necessary and scientifically demonstrated superiority.

It would be impossible to deal here with all the numberless compositions which expound, sometimes rather naïvely, this profound conviction of the essential and "biological" superiority of the Germanic race. Such an undertaking would involve the analysis of the whole intellectual product of Germany during the past century. It will be sufficient to indicate the most important branches of knowledge from which the German derives nourishment for this conviction, and in which his arguments and observations are inevitably most infected by a belief which was naturally pre-

existent in him before he set out to discover it. They are the following: philosophical and biological studies, historical and ethnographical studies, and political writings and discussions. If the first named are more in the nature of pure speculation, they none the less have a considerable influence in moulding the character of the masters who, in their turn, in the German universities, fashion the minds of those generations of students who represent the flower of the nation. The second class exercise a much wider influence, since the history book, with the Bible and the multiplication table, is one of the first objects of study of the children in the primary schools, and since the public monuments, which have accumulated in modern towns, exercise a constant influence on the eyes and the mind in the same direction. Finally, political studies, if they do not take the same form as in countries where free discussion is allowed, do none the less constitute a very important element in the life of the nation, for there, as everywhere else, they afford matter for the polemics of the daily and other Press, and it is well known that the German takes his paper very seriously.

These three groups of ideas are, moreover, closely inter-related with one another. It was German philosophy which constituted the essential originality of Germanism, and lent to the intellectual and moral development of several generations of students during the last century that national and intellectual coherence which has been the strength of the German universities and the cement of modern Germany. It was German philosophy which directly controlled the teaching of history, both by encouraging the application to historical research as well as to the experimental sciences of its own rigorous inductive methods, and its own spirit of organisation; and also by subjecting historical instructors to a very special mental discipline, by which the evidence of experience was systematically subordinated to the superior interests of the community.

Even art was drawn into the service of this systematic nationalism. And it is evident that politics and the Press, since they were controlled by men who had themselves been nurtured in these doctrines, were bound to display the same characteristics, the same phenomena and the same tendencies.

Hence the origin of that remarkable mentality which characterises actual Germanism—a mentality of which so-called Pan-Germanism is only a brutal and premature expression—is to be found in the teachings of the German philosophers of the later eighteenth century. Tannenberg or Bernhardi are descendants in the direct line from Hegel, Fichte or Kant, by way of Treitschke, Lasson or Ostwald. They are all products of the same spirit, they all apply the same formulæ, and, indeed, only differ from one another in respect of the nature of the problems to which they apply these formulæ. All, in fact, are equally imbued with the same logical series of propositions, which may be summed up as follows—

(1) The individual rises in the scale of being in proportion to the degree of his voluntary submission to the community.

(2) The supreme community, the goal to which the tendencies of all other communities and, therefore, all individuals ought to be directed, is the State.

(3) The Germanic race excels all other races in its faculty of conscious subordination to a community, that is to say, of discipline and organisation. It has been reserved for the Germanic race to realise the supreme ideal of collective human organisation.

The whole of this theory, which tends at once to idolatry of the State in the sphere of politics and sociology, and also to the most extreme nationalism and the most utilitarian dogmatism, is contained in the philosophic teaching of Hegel, who, in fact, with regard to the conception of the historic rôle of the German race, arrived at the same conclusions as the Pan-

Germanists of the present day. Was it not Hegel who wrote—

“ The Germanic spirit is the spirit of the new world, the object of which is the realisation of absolute truth, viewed as determining in itself *ad infinitum* that liberty which contains in itself its absolute form. The destiny of the Germanic nations is to furnish supports for the Christian principle. The foundation of spiritual liberty, the principle of the redemption, was planted in the as yet fresh and untutored hearts of those nations, and they were entrusted with the task of aiding the development of the human intellect, not only by taking as the essence of their religion the concept of true liberty, but by freely expressing this principle in the world, through the development of their subjective conscience.”

It seems scarcely credible that historians as well informed as those of modern Germany should have been able to maintain sincerely such a one-sided theory, but it is important to realise that, in the eyes of German thinkers, scientific sincerity is a secondary quality, which must give way before the national interest. And it must not be thought that this is merely a malicious interpretation of certain theories of contemporary Pan-Germanism. No, it was the masters of German thought, it was Kant himself who declared as early as 1784 that in many matters of public interest a “ certain mechanism is necessary,” and that “ the members of a society must sometimes behave in a purely passive manner,” and that often “ it is not permissible to reason,” but “ one ought to obey ”; that, “ in so far as he is a scholar, man is free to exercise his reason,” but that, in so far as he occupies a “ certain social position which has been entrusted to him,” this is no longer the case; thus the priest “ in so far as he is a priest, is not free, because he is executing a mission for others.”

And we are not to think that this divergence between the intimate convictions and the spoken teachings of the master necessarily involves him in an insupportable

hypocrisy. If it is true that the more a man has accustomed himself to subdue his personality to collective interests, the more elevated is his position in the scale of being, the sacrifice of his private sentiments to the essential aim of public instruction (the cult of State Germanism) ought, on the contrary, to raise him in his own estimation, as well as in the estimation of others—

“The true philosopher of life,” says Rönneberg,¹ “does not trouble himself with subtleties. . . . He obeys, and so proves himself worthy of that venerable name by doing what his duty requires. Therefore, think for yourself what you hold to be true, but do not trouble the public with your doctrines. . . . In this way, you perform your duty as a citizen of the State. . . . And you remain, even when you teach what is contrary to your conviction, none the less an honest man.”

Thus, the first duty of a citizen being patriotism, every scholar ought to allow this sentiment to outweigh even his zeal for scientific truth. This proposition may seem a little risky to Latin or Anglo-Saxon readers, accustomed, in secular matters, to the free discussion of abstract theories or scientific facts. It is none the less exact, and would not be disavowed either by the German chemists or the German historians of the present day. And it is not a recent phenomenon. As early as 1826, the admirable collection of texts known under the title of *Monumenta Germanicæ Historica*,² adopted this striking motto: “Sanctus amor Patriæ dat animum!” And half a century later the historian of the Holy Germanic Empire, Herr von Giesebrecht, did not hesitate to declare: “It is false to say that Science has no country, and that she soars above the frontiers which

¹ *Ueber symbolische Bücher im Bezug auf Staatsrecht*, second edition, Rostock, 1790, pp. 174–5.

² *Monumenta Germanicæ historica inde ab anno Christi quingentesimo usque ad annum millesimum et quingentesimum . . . edidit Georgius Heinricus Pertz*. Hanover, vol. i. 1826.

politics have raised up between the various human societies. Science ought not to be cosmopolitan; it ought to be national, that is to say, German.”¹ Ranke, Mommsen,² Sybel, thought and expressed themselves in very much the same fashion. It may be asserted that these examples and these formulæ have been meditated and adopted for more than a century by the numerous students who have issued from the Germanic universities, and it is safe to assume that, if important scientific compilations invoke “love of the Fatherland” rather than “love of truth,” the more vulgar compositions will exhibit a still more fervent adherence to this principle. A multitude of historical works, of varying merit, but all dogmatic in tone, have instilled into the German people, from the children in the infant schools to the most cultured classes of society, a more and more distorted conception of universal history. From the commencement of his education the young German is taught to venerate the past history of his race, which, both in narrative and poem, is presented to him in an exclusively favourable light. On this principle, for example, the terrible ambushade by means of which the German chief Ariminus, Armin or Hermann treacherously entrapped General Varus, whose officer he was, is presented to the youth of Germany as a glorious page of history.

“*Hermann der Deutsche hat Deutschland gerettet!*”
 (“Hermann the German has saved Germany!”)

¹ The very object of his *Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserzeit*, the first volume of which appeared in 1856, was, he said, to revive the memory of that epoch “in which our people, strong in its unity, attained the highest development of its power, when it not only controlled its own destinies, but also *ruled over other nations*.” And this work was dedicated to the King of Prussia, Frederick William IV, in whom the patriots of that time placed premature hopes. Cf. *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. xlix, pp. 341 *et seq.*

² We know the violently anti-French attitude taken by Mommsen in 1870, and every historian knows that his *History of Rome*, in spite of the remoteness of the subject, contains frequent allusions both to the Germanic empire and to the decadence of modern Latins.

exclaims O. Weber, the poet, at the end of a poem familiar to every German child.¹ The victory of Ariminus has come to be regarded as the victory of Germanism as a whole, of Germanism triumphing over the Latin spirit, and hence, at the close of the Napoleonic wars, it was selected as the most appropriate subject for a symbolic design to adorn the pediment of a temple erected to commemorate the glories of Germany.² And the most recent historian of Germany, Einhart, explains gravely, in a work designed for adult readers, which had an enormous success,³ that the undeniable treachery of the barbarian was a necessary act, which ought to be judged by its consequences rather than as a thing by itself, and which, moreover, is sufficiently justified by the fact of the well-known perfidy of Roman politics ! *Ab uno disce omnes* is a bad principle for the historian and one which we could not conscientiously defend ; but Einhart's work is so characteristic that we would recommend a careful study of his *Deutsche Geschichte* and of the school manuals in use in Germany to all historians. They will find the most unexpected views on all those events, a certain interpretation of which may either excite the hatred or the scorn of the young German for everything which is not Germanic, or strengthen his conviction that whatever is noble and

¹ *Deutsche Geschichte in Liedern deutscher Dichter*, von Dr. Franz Tetzner. Universal Bibliothek, 3281-3, vol. i. p. 21.

² This edifice, built at the suggestion of Louis I of Bavaria, is situated on the Danube in the neighbourhood of Regensburg. It has, of course, received the name of the Walhalla, but it is merely an elaborate imitation of the Parthenon.

³ *Deutsche Geschichte*, by Einhart. Leipzig (Dietrich, 1914). The first edition was published in 1909 ; the fifth edition, published on January 25, 1914, brought the total number printed up to 50,000 copies. The plates represent the great men of Germany and the monuments or works of art characteristic of Germanism. The choice of the latter is, in itself, very instructive. We see the tomb of Dietrich von Bern at Ravenna (frontispiece), the town hall of Louvain, p. 88, the Zwinger of Dresden, the cathedral of Heltau (Transylvania), p. 404, the three trees of Rembrandt, p. 416, the house of the "Têtes noires" at Riga, p. 424. On the wrapper is represented the monument of the Battle of Leipzig.

beautiful must naturally be German, and that Germany represents the flower of humanity.

It is not in the least surprising, therefore, that a polemist like General von Bernhardi should have found a public quite prepared to accept the astonishing historical reflections which he develops in his works, in order to justify his theories of conquest. For instance, in *Our Future*, he does not hesitate to sum up the history of civilisation in three pages, and to conclude—

“ In the midst of this general evolution, the Germans, of whom the present-day Germans as well as the Scandinavian nations are the direct descendants and the spiritual heirs, played a particularly important rôle. They became the essential representatives of all modern civilisation; and they left the imprint of their spirit on all the nations of the domain enriched by European civilisation. From the time of their first appearance in history, they proved themselves a civilised nation of the first rank; nay, more, the civilised nation *par excellence*.” ¹

The whole history of western Europe, from the fall of the Roman Empire before the barbarian invaders up to our time, resolves itself, then, according to General von Bernhardi, into a struggle between the Latin spirit (at first victorious in the conflict between the Papacy and the empire) and the German spirit, which achieved its first revenge with the Reformation, which established “the German nation at one stroke as the guide of humanity in the way of progress.” The struggle, moreover, is not yet ended; other civilisations have arisen which are not negligible, but concerning these we are told that “those powers which have unquestionably acquired a universal influence are sprung from the Germanic spirit.” The Germans have, moreover, given evidence of “a physical vitality which is, perhaps,

¹ *Unsere Zukunft. Ein Mahnwort an das deutsche Volk* (“Our Future. An Appeal to the German People”), by General Fr. von Bernhardi (Cotta), 1912, p. 11.

unique in the history of the nations." The demographic and economic development of Germany is only equalled by the intellectual and moral progress which humanity owes to her, since "first of all the nations, by the institution of universal military service, she introduced a new element of moral elevation into popular life." "*No other nation in the world has ever accomplished anything analogous*, and, when we compare this achievement with the history of the past, we see the proof of an almost inexhaustible national force."¹

And it will be noted that, in these examples, which are necessarily very brief, we are frequently dealing with works of by no means recent date, which cannot possibly, therefore, be connected with the recent Pan-Germanist agitations.² The fact is that this system, of disciplining the human intelligence from infancy in the name of the national interest, which was represented in the light of a Reason of State and endowed with a peculiar mystical authority, is of ancient date in Prussia. In emancipating themselves by the Reformation from the authority of the Catholic Church, the Prussian sovereigns had in reality, in the name of liberty, forced their military discipline even into the domain of individual religion; and we know with what rigour, in the very midst of an epoch of "free thought," King Frederick William II issued in 1788 a religious edict designed to rule the thoughts of his subjects. It is not surprising that, as a result of this training, the educators of German thought experienced scarcely any scruples in accommodating all their philosophic, historic or scientific conceptions to that superior interest of

¹ *Ibidem*.

² Even more strongly biased is the purely Pan-Germanist literature, in spite of its scientific pretensions: for instance, *Die Germanen, Beiträge zur Völkerkunde*, by Dr. Ludwig Wilser. Leipzig, 1914; *Angewandte Geschichte, eine Erziehung zum politischen Denken und Wollen*, by Prof. Dr. Heinrich Wolf, Leipzig (Dieterich); not to mention the remarkable manuals for the young, such as: *Das Jugendgeleitbuch: gedenke dass du ein Deutscher bist!* by Thomas Westerich. Leipzig (Dieterich), 1914, etc.

the German State, which they respected as an almost divine authority. It is the régime of State-worship, in a modernised form and adapted to the materialism of the age and to the successive theories propounded by the philosophers of the nineteenth century; for the official Christianity of the Prussian Court, under the rather vague formulæ of a Protestantism tinged with freemasonry, favoured every kind of compromise, so long as it was not aimed at the fundamental dogma of Germanic State-worship and Germanic superiority. The Christian mysteries were to be preserved as elements of fiction which were "good for the people,"¹ and which it would be dangerous to suppress. But they might be used as a cloak for the almost pagan theories of a neo-Pantheism. The official creed, always confined within the limits of the cult of Germanic organisation, would evolve, then, in accordance with individual tendencies and in the course of generations, into something between a philosophic neo-Christianity and a profound materialism; and the Christian formulæ would be regarded merely in the light of a survival.

Thus, in the time of Hegel, the younger generation who were stirred by the lectures of Fichte, were still Christians in tendency and mystics by heredity. Moreover, the ardent aspiration towards independence and Germanic unity transformed automatically this native religious sense into a mystic nationalism. The national suffering, then as always, gave a touch of idealism to these collective enthusiasms, and merged the traditional conceptions and those of the new Germanism into one single and ardent religion. It is the conception of the German God invoked by the Prussian armies, the liberator of Europe from the Napoleonic yoke. Whilst France seemed to forget her title of "eldest daughter of the Church," Germany in her universities was impressing on her young men the identity of the Christian spirit and Germanism, and this conception, which is

¹ Frederick the Great, *Gedanken ueber die Religion*.

contained in the teaching of Hegel, was quickly disseminated in the masses of the population; but, in the course of its evolution, it was destined to be variously interpreted.

In fact, while official Prussia was professing the vague deism of Frederick the Great, and gradually evolving towards nationalism and monism, a mystical reaction, of an extent unsuspected at first, was tending towards an important renaissance of Catholicism in the nation. But the pressure brought to bear upon the minds of the youth of Germany from their very infancy was so strong that the mutual contradictoriness of these conceptions was only able to effect a few quite external modifications of the intangible dogma of the superiority of the German State. Do not the Holy Scriptures provide Christians with weapons for the support of this dogma, at least as effective as philosophic theories? We know that the whole of the Old Testament is based on the notion of a predestined people, a people chosen of God, namely, the Jews. The latter having failed in its mission and incurred the divine wrath by crucifying Jesus Christ, the New Testament did, to be sure, admit all men, without distinction of race, to a participation in the benefits of the new Law and in the right of access to the eternal Jerusalem. But here German "science" intervenes, with the announcement that the German people were predestined to take up the sceptre which had fallen from the hands of the Jewish people; nay, even, that Germanism was the very essence of the Christian spirit. And since no student would ever dare to question the teaching of his master, who himself does not dare to question anything which tends to the advantage of the State, it is accepted unquestioningly, in all the communities in Germany which have remained Christian, that the Germanic people have become God's people, to whom and to whom alone it is entrusted to establish the supremacy of Truth on this earth. It would seem

that Bismarck himself had arrived at a very similar conviction. At any rate he is credited with the following assertion : " If I did not believe in a Divine Providence, which has ordained this German nation to something good and great, I would at once give up my trade as a statesman or I should never have gone into the business." ¹ Since that time, this conviction has become for many Germans an article of faith, which is taught by its evangelists with the aid of commentaries on texts of scripture ; for we have seen that they are bound only to teach what is useful to the State. And, indeed, for this purpose, they only need at most to put a very slight constraint on their inward convictions, since the latter have been moulded to the same notion from infancy.²

While this remarkable historic and religious theory was in process of development, the advent of Darwinism supplied the German universities with a new basis for their theories. Darwin's conceptions of the evolution of species were extraordinarily useful to the imperialistic tendencies of intellectual Germanism ; for, on the one hand, they served to corroborate the idea of the innate superiority of certain races, and, on the other, they justified, to a certain extent scientifically, the elimination of the weak by the strong. Starting, then, from the principle of unequal evolution, it was an easy matter to demonstrate that, of all the human races, it was the Germanic race that had undergone the most perfect evolution, or rather that the latter, being more highly endowed than all the others, considered as a nation—that is to say, from the point of view of its aptitude for expansion as an organised community—had reached a stage of its evolution at which it was incumbent upon

¹ Busch (Moritz), *Bismarck : Some Secret Pages of his History* (Macmillan), p. 218.

² The sermons preached on the Sundays of August 1914 by the present chaplain to the Prussian Court and the Catholic almoner of the Bavarian Court respectively, are strikingly characteristic from this point of view. Extracts from them were published in the Press at the time, and the general ideas expressed in them are to be found in all the German war literature.

all the others to submit to its sovereignty. Already, several generations of investigators had furnished a host of contributions—philosophical, historical, archæological, etc.—in support of this thesis. Henceforth, not only ethnography, but biology also, was pressed into the service; and it was biology, in fact, which supplied those arguments which form the principal weapons of the Pan-Germanists of the present day.¹

The chief originator of this recent evolution of German thought in university circles—or, at any rate, one of those who contributed most to define and extend it—was undoubtedly the illustrious naturalist, Ernst Haeckel.² Prepared by long and minute studies of the lower animals for the study of the successive experiments by which Nature gradually advanced from the cœlentera to Man, it fell to Haeckel to be the first to introduce Darwin's theories into Germany; and his own scientific reputation, his tenacity, his tremendous capacity for work, and the persuasive power of his exposition, were to endow them gradually, in the minds of coming generations, with an importance which was not only theoretical, but also practical, and applicable to every circumstance of individual, social, and even international life. The originality of his system and the principal cause of his

¹ We know what a famous support for their most daring theories the Pan-Germanists discovered in the work of a Frenchman, the Count de Gobineau, who had certainly never anticipated such an honour. His *Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races*, published in 1853–55, had only a moderate success in France, but it had a great success in Germany, where it seems to have exercised a determining influence, notably on the ideas of Nietzsche.

² E. Haeckel was born at Potsdam on February 16, 1834. His principal works are: *Monographie der Radiolarien*, 1862; *Generelle Morphologie der Organismen*, 1866; *Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte*, 1866; *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Siphonophoren*, 1869; *Monographie der Kalkschwämme*, 1872; *Anthropogenie oder Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschen*, 1874; *Das System der Medusen*, 1879; *Die Tiefsee Medusen*, 1881, etc. His principal work of research is his study of the Radiolaria, which he developed considerably between 1862 and 1877; his principal synthetic work is his *Systematische Phylogenie*, 1896. He also wrote accounts of travels, and numerous articles and popular essays.

success in Germany lay in the fact that he lent new force to those principles of the subordination of the individual to the community, and of "organisation," which are so dear to the Prussian intelligence; and it is rather amusing to find that those scholars who were most vehement in their opposition to the first campaigns of Haeckel in favour of Darwinism, were inspired less by reasons belonging to the domain of pure science than by the fact that the interest of the State seemed to them endangered! ¹ On the contrary, no philosophic theory could better serve the Prussian theory of the State than one which tended to regard the individual merely as a cell—autonomous, but not independent—of a superior organism, whether people or State, whose morality consisted not in personal improvement, but in as perfect an adaptation as possible to the ends of the organism as a whole.

Following on the triumphs of 1870, which seemed to infuse into Germanism a new life replete with unity, wealth and glory, this teaching really came as a sort of revelation to the youth of the Prussian universities; it was in the nature of a biological religion, which, under the title of Monism, contributed to exalt Germanic Imperialism by propagating among the masses, well in advance, formulæ which had an air of being scientific, and, on the ground of which, numerous Germans of the present day, even among the comparatively cultured classes, claim to establish incontestable reasons for believing in the superiority of their race. In company with, and, perhaps, with even better right than historians and sociologists like Treitschke, His Excellency Privy Councillor Haeckel may claim to have set his mark on German culture; for it is only in Germany that it excites no astonishment when soldiers like General

¹ For instance, R. Virchow, who perceived in Darwinism a dangerous ally of socialism! Vide: *Natur und Mensch, sechs Abschnitte aus Werken von E. Haeckel, mit einer Einleitung von Carl W. Neumann*. Leipzig (Universal Bibliothek).

von Bernhardi speak of war as a biological phenomenon!¹ If his Monism has not become the official religion, at any rate it has contributed not a little to undermine the ancient religions, and to extinguish in the youth of Germany any lingering charity for their neighbours of alien race. It must be realised, moreover, that, supporting themselves by various arguments, the German scientists were unanimous in pursuing a similar course. For instance, the professor and aulic councillor, W. Ostwald, himself a chemist and philosopher, is neither more evangelical nor less imperialistic than Professor Haeckel. And herein, perhaps, lies the explanation of certain brutalities in the recent evolution of Germanism: the Prussian officers of 1870 were, generally speaking, Christians; those of 1914, with a few exceptions, are Christians no longer.

Even if the rural masses are still Christian and walk by the light of biblical texts, the cultured classes of Germany affect a more and more complete emancipation from traditional beliefs. The wonderful material prosperity sprung from their remarkable spirit of enterprise and organisation has had the effect of distributing very widely among the masses an education which, if not of superior quality, is, at any rate, generously developed in the realistic and practical sense. But it would seem that, in any case, among an increasing number of the youth in the towns, religious practices, though carefully preserved, at any rate for official purposes, are regarded as little more than the wholly external rites of the traditional worship due to the mystical "German God." In their eyes this myth has become, as it were, the symbol of Germanism itself;

¹ See below, p. 55.

² Born at Riga in 1853, his most famous compositions, apart from his chemical works properly speaking, such as *Lehrbuch der Allgemeinen Chemie* (1885-87); *Wissenschaftliche Grundlagen der analytischen Chemie* (1894); *Grundlinien der anorganischen Chemie* (1900), are his *Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie* (1902), expanded under the title of *Grundriss der Naturphilosophie* (1908), etc.

and its divinity merely expresses the "biological" superiority of the race to which they are proud to belong. They preserve the traditional religious ceremonies in the same way that, as students, they preserve the romantic tradition of high boots, velvet doublet, big swords and harmless wounds. In so far as they retain any vestiges of the old German mysticism, they are able to tolerate and even feel affection for these relics; but nothing of the true spirit of Christianity survives in their souls. Science, by furnishing an unlooked-for justification of the most brutal conceptions of the struggle for existence, re-converted them to the old Germanic cult of force, in the sense in which it is most opposed to Christian ideas. It was the fashion among the disciples of Fichte to invoke Thor and Odin for literary purposes, but they still professed allegiance to the Gospel. The pupils of Ostwald and Haeckel disdain, in their coldly realistic intelligence, the romantic fashions of the preceding generation; but they endorse from the bottom of their hearts the merciless doctrine of the extermination of enemies of the Walhalla.¹ And this Walhalla itself, this mystical pantheon, symbolising all the memories and all the aspirations of Germanism, has in its turn served to direct the German imagination towards a progressive and self-imposed emancipation from all foreign influence. Nothing is

¹ It is rather interesting from this point of view to find, in the collections of poems for the use of the youth of Germany, symbolic and very significant applications of the ancient mythology. For instance, the legend of Thor, the god with the hammer, who, by hurling his weapon from the pole to the extremities of the world, takes possession of the universe for his domain. This legend inspires the poet, Felix Dahn, to declare—

" *Wir sind von des Hammergottes Geschlecht
Und wollen sein Weltreich erben !* "

(" We are sprung from the race of the Hammer-god,
And we claim to inherit his empire.")

(*Deutsche Geschichte in Liedern*, vol. i. p. 10. These verses serve as a motto for the book of Otto Richard Tannenberg : *Gross-Deutschland : die Arbeit des 20 Jahrhunderts*. Leipzig, Bruno Volger, 1911, 8vo.)

more curious from this point of view than to compare the various forms in which the artists of Germany have endeavoured to invent a material representation of this mythical abode. When the romantic King Louis of Bavaria, about the year 1830, decided to erect, on some rugged and picturesque spot in his dominions, a monument to all the purely German victories, he was obliged to be content with bestowing the name of Walhalla on a spurious Greek temple, in which the severely classic postures of the marble statues presented the most singular contrast with the German heroes or myths which they were supposed to represent. Anxious, above all, to shake off the detested yoke of Latin classicism, the German artists of the present day like to imagine the Walhalla as a sort of colossal dome, with a base which seems to grow out of the rock on which it stands, with its fabric bare of any carving which might suggest useless graces, and with its mighty summit dominating the distant horizon. Such is the symbolic frontispiece of the *Guide for Young People* (*Jugend-geleitbuch*). And it is rather interesting to compare the barren outlines of this species of grim fortress with the rather similar and no less singular lines of the famous monument erected at Leipzig in 1913 to commemorate the "Battle of the Nations," which was celebrated as the dawn of modern Germanism. In the period between 1830 and 1913 it is undeniable that German architecture emancipated itself from classical traditions to an extraordinary degree, and the Leipzig statues, symbolising the glories of Germany, have certainly nothing in common with the ancient art of Phidias.

But the triumphal monument at Leipzig is not really the veritable Walhalla of practical Germany of the present epoch. At the other extremity of the empire, Bavaria has seen the erection, during the last few years, of a monument which is no less daring, no less patriotic, and which conveys a moral of even more immediate

significance for the youth of Germany. This is the *Deutsches Museum*, at Munich, a sort of colossal museum of arts and crafts, containing all those objects calculated to bring before the imagination of visitors the evolution of the scientific and industrial discoveries from the birth of humanity up to the present day, admirably arranged in a systematic and chronological order. Here, again, German method and science were not enlisted for the purpose of performing a purely disinterested work, for the benefit of the whole of humanity. The lesson derived from a visit to these galleries, which are enriched by collections contributed by all the great German industries, is, above all, a glorification of Germanic activity, in the domain both of pure science and of its most recent practical applications. The discoveries of foreigners are, to be sure, not passed over in complete silence, but they are skilfully and systematically subordinated to the display of their utilisation by German engineers or scholars; whilst genuinely German inventions are portrayed with very special care; so that the general impression which results even from a careful study of this unique establishment is calculated to strengthen in the mind of the young German the sincere conviction that, in every domain, Germany is supreme above her rivals.

It was only natural that, with such a conviction, Germany should seek to emancipate herself henceforth, in every external manifestation of her life, from all those traditions which might be attributed to foreign influence. It is not only in sculptured monuments that the quest of this originality has lent to the work of Germanic artists a character which is truly esoteric in the eyes of Latins. In the construction of private dwellings, as well as in the industrial or official buildings of the last few years, German architects have aimed at suppressing all those features which are part of the traditional teachings of our schools, confining themselves to conveying an external impression of hugeness; and,

in regard to the internal construction, following only the most up-to-date prescriptions of domestic and public hygiene. An extravagant preference for immense proportions, a predominant attention to material well-being, in conformity with the most favourable "biological" conditions of human life, renunciation of all superfluous graces and poverty of decorative imagination—these are the characteristics revealed at the first glance by the numerous edifices in German towns, in which the tendencies of the new "scientific" Imperialism has found expression. The mean little Greek portico, crouching at the feet of the arrogant tower of the *Deutsches Museum*, seems to symbolise this apotheosis of German force, crushing out Latin tradition. The latter could still find a place at the threshold of a museum of historic pretensions; but in the German structures of the present day even this memory has disappeared. If art in general, and architecture in particular afford the truest revelation of the inward mentality of a race, it is certain that nothing could better symbolise the generation moulded by present-day Pan-Germanism than certain factories, railway stations, or houses in the German towns.

Moreover, in their home politics and in their social or economic polemics, all this generation, no matter to what race or party they belong, preserve that spirit of strict discipline and organisation which is the prime token of the influence exerted by Prussia on the evolution of modern Germany. Not only does no genuinely German political party regard in a serious light those general or local evolutions which might endanger the united hierarchy of the Reich; but the very special mental and moral training of the Germans of the present day has engendered in them social conceptions of a characteristic originality. Hence the Prussian glorification of the State is at the basis of all German socialism. In fact, both in the theories of Marx and in the practical policy of his disciples we find at once the strict discipline

and organisation presented by every Prussian community, and the naïve conviction of the superior mission of Germanism, as well for the organisation of the universal proletariat as for every other task.¹ Although he may protest from time to time against certain burdens and certain manifestations of the Prussian military system, the German workman is none the less in sympathy with the leaders of the empire, not only as regards the defence of Germanism, but also as regards the acquisition of new territories for its expansion; and the arguments with which his representatives in the Reichstag support their votes are of the same order as those of the most official exponents of Court Imperialism.²

¹ Regarding the socialistic and even Pan-Germanistic Imperialism of Marx, see *Briefwechsel zwischen F. Engels und K. Marx, 1844-83*. Stuttgart (Dietz), 1913.

² We know that, of all the socialist deputies in the Reichstag, Karl Liebknecht alone refused to vote for the financial proposals of the Government for meeting the expenses of the war. Now, with the exception of a very small number of objectors in south Germany, Herr Liebknecht was emphatically blamed for his attitude by the German working-class organisations. In an article in the *Volksblatt für Anhalt*, the socialist deputy, Haenisch, declared: "It is a matter of vital interest for the German working classes that the war of extermination which English capitalism in particular is waging against the commerce and industry of Germany should fail miserably! For this reason we ought to say: It is our battle that is being fought out there on the Yser Canal, in the trenches of Rheims and on the battlefields of Poland!" And, at an election meeting held at Mannheim for the purpose of replacing the socialist deputy, Ludwig Franck, who had been killed in the war, the candidate, Oscar Geck, also a socialist, was applauded for the assertion that: "In this war the interests of the working classes are identical with those of the nation as a whole. In this desperate struggle, the fate of the German nation will be the fate of her working classes. The good fortune of the one is the good fortune of the other. Whatever the German working classes do for the Fatherland in this horrible war, they do in the first place for themselves." We may recall the ambiguous attitude which the German socialists had always preserved on the question of armaments, at the International socialist conferences of the last few years, in the face of the humanitarian and pacifist declarations of the French delegates. It is particularly striking that, after seven and a half months of a war which will have imposed terrible sufferings on the German people, this moral union of the German social democrats should not have been belied. In March 1915, as in August 1914, Herr Liebknecht was alone in recording his vote against Prussian methods. The few other objectors, such as Herr Ledebour, did not feel justified in doing more than abstain from voting.

Are they not, moreover, imbued with the same essential conceptions, and do not all the German economists and sociologists claim to derive inspiration more or less from the "scientific" principles which the investigator may extract from biology? We find a collection of monographs on social questions adorned with the title *Nature and the State*, with the sub-title, "A Contribution to the Study of Sociology as a Natural Science. . . . Conclusions to be drawn from the Principle of Evolution, from the point of view of the Internal Evolution and Legislation of States!"¹ A political review will bear the title: "Politico-Anthropological Review. A monthly review of practical politics and of political development and education on biological principles," and will declare its purpose to be: "the rational application of the doctrine of natural evolution, from a critical standpoint, to the political, social, economic, physical and intellectual development of the nations, especially of our German nation."² And these biológico-social reflections seem only to have assisted in strengthening the faith of the economists in the principle of organisation, since perhaps the most Americanised among them, Emil Schalk, apparently cherished as his ideal: "an organisation with a general staff, as in the army, composed in part of competent Government officials and in part of the best craftsmen and employees of the nation, supported by the whole authority of the Government, and entrusted with the solution of social questions and with the guidance of

¹ *Natur und Staat, Beiträge zur naturwissenschaftlichen Gesellschaftslehre. Eine Sammlung von Preisschriften herausgegeben*, von Prof. Dr. H. E. Ziegler in Verbindung mit Prof. Dr. Conrad und Prof. Dr. Haeckel.

² *Die Politisch-anthropologische Revue. Monatschrift für praktischer Politik, für politische Bildung und Erziehung auf biologischer Grundlage.* Herausgeber: Dr. O. Schmidt-Gibrichenfels. Ziel und Aufgabe der P.A.R.N. Die folgerichtige Anwendung der kritisch gesichteten natürlichen Entwicklungslehre auf die politische, soziale, wirtschaftliche, leibliche und geistige Entwicklung der Völker, insbesondere unseres deutschen Volkes. Politisch-anthropologischer Verlag in Berlin-Steglitz.

the industry of the empire through the shoals of universal competition.¹

Individualism, in the sense of the defence of the rights of every human being against excessive encroachment and tyranny on the part of the community, is evidently, in the eyes of a German, only a sort of anarchic and criminal madness. It is only as elements of a large and, therefore, formidable community that the weak can claim any rights; that is to say, they can only claim such rights as the community is capable of defending by the strength of its organisation. This "biological" conception of the struggle of the classes is only a pale reflection of the conception of the universal conflicts which the evolution of German Imperialism has been preparing for the last century.

§ 3. GERMANIC IMPERIALISM IS A MYSTICAL CREED OF VIOLENCE

The general conviction of the superiority of the German race, whether it be inculcated in the minds of school children and the nation at large by dogmatic methods of instruction, or reinforced in the mind of the cultivated man by the more or less learned exposition of philosophic, biological or economic considerations, tends logically in both cases to the same result: namely, the belief that no reciprocity can possibly exist in the relations of Germany to other nations. Indeed, if the Germanic race does actually find its purest expression in the German empire, it is only natural that the latter should aim at welding together the still somewhat scattered elements of that race. If Germany has actually a sacred mission to fulfil: namely, to secure the dominion on this earth of the true spirit of Christianity (as Hegel and Fichte asserted, long before the

¹ Emil Schalk, *Der Wettkampf der Völker, unter besonderer Bezugnahme auf Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika*. Jena, 1905 (*Natur und Staat*, Teil VII.), p. 213.

modern apologists), or to bestow on humanity as a whole the material blessings resulting from her faculty of organisation—certainly no good German could do less than spur on his country to the conquest of the world. Finally, if, on the contrary (as is maintained by a few ferocious realists), the position of the German race is that of a colony of microbes, more voracious, more prolific and better armed than their neighbours, but increasingly hampered by lack of space and nourishment, it becomes inevitable that these macrophagi should, by a vigorous effort, the biological reflex to the invading communities, arrogate to themselves the right of devouring their rivals, in virtue merely of the right to exist claimed by every living creature. Whatever its foundation, this notion of the superiority of Germanism inevitably excites in the German the instinct of domination, and the latter, in a nation of such strong military traditions, culminates necessarily in the idea of violence.¹

It is no question of an intellectual domination, such as we find among the Latin races. It is no product either of commercial ambitions (like those which prompted the colonising enterprises of the Roman and British empires), or of a species of mysticism, either religious (like that which inspired the conquest of Arabia), or artistic (like that of the Hellenes). Germanism is not a universal civilisation, a conception capable of adaptation to other races. Its most popular exponents, like Count Gobineau, have demonstrated that it degenerates in proportion to the degree in which its disciples are polluted with alien blood. It is a civilisation the history, extent and propagation of which are

¹ It is worth noting, moreover, that the most cherished myths of German paganism are myths of violence. In addition to Thor (see p. 36), it is a striking fact that the intellectual and artistic world of nineteenth-century Germany have actually brought into fashion again the most brutal of these traditions. Was it not the incestuous murderer, Siegmund, who inspired the most famous passages of Wagner's *Walkyrie*? Certainly, in Oedipus, the Greeks had a hero tainted with a similar crime, but Oedipus was an unconscious victim, and he inflicted punishment on himself for crimes committed in spite of himself.

inseparable from the history, extent and propagation of a particular race. It is purely a racial phenomenon, and its Imperialism, though it employs intellectual formulæ, is at bottom an utterly utilitarian and practical materialism. It must be remembered, moreover, that many of its exponents themselves recognise this fact. Whilst, then, the Imperialism of the Hellenes, the Romans, Arabs, British and French has been in each case a force of assimilation, the Imperialism of the Germans is a force of elimination; and it is this original and dangerous characteristic which differentiates it from the rest of the civilised world of the present day.

When the Romans conquered Gaul, they were so successful in imposing upon a whole nation their own manners, language and ideas that, in less than a century, the antecedent traditions of the conquered nation were entirely effaced. The Gallo-Romans, though Gauls by descent, none the less acquired all the rights enjoyed by the other members of the vast empire. The ideal of the Pan-Germanists is not of this order; its aim is to render the habitation within the German empire of any subject even of mixed blood practically impossible. The German race aims at conquering not nations, but territories, and in these territories she proposes to install herself as sole mistress. Nothing is more instructive in this connection than the picture traced by one of the most candid and impetuous apostles of Pan-Germanism, of the ideal constitution for this regenerated empire. It is the application to immense human communities of notions as bigoted as any that ever tainted the jealous policy of the smallest Hellenic cities. But whilst exclusivism in regard to aliens might for a time be justified in certain circumstances in the case of a small town, it is incompatible with the notion of a world-wide civilisation. Tannenberg writes as follows—

“ We desire to be able in a new empire to commence a new life, the supreme law of which shall be: The chief purpose of greater Germany is the welfare of the




Diagram I.—The Nations of Europe.
(From Tannenbergs Gross Deutschland.)

German race. Every particular law is a corollary of this fundamental law—

“The Reichstag of Greater Germany is elected in accordance with the principle of universal suffrage. The right to vote can be acquired by any married man aged thirty years or more. The right to vote is conferred on all who are admitted to the complete rights of citizenship; and these rights of citizenship can only be acquired by those whose mother tongue is the German language, whose education corresponds with the standard of a State school, who are of pure German blood, and who take the oath of citizenship. The rights of citizenship may be cancelled by a court of justice, as a result of actions or words contrary to the interests of Germanism.

“The countries recently acquired by Germany will only elect deputies to the Reichstag when their complete colonisation shall have been effected. All the official representatives of Greater Germany shall make use of the German language. Interpreters shall be tolerated in case of necessity, but only at the cost of the parties requiring them; and the cost shall be calculated in accordance with the object and the resources of the individual. Half of these payments shall be appropriated to the State fund for German colonisation.

“Books, newspapers, periodicals and pamphlets shall only be published in German. Books from foreign countries shall only be imported by permission of the Government and subject to a stamp duty of 100 per cent. *ad valorem*. The same conditions shall apply to the importation of foreign newspapers. The State is entitled to requisition without payment the first page of the principal edition of every newspaper, for the purpose of laying before the people the views of the Government, free from party colouring. . . .

“In Greater Germany, no house or estate may be acquired by a foreigner . . .” etc.¹

It is difficult to conceive a more rigorous application to internal politics of the principle of inequality and non-reciprocity between the Germanic and the non-Germanic races; and to any one who has followed

¹ *Gross Deutschland*, pp. 82-3.

during the last half-century the increasingly oppressive policy of Prussia towards her Polish, Danish and Alsace-Lorraine subjects, it is only too evident that these notions of Tannenberg are very far from being idle theories. Here, as usual, the Pan-Germanists are only the advance guard; they are the scouts of the movement, and the full significance of their programme can only be appreciated when it is seen in relation to the practical fulfilment of it which is now taking place. This same principle of non-reciprocity, with its tendency to eliminate any foreigner who presents the least shadow of an obstacle to the free expansion of Germanism, will also be the necessary foundation of all Germany's notions with regard to foreign politics; that is to say, with regard to international relations. In fact, from the moment that the German becomes possessed with the idea of an innate superiority—whether historic, providential or biological—imposing on his race the obligation to civilise the world, his conception of the relative rights of nations must undergo a profound modification, the duty of expansion by means of elimination which this mission imposes being scarcely reconcilable with the right to exist of other nations.¹

But in regard to this theoretic and philosophic conflict, which is more singular than dangerous, a series of arguments of a practical nature have furnished the mentality of present-day Germany with a formidable commentary: these are the arguments derived from

¹ This conviction is not confined to such frenzied patriots as Bernhardi. Historians like Rohrbach have set before them as their goal the national ambition of "ensuring for the German idea an important rôle in the stage of evolution upon which the world is entering" (*Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt*, p. 217). He concludes a résumé of the history of humanity in seven chapters, with an anticipation of the high destinies reserved for Germanism; for, he affirms, in the progress of the world's evolution, "the sublimest future will fall to the lot of those nations who, being endowed with physical vitality, the necessary space for outward expansion and a keen moral conscience, shall form the most vigorous social entities, in accordance with the fundamental ideas of the ethico-social German constitution" (*Die Geschichte der Menschheit*, p. 295).




Diagram 11.—The European Races.

the recent and considerable development of the German race, both in regard to rapid increase of population, and also to the equally rapid increase of productivity in the sphere of economics in general. The necessity for Germany to find new markets for her industry, and new sources of raw material, and, finally, to procure territories which should absorb the annual surplus of her population and in which the German national spirit could be preserved and developed—these are the more and more pressing economic considerations which, during the last few years, have occupied the attention not only of politicians and financiers, but also of the mass of the working classes, who have been systematically instructed in them by the Press.

A countless host of pamphlets, articles, ocular demonstrations, maps, graphs, diagrams of every kind, have been showered upon the public during the last twenty years by the Pan-German associations, with the purpose of propagating the fundamental idea that, under the present constitution of the world, the German nation is deprived of its inheritance. Here, once more, we must borrow a few of the most striking diagrams from Tannenberg's book, which is, indeed, a synthesis of all these popular productions; and we may readily understand the effect of a study of these diagrams upon the necessarily rather crude intelligence of the great German public.

The first represents the various states of Europe by rectangular figures, of an area proportionate to the number of their inhabitants. The second figure represents in the same way the principal European races; and, if we look at these very elementary diagrams side by side, we perceive that they furnish a rough demonstration of the fact that the Germanic race represents the most powerful group in Europe.¹

¹ Cf. Diagram II. Observe the ingenuity with which the Slav races are split up again and again, while the Germans are grouped in a single block.

The third and fourth diagrams represent the empires of the various Powers, the one from the point of view of their continental and colonial territories, the other from the point of view of the populations subject to their administration, both in Europe and beyond the seas.

These two diagrams exhibit very clearly the marked disadvantage of Germany; and we can well conceive how the Pan-Germanists boil over with indignation when they study it. The colonial empire of great and powerful Germany, far from being proportionate to the importance of the Germanic group in Europe, is seen, on the contrary, to occupy a place in the world, both as regards the number of its subjects and the area of its domains, not only inferior to that of England and France, but hardly less insignificant than that of Belgium and Holland taken together.

Hence, during the last few years, school debates in Germany have no longer been concerned with the noble tasks imposed upon Germany, but with practical inquiries into the best means of ensuring for the development of the German race and German enterprise that field of action which they declare to be growing more and more indispensable. No matter to what party they belong, German thinkers and writers are all one in their conviction that Germany, in virtue of the natural right to exist of every human entity, possesses also the right to secure to herself, by every possible means, those outlets for expansion which have become a vital necessity. Their only point of disagreement concerns the methods of this necessary expansion. The extremists, the Pan-Germanists, are continually summoning the Imperial Government to attack this great task by force of arms. The moderates endeavour to attain the same end by persuasion or intimidation. But between General von Bernhardi and Herr von Bülow ¹ the difference is more apparent than real; and

¹ It is instructive to reflect upon the conclusion with which that eminent diplomat closes his elegantly and weightily written book on




Diagram III.—The Domains of the European States.

the great body of Germanists are all alike convinced of the necessary task incumbent upon Germany and of the right which this task confers upon her.

It should be remembered, moreover, that this conviction has been fostered in Germany for a long time by the teaching of her philosophers; and this is perhaps the unique feature of the conflict between the traditional notions of International Law, based upon the safeguarding of the weak, and the Germanic ideas of the legitimacy of conquest, as a normal and necessary expression of that force, which alone conveys a right to existence. Western philosophers regard war as a practically unavoidable evil, necessary for the purpose of deciding certain international conflicts, which cannot be settled by any other means; but they deny to this exceptional remedy the right of exterminating a conquered nation; and they endeavour to limit its power of establishing an economic and political subordination of the weaker to the stronger, as well as to reduce to a minimum the devastations inseparable from military operations. German theorists, on the other hand, regard war as the supreme reflex of a nation's vitality, as a noble work, a work beautiful and desirable in itself, in so far as it exalts the victorious nation by destroying rival nationalities, by despoiling them as completely as possible, and finally by wiping them out altogether, so as to obtain for the conquerors the place once occupied by the conquered. Stripped of its array of philosophic and scientific considerations, this form of bellicose Imperialism becomes simply that instinct for rapine and violence latent in every carnivorous animal, and its rights become what the Germans describe as

German politics: "It is not in Wagner, devoutly contemplating the achievements of his fellow men, that Goethe personifies the German nation, but in Faust, the man who, being endowed with an immense confidence in himself, pursues without ceasing his ambitious efforts, and discovers this truth, the supreme conclusion of wisdom: only that man is worthy of liberty and life who is forced to conquer them afresh every day."

Faustrecht, the right of the fist. But what is most remarkable is the kind of quasi-religious cult and fervent mysticism with which they extol this violence as the normal manifestation of that Might which is the origin of Right.

Nothing could be more natural than that poets like Schiller, Rückert, Körner or Arndt, living in a tragic epoch, should have extolled the glories of a national war, and it is not surprising that their historical poems should have survived as classics. But even in these we find some remarkable lines—

“ *Denn der Mensch verkummert im Frieden ;
Müssige Ruh ist der Grab des Muts ;
Das Gesetz ist der Freund der Schwachen,
Alles will es nur eben machen :
Möchte gern die Welt verflachen ;
Aber der Krieg lässt die Kraft erscheinen,
Alles erhebt er zum Ungemeinem
Selbst dem Feigen erzeugt er den Mut. . . .*”¹

Nor is it surprising that a soldier like Clausewitz should have written, in a work on military science, pages which are designed to justify war as a thing in itself. It is surprising, however, to find these opinions echoed in Prussia by such philosophers as Kant, and to find, as early as 1868, in the writings of such a professor as Herr Adolph Lasson, assertions regarding the identity of the concepts of Right and Might which have scarcely been surpassed since. Later, we find men like Ostwald, Nietzsche, Treitschke and Bernhardi, to mention only the chief of them, impregnated with the same spirit and

¹ “ For Man languishes in peace ;
Indolent peace is the grave of courage ;
Law is the friend of the weak,
It aims only to make all things equal :
It would like to reduce all the world to one level ;
But War allows Might to reveal itself,
It raises everything above the commonplace,
It breeds courage even in the coward.”

These verses from Schiller's *Die Braut von Messina* are often quoted by German militarists, notably by Bernhardi at the beginning of his *Germany and the Next War*.




Diagram IV.—The Populations Subject to the European States.

Vereinigtes Staaten
von Nordamerika
90

developing the same principles to a point at which the proposition is no longer expounded in a few striking passages, but pervades the whole of their teachings and writings. In their works we find once more the old conception of the Prussian State as the supreme organism, and, as such, incapable of recognising any principle of right, justice and force outside itself; then the notion of Force in itself, as the supreme manifestation of existence, tending to become identified with existence; finally, a traditional and perhaps atavistic respect for warlike violence so brutal that, in spite of the assembly of arguments, one is tempted to regard it as the reflex of a military race, rather than the deliberate choice of a free intelligence.

Thus, in the eyes of Professor Lasson, conflict is the essence and the rule of international relations. Friendship is only an accident and an exception. Between State and State there is no law. Since a law is only the fruit of a power of unquestioned superiority, a State which should recognise any law proceeding from another State would thereby confess its weakness; and from these curious principles the professor deduces the following no less remarkable conclusions—¹

“Between States, there is only one force of right, the right of the strongest.² It is perfectly reasonable that wars should arise between States.³

“It is impossible that a State should commit a crime. . . . Not all the treaties in the world can alter the fact that the weak is always the prey of the stronger,

¹ *Das Kulturideal und der Krieg*, by Adolf Lasson. The first edition of this remarkable dissertation appeared in 1868, but it is rather significant that a new edition has recently been published in a popular series (*Deutsche Bücherei*, No. 57).

² This is almost the same as Faust's maxim, which formed the conclusion to Herr von Bülow's book (see above, p. 48, Note 1).

“*Nur der verdient die Freiheit und das Leben
Der Täglic sie erkämpfen muss!*”

It also forms the conclusion to the *History of Germany*, by the Pan-Germanist, Einhart.

³ Lasson, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

whenever the latter desires and is able to assert this principle. As soon as we consider States as intelligent entities, lawsuits between them are seen to be capable of solution only by material force. In order to suppress war, it would be necessary to suppress the State—that is to say, to establish a universal despotism and slavery.”¹

“The State which is only organised for peace is not a true State; the State only reveals its whole significance by its preparations for war. . . . Law is the friend of the weak.”²

“War is a fundamental phenomenon in the life of the State, and the preparation for it occupies a place of the first importance in national life.”³

“It is incorrect to say that technical improvements only produce instruments of destruction. . . . The cannon is the most important part of the weaving-loom.”⁴

“When once war has been declared, everything is at stake, for every war is a question of life and death. . . . It would be as weak to show mercy as it would be futile to expect it.”⁵

“It is not only its own possessions which the State has to defend by war, but also those which it has not yet acquired and must conquer by means of war. It is absurd to profess indignation against the very idea of a war of conquest. The only interesting point is the object of the conquest.”⁶

“The national State, representing the highest expression of the culture of its race, can only come into being by means of the destruction of other States, and this destruction can only be effected by means of violence.”⁷

“It is only dread of a foreign Power which can restrict the expansion of the State. Any enterprise which does not hold the promise of success ought to be relinquished; but, if its success is assured, then it is

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 26.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 29. It will be noted that the use of this quotation by Bernhardi is referred to on p. 30.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁴ *Die Kanone ist der wirksamere Teil des Webstuhls*, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 56.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 60.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 66. This principle is also the foundation of the theories of Treitschke and Bernhardi (cf. below, pp. 53–5).

not only justified; it may become an actual duty owed by the State to itself.”¹

“The idea of settling all international problems by means of congresses of princes and diplomatic negotiations is like the beautiful dream of an idealist, or like the treacherous piping of a bird-catcher. We may postpone a great many things; but, when the occasion offers, it is the duty of the State which has the power, and knows itself prepared, to decide questions at issue by the sword. For all the great questions of history, this is the only rational and lasting solution.”²

The editor of the recently published second edition of this pamphlet by Professor Lasson refers to the scandal caused by such theories in 1868 throughout the cultured classes of Germany. The victories of 1870–1, the glory and prosperity of the new empire, and the overweening pride and aggressive confidence which these engendered in succeeding younger generations, seem to have been remarkably effective in winning popularity for the formidable ideas of this fierce pioneer. His most daring propositions have come to be accepted without question; his formulæ have been repeated not only by controversial writers, but also by the most famous German authors of recent days. Thus, in his *Energetic Foundations*, in Chapter X, entitled “The Right and the Penalties,” the famous chemist Ostwald declares: “I cannot recognise any other source of right than Force.”³ And H. von Treitschke, the great educator of modern German thought, enlarges copiously upon the same idea in a number of political lectures and essays, which have become the breviary of modern German statesmen.

“The great strides which civilisation makes against barbarism and unreason are only made actual by the sword. Between civilised nations also war is the form of litigation by which States make their claims valid. The arguments brought forward in these terrible lawsuits of the nations compel as no argument in civil suits

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 82.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 130.

³ W. Ostwald, *Energetic Foundations of Science and Civilisation*.

can ever do. Often as we have tried by theory to convince the small States that Prussia alone can be the leader in Germany, we had to produce the final proof upon the battlefields of Bohemia and the Main.”¹

“It is, then, the normal and reasonable thing for a great nation to embody and develop the essence of the State, which is power, by organising its physical strength in the constitution of the Army. We live in a warlike age; the over-sentimental, philanthropic fashion of judging things has passed into the background, so that we can once more join hands with Clausewitz in calling war the forceful continuation of politics. All the peacemakers in the world will never make the political powers of one mind, and until they are, the sword will be the only arbiter.”²

Nietzsche was, at about this time, giving expression to practically the same ideas through the mouth of his symbolic Zarathustra—

“You ought to seek out your enemy and make your war, a war for your thoughts! And if your thoughts succumb, your loyalty ought none the less to cry victory.”

“You ought to love peace as a means of war, and you ought to love a short peace better than a long.”

“It is not work that I recommend to you, but conflict. It is not peace that I recommend to you, but victory. Let your work be a conflict; let your peace be a victory! . . .”

“You say that a good cause sanctifies war? I say to you that a good war sanctifies everything.”

“War and courage have achieved greater things than love for one’s neighbour. It has not been by your pity, but by your valour, that the victim has been saved hitherto.”

“‘What is truly good?’ you ask. To be brave; that is good. It is only for little girls to say: ‘Good—that is something beautiful and touching.’”

“‘*Thou shalt not kill; thou shalt not steal.*’ These words were once called holy; before them, men bent the knee and bowed the head and stripped the shoes

¹ Treitschke (Heinrich von), *Politics* (Constable), vol. i. pp. 65–6.

² *Ibidem*, vol. ii. p. 395.

from their feet. But I ask you : When have there ever been greater brigands or assassins in the world than these sacred words ? ”

“ Do we not find theft and assassination in life itself ? Oh, my brothers ! I entreat you to break the old tables ! ”

“ Wotan set in his breast a hard heart. These words of the old Scandinavian sage came from a haughty viking. For, when a man is sprung of such a race, he is proud that he is not made for pity. ”

“ If you do not desire to bear a destiny, to be inexorable, how will you be able one day to contend with me ? And, if your hardness cannot dazzle and cut and probe, how should you join me in creating ? ”

“ For creators are hard. And you ought to find true bliss in setting the mark of your hand on the centuries, as though on soft wax, in engraving upon the will of millenaries, as though on steel, harder than steel, nobler than steel. The harder alone is the nobler. ” ¹

“ It is the old saying : ‘ Landgraf werde hart, ’ ² and no invention of Nietzsche’s. But, if the philosophers and chemists of Germany agree with literature and popular tradition in this universal cult of brute force, it is in no sense surprising that General von Bernhardi, in a chapter on “ The Right to Make War, ” should arrive logically at the following formula, which expresses exactly, beyond need of further explanation, the standpoint of all modern Germany in relation to International Law—

“ In such cases, might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. Might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision, since its decisions rest on the very nature of things. ” ³

¹ *Also sprach Zarathustra.*

² This phrase is attributed in the legend to a humble blacksmith, who invented it as a rhythmical accompaniment to his labour of preparing the shoes for his lord’s horse. It expressed the appeal of the populace of mediæval Germany for a strong and respected central authority.

³ Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, Chapter I. p. 23.

It is a terrible formula, and one which, admitting the general conceptions of German Imperialism, with its sense of universal superiority and its tendency to eliminate the weak, contains in itself potentially all those violations of International Law which were to be perpetrated with so much arrogance on the eve and in the course of the Great War by the soldiers and the statesmen of Germany. For, if Might itself can create Right, and if violence is the necessary manifestation of Might, it follows inevitably that sanction will be given to such acts of violence as are elsewhere reputed most criminal. Is not the very object of this violence on the part of Germany not only victory, but also and above all conquest—that is to say, the spoliation and elimination of the weak? And if the interest of the State justifies the spoliation or systematic expulsion of the vanquished, will not the instruments of these collective executions lose their individual respect for the property and life of the weak against whom they are sent? Will not such an almost fanatical faith in the absolute superiority of German civilisation inspire in these masses disdain, if not contempt, for the civilisation of their enemy, and for even the most precious monuments in which it finds expression?

The principles of German Imperialism lead then to contempt for treaties, and to the creation, at no matter what cost, of that state of war necessary for “the national industry of Prussia”; and they explain the systematic confiscations of the public and private property of the vanquished. They lead to the terrorising of the districts traversed or subjugated, with the object of removing every obstacle in the way of the invasion of the German race. If foreign nations condemn these actions as crimes, that makes no difference whatever; by the whole German people they will be regarded only as necessary and justifiable acts of war and conquest. At the most they will discuss certain local excesses, mistaken interpretations of orders, more or less regret-

table, but qualified by important extenuating circumstances. For what the world calls vandalism Germany will always excuse in the name of the superior necessities of a sacred war, the moral beauty and profit of which place it above any duty of consideration for a few old heaps of stones and a few collections of works of art and science, which are not even Germanic. Finally, if, in the course of "some rather harsh police measures," German officers and soldiers have carried the jest to the point of exhibiting a "biological" contempt for civilians, wounded men, and sacred buildings, in which foreigners would be tempted to see a revolting cynicism, to the authorised representatives of German science such incidents will doubtless appear merely the reflexes of a powerful nature, to be classed among those thousand regrettable but insignificant accidents on the march of the deity who, to the sound of wailing, tears off the fetters from the nations.¹

A few characteristic examples will enable us to judge from actual facts how, by the application of these collective principles of German Imperialism, the whole German people, great and small, statesmen and soldiers, both in their political preparations and in the everyday conduct of the present war, have, from the point of view of international jurisdiction, placed themselves deliberately outside the law.

¹ " *Hör ich schon des Gottes Schreiten
Der sie jammervoll zerreisst !* "

Quoted by Bernhardi in *Our Future*.

CHAPTER II

VIOLENCE AS AN ELEMENT IN GERMAN POLITICS

*“ Not hat kein Gebot ! ”*²³

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

§ 1. THE WHOLE GERMAN PEOPLE WANTED THE GREAT WAR, THE DAWN OF GREATER GERMANY

WE have already noted the process of logical evolution by which Germanic Imperialism arrived at substituting the fetichism of its mission to civilise the world for all the most universally respected notions of International Law and of simple humanity. The more and more urgent appeal for an energetic policy which should exact either peaceably or by force—and preferably by force—the acquiescence of Europe in the extension of the frontiers of Germany, was bound some day or another to provoke a conflict, which would end in a European war. When this war did actually break out in 1914, the population of the other nations, whom it had taken by surprise, sought where to lay the responsibility for this immense calamity, and they had no difficulty in assigning the blame to the blustering leaders of the German empire. But it would be as unfair to attribute the whole responsibility for the war of 1914 to the Emperor William, to the Crown Prince, or to any social or political coterie in Prussia, as to cast the responsibility for the repeated violations of International Law by the German troops during this war on a few individuals.

The fact is that the whole German people have been awaiting, for at least two generations, the kind of messianic era in which a world war should afford an

opportunity for repairing the injustices of international treaties, at the discussion of which their representatives had not been able, as they thought, to secure for the Germanic race a sufficient place in the universe.¹ Impregnated with the idea that everything is permissible, if it is done for the sake of the Fatherland; that Might overrules laws, or rather creates new laws; and that the duty of the strong is to employ every possible means for reducing or eliminating the weak, the German people, transformed into a nation in arms, have only converted into action the notions which have been bequeathed to and inculcated in them from infancy. The logic natural to the masses has corroborated the actions of the higher administration to such purpose that, from the commander-in-chief down to the last Landwehrsmann, from the distinguished diplomat down to the most humble school teacher, there reigns in modern Germany, from this point of view, the most remarkable national unanimity. It was inevitable that this implacable Imperialism should incite both the people and their leaders to revolt against the restrictions of International Law, and to transgress them. But it is the whole German nation that we have to blame for these transgressions; for the German nation is responsible for what are the very principles of its civilisation.

There is, of course, a natural tendency in men to synthetise in one individual those great collective questions of which they fail to realise the complexity. But these symbolic individuals are scarcely more than the resultants of multiple forces, among which their personality is as a rule only an insignificant and in some degree accidental factor. So-called men of genius have only had a supplementary and accidental influence on the course of events prepared by the subconscious evolution of the nation. The men of no genius—that is to say, almost the whole body of statesmen—only dominate events in the sense in which a feeble vessel

¹ Tannenbergh, *Gross-Deutschland*, pp. 23 and 88.

dominates the waves, painfully making her way through the midst of them, without aspiring to subdue them. All that Napoleon and Bismarck did was to stimulate, in the confused and turbid world of the European politics of their day, the rapid crystallisation of elements which it already contained in suspension. But these elements existed before and apart from Napoleon and Bismarck, and they would have crystallised without their aid, under conditions possibly less different than one would imagine.

Other equally symbolic figures in history, such as Louis XIV or William the Conqueror, have merely been the results of tendencies outside themselves, and their personal distinction has been their success in acting conformably with the most profound tendencies of the society of their day.

It seems as though we might regard the Emperor William II and his eldest son, the Crown Prince, as equally synthetic from this point of view. The former, with his loud pomposity, his weakness for military parades, his original sentiments upon the most diverse subjects, finally his practical sense and his personal talent for publicity on a large scale, is the sovereign *par excellence* for this nation of wealthy, self-made merchants, as sentimentally loyal to the beautifully refurbished splendours of their old past as they are practically solicitous to awe the whole world by a dazzling display of its triumphs, especially in literature and in military display. The latter, more sportsman than soldier, little acquainted with economic currents and cross-currents, represents, above all for the foreigner, that appetite for territorial acquisition which is instinctive in all agriculturists and landed proprietors, and, in the case of the Prussian nobility, traditionally expressed in brutal warfare. The Crown Prince might be conceived, then (and a legend to this effect has grown up round his name), as an answer to the prayers of that immense party which, under the name of Pan-Germanism, is

continually expounding the general and logical consequences of Germanic Imperialism. Both father and son are merely, as it were, diagrammatic representations of the tendencies of modern Germany, the one more sedate, the other more pushing, but both alike so acclaimed by the crowd that it is perhaps less true to say that Germanic Imperialism is the policy of the Hohenzollerns than that the Hohenzollerns are the expression of German Imperialism.

It would not even be the first time that the Prussian monarchy has been seized upon *nolens volens* as the necessary headpiece for the large ambitions of German nationalism, and obliged to follow the troops which were acclaiming it as their leader.¹

We may recall that, in 1808, the movement of ardent nationalism which aimed at effecting the emancipation of Germany originated not from the Court of Prussia, but from the youth of the universities, and found its most ardent expression in the association of the *Tugendbund*. This association, which was spontaneously founded by patriots, doubtless became the instrument of the Prussian monarchy, even on the occasion when, after having been openly patronised, it had to submit to a dissolution at the demand of the Emperor Napoleon. But the origin of this formidable engine of anti-French hostility, after the fashion of the Germanic universities of the time, was less monarchic than popular, less military than intellectual. We know also how, through the whole course of the nineteenth

¹ At the meeting of the General Council of the Pan-Germanist League at Brunswick, in 1912, the principal orator, Count Moulin-Eckart, of Munich, a doctor and professor at the university, claimed for the league the rôle of the conscience of the German people. He added: "A great deal is talked about the great past of Germany, but few German emperors have understood the soul of the German people. If the German people has become great, it has been, in some sense, in spite of their emperors." And his conclusions, which were much applauded, conveyed the impression that the present and future of Germany corresponded with the past (*Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten*, December 2, 1912).

century, the kings of Prussia endeavoured, more or less skilfully, to utilise the aspirations and resentments of the German people, now gradually attaining self-consciousness, for the purpose of re-establishing, for their own advantage, a unity which the Hapsburgs had not been able to maintain. But for the most part the Hohenzollerns only turned to account movements which were already in progress, and which they frequently quite misunderstood and sometimes even had to repudiate officially. Without entering into the details of these events, let us confine ourselves to recalling that the founders of the Zollverein, which aimed at securing, for the advantage of Prussia and apart from Austria, the economic unity of Germany, were private persons, economists or men of business; and that Bismarck himself, forty years later, would hardly have been able to effect a similar unification in matters of politics and the army if his work had not been sustained, prepared and preceded by another private association, the *Nationalverein*, the influence of which it would be impossible for history to disregard.

These precedents of recent date in the history of the Prussian monarchy afford striking illustration of the determining influence exercised on recent events by the private societies founded in Germany in the course of the last few years. Among these societies, the most important certainly affect an outward character of philanthropy and mutual aid: for instance, the formidable federation of the *Deutsches Kriegerbund*, which, in 1912, comprised 31,316 societies of ex-soldiers and 2,771,418 members, maintaining four orphanages and more than 700 sanitary sections; or, again, the *Deutscher Kriegerverband*, with its 19,000 societies and its 1,600,000 members. We may imagine what excellent soil these enormous masses of veterans and their families presented for the propaganda of the Pan-German League (*All-deutscher Verband*), which, though comprising a smaller membership, was in fact the inspiration of every one

of them. It has been in reality these same elements which have led to the foundation in Germany of the many powerful associations of declared political or nationalist tendencies. Supported by a large, active and powerful Press, they have multiplied their activities of recent years, at the same time evincing a more and more aggressive attitude towards the foreigner. Whilst the *Flottenverein* (Navy League) was carrying on in all the districts of the new empire a persevering propaganda, with the object of creating in public opinion a tendency favourable to the increase of the imperial fleet and to an energetic overseas policy; whilst the *Siedlungsverein* (Colonisation Society) was devoting all its efforts to encouraging German colonisation, a society was founded in Berlin, on January 28, 1912, under the name of the *Deutsche Wehrverein* (German Defence League), with the avowed aim of re-animating the patriotism and the military power of the German empire. In Article 2 of the Statutes of this society, we read—

“The object of the *Deutsche Wehrverein* is the strengthening of the patriotic conscience and the maintenance of a virile spirit in the German people. It proposes more especially to devote its energies to rendering the armed force of Germany both in numbers and in efficiency so strong as to be incontestably adequate to secure the protection of the empire and its power in the world.”

The membership of this society is open to both men and women, upon payment of a minimum contribution of one mark. It is divided into groups and sub-groups, according to states, provinces and localities, and it distributes to all its members an illustrated monthly review of sixteen pages, entitled *Die Wehr*. It is controlled by a committee, comprising twenty-one members, and a general council, comprising the presidents of local committees and a few distinguished persons elected at the triennial meeting. Now, nothing could be more

instructive for any one who wishes to understand the mechanism of German Imperialism than a study of the report of the first year's activity of this formidable association, as given in its *Wehrkalender* for 1914.¹

We cannot but be struck both by the very efficient management of this complex instrument of a propaganda carried on both at home and abroad by means of newspapers, tracts, postcards, etc., and by the amazing results achieved by these means in the space of one year, since at the end of its first year of activity—that is to say, at the beginning of 1913—the *Wehrverein* included more than 78,000 members and 190,000 associates, divided into 440 local committees, themselves grouped into 14 district federations, and, in addition to these, 350 confidential agents acting in localities in which no local committee had yet been founded. What, however, is no less remarkable is the composition of the general council of the association, which, among 62 members, recruited from every profession, numbers not more than 17 officers or ex-officers. And the proportion of soldiers is even more insignificant in the supreme committee, which numbers among its 21 members : 4 teachers, 3 business men, 2 diplomats, 3 civil servants or officials, 1 woman, and only 4 soldiers, among whom certainly is included the president, the famous General Keim.²

¹ *Deutscher Wehrkalender, 1914, Kalender des Deutschen Wehrvereins, mit 15 Vollbildern . . . und zahlreichen sonstigen Illustrationen.* Oldenburg, Berlin (Gerhard Stalling).

² General Keim is a retired Major-General. The other members of the supreme committee are : The Imperial Ambassador, von Pilgrim-Baltazzi, first vice-president; Privy-Councillor Professor Dr. Dietrich Schäfer, second vice-president; Richard Nordhausen, the publicist, secretary; Buexenstein, privy-councillor of commerce, treasurer; Baltz, the editor, vice-treasurer; all residents of Berlin; and also General von Alten (Berlin); Captain (retired) von Boehlendorf-Koelpin (Berlin); Councillor of Administrative Justice Dr. von Haller (Stuttgart); Heckmann, director of mines (Bochum); Professor Freiherr von Lichtenberg (Berlin); Lieut.-General Litzmann (New-Globow); Otto, inspector of education (Posen); Plattel, head master (Hanover); Senator Possehl (Lübeck); Dr. von Schwelin, diplomatic councillor; Major-General Taubert (Berlin); Judge Warnnith (Iauer). *Wehrkalender*, p. 156.

Nothing could illustrate more strikingly the extent to which every class of German society has contributed to this pressure of public opinion for a policy of energetic national action, of conquering Imperialism.

Doubtless the *Wehrverein* furnished a very opportune support to the armaments policy of the Imperial Government; and the latter could not fail to encourage its formation. But the prodigious rate of its development indicates something more than official encouragement. We can only explain it by assuming that the foundation of this association was an expression of the deepest aspirations of the masses of the German people. This was actually the case. Popular discontent murmured more and more at the statesmen of the empire, and even the Emperor was not spared the reproach of having been unable for twenty years to defend the destinies of the empire. Einhart concluded his *History of Germany* by asserting that the country was sick, and he added—

“Our need is for a doctor, an energetic man, who will recognise the necessities and dangers of the time, and direct and utilise the forces of health, so as to overcome those of decrepitude.”

And he prayed for the new Bismarck, who, with the aid of all wise men and true, should fulfil the destinies of Germany. For we must remember, he says, that “the great day of Versailles marks not the end of the political development of the German people, but the beginning, the first step of their march towards the future.” And he sees no hope save in a “*war of liberation*” or a long labour of peace, always remembering that to understand is much, but to will is everything.” And, even more aggressive, Frymann, in a truculent work entitled *Wenn ich der Kaiser wär*, took openly to task William II, the Crown Prince, the chancellors, the ministers, and all the court and the bureaucracy.

“This book,” he says, “has been prompted by a sense of the political decay of our nation, a decay which

may be attributed, in large measure, to the consequences of an undirected evolution, and to the fact that our race is dissatisfied with the manner in which the destinies of the German empire have been guided during the last twenty years. We have come to recognise the deficiencies of our higher administration, and we know that the political parties of the Reichstag are also charged with a heavy weight of responsibility; but, however serious the failings of both these bodies, the prime responsibility for the present and the future rests with him who wears the crown."

And so the criticism continues, with great vigour, sparing no one, and finally concluding with a strong appeal for action, an appeal which found only too ready an echo in the powerful nationalist Press disseminated over the whole of Germany. Was it this persistent campaign which engendered in the Emperor himself that bellicose frame of mind which is exhibited in the diplomatic correspondence reproduced in the French Yellow Book. This is an historical problem which is only interesting in relation to the psychology of the Kaiser.¹ It is sufficient here to declare that the proceedings of the Imperial Government, both as regards the preparation for and the direction of the war of 1914-15, corresponded with the desires and received the acclamation of the whole nation, who had been prepared long in advance to understand their significance and to support them.

§ 2. THE GERMAN EMPIRE WAS UNABLE TO EXTEND ITS OVERSEAS DOMINIONS BY PACIFIC METHODS

It is only just to recognise that the situation of Germany among the nations of the world did not make it easy for her rulers to satisfy her increasing appetite

¹ This problem has been already studied, from the point of view of a German who is anything but an Imperialist or a courtier, in an amazing book which its author could only publish in Switzerland and under the veil of anonymity: "*J'accuse!*" by a German.

for new territory on the map of the world. The youngest of the great states of Europe, the German Empire, a continental and military power, had in the nineteenth century made the same mistake in regard to colonial expansion as France had made a century earlier—that of neglecting too long the acquisition of fruitful overseas territories. Later, when she had become a great maritime power, she had found only a few crumbs (*tarde venientibus ossa*), whilst France, taught by experience, had made up for her European defeats by constructing a colonial empire superior to any that she had formerly possessed. By the labours of successive generations, from 1871–1900, the economic strength of Germany had been built up, and the new empire had become the most up-to-date and the best organised in the world. But the generations which followed could not forgive their statesmen for not having forestalled their need by procuring sufficient outlets for the energy of this enormous machine; nor could they forgive France and, above all, England, for having been more clever or more prudent than themselves.

Therefore, side by side with the so-called historical claims to various regions of Europe, on the ground that they had formerly been dependencies of some ruler of the Holy Roman empire, side by side with ethnographical dissertations on the Germanic origin of such-and-such a nation which still remained independent, there have appeared in Germany during the last fifteen years an increasing number of more or less serious disquisitions on the question of the economic domains, of which at some future date the empire ought to secure either the control or the possession.

Here, as elsewhere, it would appear that Treitschke was among the first to point the way to Pan-Germanism.

“The entire development of European polity tends unmistakably to drive the second-rate Powers into the background, and this raises issues of immeasurable gravity for the German nation, in the world outside

Europe. Up to the present Germany has always had too small a share of the spoils in the partition of non-European territories among the Powers of Europe, and yet our existence as a state of the first rank is vitally affected by the question whether we can become a power beyond the seas. If not, there remains the appalling prospect of England and Russia dividing the world between them, and in such a case it is hard to say whether the Russian knout or the English money-bags would be the worse alternative.”¹

German statesmen attempted to follow this advice; and it was the very imperfect success of their endeavours which was the true and primary cause of the war of 1914. Ill-contented with their African colonies, which were, to be sure, poor, disaffected and unhealthy, and even with their outlying conquest of Kiao-Tchaou, the Germans had long been seeking some region of the world where they might shape for themselves a *dominium* capable of absorbing the surplus of their population and their products. Having met with rebuffs in America, Africa and Asia, as a result of their arrogance, the lack of complaisance and consistency of their diplomats, the political superiority of their rivals, and the concurrence of circumstances, they finally decided to carve out for themselves in Europe what they despaired of finding elsewhere, and, knowing themselves defeated in the diplomatic world, they fell back on their arms, like thwarted suitors venting their spleen in blows.

As a matter of fact, South America, with its vast and thinly populated territories, its immense resources of natural wealth and a climate favourable for Europeans, had long attracted the attention of German economists. Brazil and the Argentine attracted thousands of poor and working-class German emigrants, while Chile attracted a host of engineers and traders. Now the increasing influence exercised by the English over the South African republics, the troubles which followed

¹ Treitschke (Heinrich von), *Politics* (Constable), vol. i. pp. 33-4.

the Jameson Raid, the war which resulted in the conquest of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State by the force of British arms—in short, the control exercised by a great colonising nation over small independent and outlying states, in response to the call for support of her subjects in those territories, had forcibly impressed a number of Germans with the possibility of executing a similar operation in the case of certain South-American republics. This policy found vigorous supporters in the first years of the twentieth century. W. Sievers, a professor at the University of Giessen, did not hesitate to declare—

“ If the German Empire proposes to reconquer the position of a ruling power in the world, a position which at present it is in rapid process of losing, then let its aim be to acquire a decisive influence in the region where such influence is still possible, namely in South America, and this not merely by occupying territory, which would only embitter the population, but by forming there a base of operations, of a financial, politico-commercial, industrial, and even—in case of necessity—military nature, for the states of South America, against the increasing avidity of the United States.”¹

The same project was put forward by Reimer, in his scheme for a “ Pan-Germanic Germany.”

“ It must not be imagined that this afflux of German energy and German capital would be unfavourable to the ends of Germanism. The most far-seeing of the population would not only sanction such a material and moral assistance, but would accept it gratefully, because they would recognise it as a valuable support against their natural enemy—the United States of America, an enemy who will otherwise seize the first opportunity to compel them to submit to her in politico-commercial questions, as well as to yield up not only their territory, but even their nationality.”²

¹ W. Sievers, *Süd-Amerika und die Deutschen Interesse*, 1903, pp. 94–5.

² Reimer (Joseph Ludwig), *Ein Pan-Germanisches Deutschland*, 1905.

We know further that, from this time onward, German emigration organised certain important Germanic centres, notably at Brazil, and, in 1903, Funke put forward the claim of these to political rights, asserting—

“It is absolutely essential, in view of their numbers, that the German population of Rio Grande do Sul should have a political influence, but hitherto the Government has succeeded in evading this obligation by every kind of electoral strategy. At elections, it is exceptional to find a German name on the list of candidates. Yet the numerical importance of the German population absolutely entitles them to this privilege, just as it entitles them to have their views and ambitions represented by their compatriots in the Parliament and the Senate. Rio Grande do Sul ought to be a field for German capital and German immigration; our claim to it is founded both on history and on force. No representative of the State on the other side of the water¹ can withhold it from us as long as we are not misled into cherishing utterly misplaced political ambitions.”²

This theory might naturally be expected to meet with a most cordial reception from the leaders of Pan-Germanism; and it is not surprising to find F. Lange concluding—

“Only a far-sighted policy can attain both the breadth of vision and the resources necessary for directing German emigration, so that the vital interests of the individual may be bound up with the interests of Germanism. Only such a policy, by the unhampered employment of the weapons at its disposal, is capable of concluding treaties with those foreign states who are in actual need of our emigrants and who consequently

¹ The United States of America. It appears that the respect shown by the Germans for the Monroe doctrine was only inspired by the fear of creating difficulties for their very numerous compatriots in the United States.

² Alfred Funke, *Die Besiedlung des Sud-Amerikas. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Deutschtums. Angewandte Geographie*, 1 Serie, 10 Heft, 1903.



Pan-Germanists South America (1)

(1) This map is taken from Tannenberg's *Gross Deutschland*. It represents one of the aspirations of the Pan—Germanists for the world in 1950. As a matter of fact, however, these ambitions date back earlier than 1911, the date of Tannenberg's book. They are to be found in the earliest pamphlets of all the *Alldeutscher Verband*.

will be prepared to accept the conditions which our Government may see fit to impose. Such mouldering states as the Argentine and Brazilian republics, and, indeed, practically all the mendicant republics of South America, could be brought either of their own free will or by the exercise of force to listen to reason.”¹

It was, moreover, to the Imperial Government that the advocates of this policy addressed their appeals, with the object of preventing the extensive German emigration overseas from being a pure loss to Germanism, as had been the case for only too long with the German emigration to the United States of America. What was needed, declared von Liebert, was—

“To exercise a systematic control over German emigration, with a view to deflecting it from the United States to the German colonies, as well as to the southern parts of Brazil and the Argentine. . . . This cannot be achieved without the aid of vigorous measures on the part of the State. In the first place, it is essential to suppress the law of the first of June 1870 concerning loss of German nationality, and to substitute much less stringent conditions. At the present day, the German population in foreign countries is our best, our strongest and our most important colony. It is one of the most fruitful tasks of German politics to extract from this Germanism the greatest profit for the nation.”²

How is it that these political ideals have not been followed up by more direct efforts toward their realisation? This was doubtless to be explained in part by the decrease of German emigration, in part by the desire to avoid a conflict with the United States, which would be even more regrettable from the economic than from the military point of view; but, above all, by the fact that the Russo-Japanese War had in the meantime altered the equilibrium of the world, and had again revealed clearly the serious military difficulties confront-

¹ Friedrich Lange, *Reines Deutschtum*, fourth edition, 1904.

² E. von Liebert, *Ziele der deutschen Kolonial und Auswanderungspolitik*, from *Aldeutsche Blätter*, 1907, No. 21.

ing even the finest army in the conduct of a campaign some thousands of miles from the administrative centre. These reasons no doubt contributed to turn the attention of Imperial politics, and even of the Pan-Germanists, to less distant territories and more immediate achievements. But, a few years later, Tannenberg, describing the ideal configuration of the world towards 1950, still prophesied a division of South America into an English sphere of influence, occupying the whole of the central part, and a Germanised zone, extending over the southern half—Argentina and Chile (that is to say, the region best adapted for European emigrants); for Tannenberg at least proceeded upon the wise principle that overseas it was indispensable to secure the support of Great Britain.¹

Without abandoning the idea of consolidating a colonial empire under the national flag, it would seem as if German statesmen were anxious to strengthen the cohesion of the former subjects of the empire who were now dispersed in foreign countries and constituted in reality the most prosperous of the Germanic “colonies.” The all too numerous German “colonists” scattered over France, Belgium and England have played a rôle to which we shall need to refer later. Up to 1913, however, a certain control could be exercised over the German immigrants by the various states in which they pursued their activities. For it was legitimate to suspect of national preferences those who, in order to remain German subjects, refused to be naturalised as subjects of any other country. The German law of July 22, 1913, reversed all the accepted notions in the matter of nationality, by permitting German subjects to remain citizens of the empire even when

¹ See diagram. Tannenberg affects the most profound contempt for the South Americans, who, he declares, “combine the vanity and indolence of the Latin races with the cunning and cruelty of the Indian.” He insinuates, moreover, that, of the twelve million inhabitants south of the Amazon, eight million are coloured, and that of the remaining four million white, 500,000 are German.

they had gone through the necessary formalities for the apparent adoption of a foreign nationality. Article 25 of this law stipulates as follows: "Any one who, before acquiring a foreign naturalisation, shall have requested and obtained from the proper authority in his native state a written authorisation to preserve his own nationality shall not forfeit his German nationality upon so doing. Before granting this authorisation, it will be necessary to consult the German consul." The Baron von Richthofen declared in this connection, in his address to the Reichstag: "We are glad to note that this plan enables Germans, who for economic purposes are obliged to acquire a foreign nationality, to preserve at the same time the nationality of the empire. . . . In the case of certain countries, the new conditions which this law proposes to introduce are highly desirable. I will confine myself to recalling the fact that in England a merchant is only admitted to the London Stock Exchange provided that he is of British nationality. Moreover, in the states of Latin South America, it is not easy for a German who has not adopted the nationality of the country in which he is residing to compete successfully against those who have acquired this nationality."

This factitious naturalisation has been characterised very justly as "a direct instigation to fraud and perjury." In fact, in the United States, for example, Article 4 of the Federal Law of June 29, 1906, stipulates that the candidate for naturalisation shall declare under oath that he intends, in good faith, to become a citizen of the United States, and that he intends to renounce for ever all allegiance and duty and fidelity towards any prince, potentate, state or sovereign, and, in particular, towards the prince, state or sovereign whose subject he might be at that time. Under these conditions, any German who, before petitioning for American naturalisation, whether in order to secure advantages of an economic nature or the right of

possessing property in certain states of the Union, should have taken advantage of the facility accorded under Article 26, par. 2, of the German law, would be guilty of perjury, and the consul would in reality be an accomplice. But it is to be noted that here, again, the Imperial Government has only realised one of the most ardent aspirations of the Pan-Germanists.

We know, moreover, how the abandonment (possibly only a temporary abandonment) of German designs on South America was immediately compensated by the sudden discovery of very special German interests in Morocco. This country, the natural riches of which had lain unexploited for centuries, as a result of the chronic anarchy by which it was devastated, was necessarily a subject of interest to Spain, of which country its northern part forms, as it were, a natural prolongation, and also to England, since it might threaten the traditional English policy in relation to the Straits. Yet neither of these Powers possessed interests in Morocco comparable with those of France, since a hostile Morocco might constitute a serious danger to Algeria, already sufficiently inconvenienced by Moroccan anarchy. In fact, France, Spain and England monopolised almost the whole of Moroccan commerce, and Germany had never attached any serious importance to the isolated enterprises of a few of her subjects in this region. The campaign of intimidation which, from 1905 to 1911, the German Imperial Government saw fit to carry on against France, in order to compel her to pay as dearly as possible for the advantages which she derived inevitably from geographical and historical circumstances, originated solely from the jealousy of an aggressive Imperialism, the material power of which was regarded as a reason in itself. We may recall how, after having feigned for some time to acquiesce in the African policy of France, and having pursued the legitimate advantages to be gained from an economic co-operation with her, Germany suddenly changed her tone, and sent to Fez,

in the winter of 1904-1905, the blustering embassy of Herr von Tattenbach, soon followed by the still more sensational visit of Emperor William II to Tangier. We know the extreme forbearance shown by France, and the subsequent diplomatic rebuff suffered by Germany at the Conference of Algeciras, a conference held at Germany's own request; we may remember the increasing anarchy of Morocco, where the most fanatical elements, encouraged by the hope of a Franco-German conflict, resisted in every way the attempts at organisation counselled by France; the generous facilities which were enjoyed, thanks to these measures, by German firms, who for the first time were able to carry out such important undertakings as those at the Port of Larash; finally, the troubles of 1907, which, after the massacre of French workmen at the Port of Casablanca, resulted in the tardy intervention of the French army.

In 1908 occurred the well-known incident which ought to have opened the eyes of the whole world to the significance of Germany's policy in Morocco, and which almost brought about the Great War. An agency for desertion having been discovered at Casablanca, in the act of paying some soldiers of the Foreign Legion in the service of France, the Imperial Government did not scruple to intervene in the most threatening manner on behalf of its least worthy subjects, and, once again, the Conference at the Hague had to minister to this Imperial arrogance a rebuke which, for all the courtesy of its diplomatic phrasing, was none the less a very real mortification to German public opinion. Perhaps we may even trace back to this incident the increasingly bitter resentment which the patriotic associations of Germany began from that time to exhibit towards those responsible for her foreign policy. None the less, Franco-German relations became less strained; and more friendly conversations made it possible to discuss an economic collaboration between the manufacturers and financiers of France and Germany

for the development of districts politically subject to France. An agreement upon these lines was signed in 1909 in regard to Morocco; and further agreements were outlined in regard to Algeria and the Congo. Although delays were caused by a few difficulties in points of detail, there was nothing which could justify German indignation when, suddenly, as if once again to intimidate French opinion, the Imperial Government, on July 1, 1911, thought fit to dispatch, to the Moroccan port of Agadir, a cruiser bearing the symbolic and now famous name of *Panther*. This summary proceeding, as brutal as it was untimely, at the very moment when the two governments were arranging a settlement of their reciprocal grievances, had the double effect of stirring up French public opinion and of making plain to foreign powers the undisguised and unjustified rapacity of Germany. Compelled by the energetic attitude of England and of France herself to reflect on the consequences of her act of provocation, the Imperial Government had to be content with an agreement which, although it secured for Germany important economic and territorial advantages in the French Congo, was none the less far from realising the vast ambitions which had been kindled in the German public by the first act of defiance, and further encouraged by the Pan-Germanist Press. Although, practically considered, the Franco-German agreement of November 4, 1911, constituted an advantage for German colonisation purchased on very favourable terms, from the point of view of the Pan-Germanists it was a rebuff; and such was the frenzied Imperialism of the German public, that, even among the common people, the positive advantages were gradually forgotten, leaving only the memory of the check to their ambitions.¹

¹ In the appendix to the sixth edition of his work, *Germany and the Next War*, which appeared in February 1913, General von Bernhardi declares that the Franco-German agreement in regard to Morocco, "by its consequences even more than by its concrete clauses, constituted a serious injury to Germany, which still prejudices her situa-

This rebuff soon became all the more perceptible, because Germany was to encounter in other regions new and serious obstacles which she had not foreseen. Whilst, prior to 1870, France had exercised the predominant secular influence in the eastern Mediterranean, Germany had, since that date, formed friendships and interests in Turkey upon which she based great hopes. The Turkish army had been reorganised by Prussian military missions; Asiatic Turkey in particular was over-run by innumerable commercial agents; and plans were laid for a more and more extensive participation by Germany in the great public enterprises of the country. We may recall the long negotiations which ended in an undoubted success for Germany, diplomatic as well as economic, by which she secured the construction and control of the Bagdad Railway. This, from the point of view of the Pan-Germanists, was, as it were, a corner-stone for a whole wing of the majestic edifice which Greater Germany was one day to build up, and Tannenberg foresaw the day when judiciously framed agreements would secure for the empire the trade of the whole Orient, of Asia Minor, Syria, and Mesopotamia.

"These regions might become for us what Egypt is for England—that is to say, not only an important market for the products of our national industry, but also a base of operations and an outlet for German expansion in the direction of eastern Asia and Africa."¹

The Turkish revolution of 1908, which resulted in the downfall of the political party which had been laboriously won over to these convictions, was a momen-

tion."² He reproaches the Imperial Government with having sacrificed too much to the desire to keep the peace at any price, and he even criticises the economic basis of the agreement, which he declares, moreover, to involve serious consequences for the future of Mediterranean politics. The daily Press, naturally even more violent, did not scruple to call this agreement "The Morocco box-on-the-ear"³ (*Die Marokkanische Ohrfeige*).

¹ *Gross-Deutschland*, p. 87.

tary set-back, but the remarkable skill of Baron Marshal von Biberstein, German ambassador at Constantinople, successfully repaired the misfortune, and created new Ottoman sympathies for German politics. The paradoxical conflict which soon flung at each other's throats Italy—Germany's ally, and Turkey—Germany's friend, and ended in the defeat and spoliation of the latter, afforded a still more delicate test of German diplomacy at Constantinople; but she showed an equal skill in meeting it. So much so that Germanism was forming the most radiant anticipations in connection with the fertile plains of Anatolia and Mesopotamia, when there burst upon the world, like a clap of thunder from a blue sky, the first Balkan war.

The renaissance of the Balkan nationalities, the increase of material and moral power which they gained by their victories over the Turkish army (which had been tutored by the German army),¹ their entirely unprecedented union, which led to a military and economic combination in this part of Europe capable of resisting any Power so long as it lasted—these were the results foreshadowed by the first events of this war. Whilst the Turkish revolution had made it possible for Austro-Hungary coolly to annex the Servian provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thereby pursuing a stage further the policy of pressing back the Slavs and her gradual progress towards the Mediterranean, as a result of this twofold tendency, Germanism in general and Austria in particular became the natural enemies of the new Balkan Confederation, which had been exasperated by Austria's proceedings; and it became evident that it would be here that Greater Germany would meet with the most formidable barrier in her march towards the Orient. When the Machiavellism of Austrian policy incited Bulgaria to embark on the second Balkan war, it seemed for a moment as if this

¹ Bernhardt does not fail to emphasise the bitterness of this fact for German *amour propre* (*Unsere Zukunft*, pp. 150–1).

formidable chain might be broken, but the entry of Roumania into the alliance which this war provoked counterbalanced Austria's doubtful advantage; and the second Balkan war finally resulted in an unquestionable check to German policy in the East. The victory for slavism and the rise of a new military power guarding the route to Constantinople were two facts which lent a fresh significance to the petty diplomatic rebuffs which had been so bitterly resented by German *amour propre* in the affair of Morocco; for everything combined to prove to Germany that she was being more and more completely encircled, and that neither the threats of her Press nor the brutalities of her diplomacy would avail any longer to open up for her fresh outlets into a world which was beginning to be alarmed at her overt pretensions. Experienced observers were quick in seizing the situation; and it is from the time of the Balkan wars that we begin to hear those thundering appeals to arms which Pan-Germanists, and even simple patriots, combined henceforth to address without ceasing to the German nation. It was a question, said Bernhardi, of choosing "between world power or downfall,"¹ or, according to Frobenius, of listening for the stroke of "the fatal hour for the German Empire";² and the Government, having been violently censured for not foreseeing and preventing these things, yielded to the aspirations of the German people, inflamed by their favourite publicists, by proposing to the Reichstag a considerable increase of the military strength of the empire.

We know that, from this date, the majority of the apologists of Germany did not scruple to affirm that her new armaments were necessitated by a previous augmentation of the French and Russian armies, and that

¹ "Weltmacht oder Niedergang" is the title of a chapter in his two books, *Deutschland und der nächste Krieg* and *Unsere Zukunft*.

² *Des Deutschen Reichs Schicksalsstunde*, by H. Frobenius, Oberst-Leutnant, A.D. Berlin, Carl Curtius, 1913.

the enemies of Germany, by a direct menace, had compelled her to take adequate measures of defence. These arguments make their appearance not only in the pamphlets destined for international propaganda, but also in articles in the German Press, in which, from that time, they were repeated *ad nauseam*. An examination of the dates, however, will suffice to dispose of these claims, and to establish the fact that Germany's new armaments did not follow but preceded the extreme measures taken by France, and the reorganisation effected by Russia.¹ Moreover, the *enfants terribles* of Pan-Germanism did not hesitate to affirm, even before the military laws were finally voted, that Germany was on the brink of a war, in which it would be her task not to defend her existing territories, but to force a passage by violence towards the goal of her destiny. The opportunities which German Imperialism had missed for extra-European expansion were to be made good by energetic action in Europe itself, with a view to concentrating, under the ægis of the German empire, the still scattered elements of Germanism, shattering the forces of any Powers which should oppose this concentration, and at the same time constructing, at their expense, a colonial empire for exploitation and colonisation.

Doubtless there were, even in Germany, a few enlightened spirits who tried to warn the people against Pan-Germanic exaltation and the madness of world-conquests, and, above all, to dissipate the clouds of misunderstanding and ignorance which obscured Franco-German relations and threatened such terrible consequences. In addition to the publications of the *Verband für Internationalen Verständniss* (League for International Understanding) to which we have already referred, a few writers of talent endeavoured to convince

¹ The German periodicals of 1912-13, which are still easily obtainable, afford sufficient evidence in this connection. Cf. below, pp. 81-2.

their compatriots that the French are not necessarily more vicious and perverted than other nations, some—for instance, Herr Osk. A. H. Schmitz¹—developing the theme with some wit. At the most acute period of the crisis of 1913, when the German nationalist Press had seized upon certain rumoured incidents at Lunéville and Nancy as a pretext for embarking on a campaign, a few wise men appealed for calm; and one of them, Herr H. von Gerlach, in an article in *Die Welt am Montag*, entitled “Madness on both sides,” declared plainly—

“If we use our reason, we cannot but perceive that the defeats of 1870–1 and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine were an injury to the French nation, and that they were bound to feel the bitterness of it for a long time. Only time and a wise policy on the part of Germany could bring about the healing of this sore.

“By degrees the situation improved. There was a time—after the incident of Fashoda—when the French were more hostile to the English than to the Germans. To be sure, the fact that we always celebrated as a national fête day and with much pomp and parade the anniversary of the bitterest defeat of the French—that of Sedan, and that, in our “pacific” orations, we always like to speak of France as our “hereditary enemy,” was calculated to keep the wound open, a process which was further assisted by the incredible blunders of the police in Alsace-Lorraine! But, on the whole, notwithstanding these facts, feeling had calmed down.

“The unfortunate treatment of the Morocco affair by our diplomats revived the whole question. . . . The descent of the *Panther* on Agadir threw the whole responsibility on the Crown. The French thought that Germany wanted to provoke a war, and, as there was no real occasion for sending a vessel to a port where no German interests were involved, it is not surprising that the French should have formed this opinion, even

¹ *Das Land der Wirklichkeit, französische Gesellschaftsprobleme.* Munich (G. Müller), first edition, 1907, second edition, 1913, third edition, 1914.

if it was erroneous. Ever since Agadir, the French have credited us with the worst intentions. . . .

"Now, on top of this, came the enormous German military programme. France for some years had been unable to keep pace with the German armaments. She simply had not the men to do it. Suddenly, without any sufficient reason, the German army saw fit to increase its numbers by another 130,000 men. The French Government, seriously alarmed, endeavoured to counter this thrust from Germany by resorting to the desperate expedient of prolonging the term of military service from two to three years. France was summoned to make the immense sacrifice of withdrawing her sons from civil life for a year longer than previously; and this merely because Germany, without any excuse of urgent necessity, set the bad example of an increase of armaments. Can we be astonished if public opinion in France has become more and more embittered against us?"¹

And the author remarks, not without bitterness, that, far from encouraging the conciliatory efforts of those French parliamentarians who, like Monsieur Jaurès and Compère-Morel, fight against armaments by every means in their power, the German Government prohibit them from making a public appearance in Germany, or even go so far as to threaten them with expulsion. An interesting testimony, which, like so many others, proves the moral support given by German official circles to the most uncompromising and aggressive nationalists.² Now these latter seem to have been seized—especially between 1912 and 1914—with a

¹ H. von Gerlach, *Unvernunft hüben und drüben*, in *Die Welt am Montag* of April 21, 1913.

² Professor Nippold remarks, with justice, that there exists an aggressive chauvinism in France no less than in Germany, but of French chauvinism, however clamorous it may be from time to time, it may be said that its bark is worse than its bite, and that it is neither dangerous nor widespread. Moreover, its chief service is as a platform for opposition parties; while German nationalism, on the contrary, is supported by the conservatives—the Government party, and is powerfully organised, widespread and dangerous.—*Der Deutsche Chauvinismus*, pp. vi, vii *et passim*.

frenzy, the violence of which was particularly dangerous because, by their immense associations and their noisy Press, they had become a power in the nation and the State with which any Government would have to reckon, and independently of which it would scarcely have been possible for a government to accomplish any lasting work. This collective mania for sanguinary conquest which possessed the whole German people, incited by the Pan-Germanists, forced the government to make systematic preparations for the Great War at a moment when Europe was in a state of peace, and Germany was on the point of obtaining, without drawing the sword, the ostensible object of her desires.

At the very moment, in fact, when the new armaments, for which there was no precedent in Europe, were in preparation, the so-called oppressors of Germanism had, as a matter of fact, displayed a readiness to yield peaceably an exceedingly handsome contribution towards the realisation of Germany's dreams of territorial expansion. Impressed with the difficulties in which Germany was involved as a result of the Balkan wars, and foreseeing the possibility of serious misunderstandings and disputes in the future as a consequence of ill-defined interests in Turkey, the French Government, in November 1912, opened a conversation with Germany relative to the legitimate aspirations of the two Powers in the Levant. This was just after the settlement of the Morocco affair, and the Balkan war was still in progress. Aggrieved at the hostile reception accorded by German opinion to the Franco-German agreement of November 4, 1911, rather nervous, moreover, of the course which events were taking beyond the Danube, the Imperial Chancellerie gave only a very chilly reception to the proposal for a fresh exchange of views between France and Germany, from which the latter seemed to fear a new loss of prestige, and to fear it even more within the German frontiers than beyond them. But the French proposals were serious, and they were

persisted in; for the Government of the Republic was anxious, by a frank explanation, to remove any possible cause for Franco-German disputes for some time to come. So the conversation took place, first between two Powers, then three, then four, then five; for England and Italy could not be unconcerned in the discussion, and it was necessary that Russia should be kept informed of what was taking place. And the conversation was serious, for the questions merited investigation; and it was lengthy, the negotiations continuing all through the year 1913. In fact, it was not until February 15, 1914, that the agreement was signed at Berlin, defining the zones of economic influence in the Asiatic territories of the Ottoman empire, which the Powers in question pledged themselves severally to respect henceforth. These zones were defined with the utmost possible precision, so as to reduce to a minimum the possibility of any divergencies of interpretation, and, as a result, Germany, by the signature of France, England and Russia, found herself in possession of an immense field for economic activity, which would have secured for her, from Anatolia to the Basin of the Euphrates, the territory which she required for demographic and industrial development.

But this was by no means the goal of German policy.¹ Engendered of violence, raised to an empire by violence, the Prussian State cannot conceive a success attained by other means than violence. The agreement of February 15, 1914, of which any other Government might have boasted as of a victory, passed almost unnoticed in Germany, as it did in the rest of the world. France and England, for their part, had no gains to celebrate; they were merely satisfied with having eliminated, by prudent concessions, the possible cause

¹ *Behandlungen ohne Waffen sind wie Noten ohne Instrumente* (Negotiations without weapons are like notes without instruments) is a phrase which Bernhardi quotes from Frederick the Great; and he dilates upon it with much vehemence in his *Germany and the Next War*.

of a European war. Germanism alone had won still further gains, which might have been peacefully turned to account for the benefit of the German idea as well as the German people.¹ But the leaders of German thought had been too much infected by Prussia with the cult of war to be able to discourse to the people on the victories of peace with any conviction or sincerity; a perfervid Germanism had, for months and years, been becoming more and more identified with Pan-Germanism; and it was not in America nor Morocco nor the Levant that German Right—that is to say, German Might—was to be celebrated in 1914. Hence, we may seek in vain for any trace of this recent and substantial success for German diplomacy and German politics in the official reports, or in the more or less official publications by means of which, since the outbreak of the war of 1914, the German Government and the German people have tried to throw the responsibility for the catastrophe on others. The official reports affect to reduce the world-crisis to an immediate consequence of the assassination of the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, as a result of a Pan-Serb conspiracy.² But this confusion of cause and effect is considered ridiculous by the greater number of the genuine apologists of Germanism, who declare that the predominant factor in the question of the causes of the war was the respective positions of the other great Powers and of Germany.³ The more or less official publications to which we have referred, that is to say, the mass of enlightened opinion in Germany, appear to be genuinely ignorant of the large concessions made spontaneously to Germanic ambitions by the

¹ In his book, *Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* (Königstein, Leipzig, 1912, 75th thousand, pp. 217 *et seq.*), Paul Rohrbach deplores in particular the slight influence of German culture in Turkey.

² Cf. the memorandum laid before the German Imperial Diet on August 3, 1914, with which the German White Book opens.

³ Albert Osterrieth, *Die Ursachen und Ziele des europäischen Krieges* (The Causes and Aims of the European War). Berlin (Puttkammer), 1914.

prudent equity of the Great Powers, stimulated by a generous initiative on the part of France.¹ The violence of the conflict which has been unchained hardly permits the nations involved in it to think of anything else than of defending their existence; but possibly, when the clash of arms has subsided, Germany herself will demand from her leaders an explanation of the singular motive which induced them, for the more effective kindling of the war, to conceal the very valuable gain which they had been able to achieve as a result of peace

§ 3. THE CONQUEST OF THE SMALL EUROPEAN STATES POSSESSING COLONIAL TERRITORIES IS THE REAL OBJECTIVE OF GERMANY IN THE EUROPEAN WAR

“The object of a war is to be sought not in the phrases with which it is opened, but in the paragraphs with which it is closed,” remarks Naumann, the sociologist, in a famous anthology from his works which was published and sold in very large numbers in 1913.² And this curious and profound remark induces us to seek the true reasons for the war of 1914, not in the diplomatic correspondence, but in the general manifestations of German thought during the last few years.

For if war, and a war of conquest, had been always regarded by Germany as a sacred national right; if the expansion of Germanism appeared to her in the light of a higher destiny, as well as an economic necessity; finally, if the present state of the world made any such expansion outside Europe difficult in the future, except

¹ See in particular the extraordinary statement at the beginning of Fr. Koehler's pamphlet, *Der Neue Dreibund*. Munich (Lehmann), 1915, pp. 7-15. It is true that, in order to establish on a basis of mutual confidence a Germano-Austro-Turkish “triple alliance,” it might have been a little awkward to have to reveal a previous project for the economic dismemberment of Turkey. The same errors or omissions are to be found in a number of other works. Cf. Steffen, *Weltkrieg und Imperialismus*. Jena (Diederich), 1915, pp. 62-3, etc.

² Friedrich Naumann, *Das Blaue Buch von Vaterland und Freiheit. Auszüge aus seinen Werken*. Königsstein, Leipzig (Langewiese), 1913, 50th thousand, p. 264.

by conflicts in which the German army would not reap the full advantage of its strength; it was logically to be expected that, in order to accomplish what she regarded as a right and a duty, Germany should let loose on Europe this general war, since it appeared the sole means of deciding at one stroke all the questions at issue. It was equally logical that the war—the supreme conflict between Germanism and its rivals—should have for its double object the final subordination of the small Slav nationalities and the forcible inclusion in the empire of all those ethnical territories which, according to the theorists, composed the German group of central Europe; and it was inevitable that she should have as her opponents those great Powers whose natural destiny necessarily rendered them antagonistic to this double achievement. Moreover, for more than twenty years, with a systematic perseverance which it is impossible not to admire, the Pan-Germanists had not ceased to instruct and excite German public opinion concerning the “unacknowledged rights” and the “necessary tasks” of Germanism in the world; and also the inevitability of a universal war, for the purpose of realising the national ideal of every German worthy of the name.

If any one still had any doubts of the success of these untiring efforts, these doubts might be removed by a consideration of the present state of opinion of the German people themselves, not, perhaps, that opinion as it is propagated abroad, but the opinion of Germans in Germany,¹ and the success achieved, on the eve and

¹ It would be possible in this connection to quote extracts from the whole German Press, especially during August 1914. The most characteristic would be from the *Zukunft*, the weekly organ of the famous publicist, Maximilian Harden. The independence of judgment to which this periodical owes its immense success has nothing in common with the paradoxes of, say, a Bernard Shaw. While the English public is entertained by finding in the productions of Shaw the reverse of its own opinion, the German public enjoys reading, in the *Zukunft*, opinions which in many cases it would not dare to express aloud, but which it inwardly cherishes. Harden as a rule expresses

since the outbreak of the war by those very books which propound the national necessity of this "sacred task." For instance, Bernhardt's famous pamphlet, *Unsere Zukunft*, is advertised for sale at the present moment (spring, 1915) as: "The key for the understanding of the present war"?¹ It would, in fact, be difficult to find a more exact prophecy of the international conditions of the Great War, and a more brutally frank exposure of the principles of German military Imperialism than is furnished by this propagandist pamphlet, published immediately after the Balkan War, by this fire-eating Prussian General.

"Our future is in our hands," he concluded. . . . "We ought all to draw ourselves up in line of battle. All true Germans ought to-day, with one heart and with one joyous spirit of sacrifice, to group themselves round the Emperor, ready at any moment to risk their property and their lives for the honour, the greatness and the future of the German nation and her progress to victory."²

There exists a whole literature animated by the same bellicose spirit; and it seems to indicate a systematic attempt to stimulate in the masses and the youth of the nation a sense of the solidarity of Germanism, as understood by the Pan-German theorists. In the *Guide for Young People*,³ a collection of extracts from

with a savage candour, which is very individual but also very Prussian, opinions which are already widespread, only presenting them in a rather brutal form.

¹ *Der Schlüssel zum Verständnis des gegenwertigen Krieges.*

² *Unsere Zukunft*, p. 154.

³ *Das Jugendgeleitbuch. Gedenke dass du ein Deutscher bist.* Edited by Thomas Westerich. Leipzig, Dieterich, 1914, 415 pp., bound in cloth, with an illustrated cover representing the Walhalla, a sort of mythical structure in the shape of a sugar-loaf, crowning a mountainous landscape, symbolising the ideal of Germanism dominating the world. The advertisement describing the work as: *Das Hohelied germanischer Kulturkraft. Eine würdige Einsegnungsgabe für Jünglinge und Jüngfrauen. Ein Leitfaden für Offiziere, Lehrer und Volkserzieher, unentbehrlich für jeden Wandervogel* (i. e. "The song of songs of German culture, a suitable confirmation gift for young men and girls, a guide for officers, professors and teachers, indispensable for all travellers") is no less characteristic.

various authors published on the eve of the war, amidst some amazing dissertations on the history and the wonders of Germanic civilisation, we come across statements like the following, by Professor Dr. Wolf, on the "task of Germans residing in foreign countries"—

"By some defect of intelligence, our contemporaries have become more and more prone to regard "Germany" and the "German Empire" as equivalent terms. This is an error which calls for an emphatic protest. The name "Germany" still continues to describe the great territory of central Europe where the Germans reside in compact masses; but only two-thirds of these Germans belong to the new German Empire, founded in 1871; Austria, Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg and Switzerland lie outside it. It is our duty to foster energetically a sense of community of spirit, nationality and culture between ourselves and these German compatriots belonging to other states." ¹

And, in an account of Bismarck's policy, Captain Edward Preuss concluded—

"The development of Germanism has suffered a fresh injury by the strengthening of the Slav populations of the Balkan States. Here again we see the completion of the work of Bismarck, who had foreseen that in these states there was preparing a fierce attack against Germanic Central Europe. *It is becoming more and more clear every day that it is high time to support the Germans of Austria against the advance of the Slavs.* They are waging a fierce conflict in Bohemia and Transylvania. If they succumb, a rampart will have fallen. Hence the keen interest of our Press in these events; hence the need *to whet our German conscience*, and not to remain indifferent to what is happening on that side. It is a question of *the outposts of Germanism*; it is a question of accomplishing what Bismarck had in view when he guided the policy of Austria in relation to the East and the Balkans." ²

¹ *Jugendgeleitbuch*, p. 219.

² The passages in italics are in italics in the German text—*Jugendgeleitbuch*, p. 254.

Such notions might be expected to awaken an echo in the patriotic circles of Austria; and the latter, in fact, showed themselves no less aggressive and no less presumptuous in their dreams for the future. Their ideal, to be sure, differed perceptibly from that of the Pan-Germanists. Whilst the latter had for the last half-century devoted to the service of the German race alone all the inflexible arrogance of the old cult of the Prussian State, the Austrians, by mere force of circumstances, had got no further than the antiquated formulæ of Hegel and Lasson, according to which the State is independent of any plurality of language, religion or race, and ought not to be inconvenienced thereby.¹ The Pan-Germanists resigned themselves to an eventual defeat or a dissolution of the Dual Monarchy, because it appeared to them to offer an opportunity for Germany to unite under one sceptre all the Germanic brotherhood, and to consolidate in central Europe one sole, homogeneous and formidable empire, of which the little Slav States must inevitably become the economic and military clients. But, apart from a few fanatical adherents of the "*Los von Rom*"² movement, and a few groups of Hungarians, seduced by vague prospects of independence, Austria remained faithful to her ancient territorial ambitions and to her traditional policy of hegemony over various nations, who owed their subjection to their own mutual rivalries. Her patriots, therefore, had conceived vast ambitions stretching even beyond the Balkans. The rapacity of the double eagle was not less than that of the Hohenzollerns, and it is not without interest to find the proof of it in popular pamphlets which, in point of violence, yield nothing to Pan-

¹ V. Lasson, *Das Kulturideal und der Krieg*, pp. 21-3, § 5, *Staat und Volk*.

² This motto, as we know, signifies, "Away from Rome!" It is the motto of an extremist party, at once Germanist and Lutheran, who represent an offshoot in the Dual empire of the German Pan-Germanists. Although the Pan-Germanists have no officially sectarian programme, their leading spirits none the less belong to the most militant circles of Prussian Lutheranism.



Austro-Hungarian Ambitions.

Germanism proper.¹ But the Germans not only had in view in regard to Austria the eventuality of a military collaboration in the indispensable task of crushing Slavism; they were prepared also to accomplish by force the annexation of the Dutch, the Belgians and the Swiss, and their admission into that economic, political and intellectual union which should be the crown of their contentment. For those theorists who enjoyed the greatest vogue in Germany had long refused to admit that the small independent states had any right to exist under modern conditions. Did not Treitschke declare—

“Any political community not in a position to assert its native strength as against any given group of neighbours will always be on the verge of losing its characteristics as a State. This has always been the case. Great changes in the art of war have destroyed numberless states. It is because an army of 20,000 men can only be reckoned to-day as a weak army corps that the small states of central Europe cannot maintain themselves in the long run.”²

“On close examination, then, it becomes clear that, if the State is power, only that State which has power realises its own idea, and this accounts for the undeniably ridiculous element which we discern in the existence of a small state. Weakness is not itself ridiculous, except when masquerading as strength.”³

¹ We find, for example, diagrammatic maps like that reproduced here from the pamphlet, *Gross Habsburg: Das Resultat der russisch-oesterreichischen Krieger*, 1918. von Octavius, Cracow, 1914. It should be mentioned, however, that these vast ambitions did not win the approval of all the Germans of Austria, who feared an ultimate preponderance of the Slavs in the Hapsburg monarchy. For instance, K. Leuthner, Austrian Deputy, *Deutsch-Oesterreichischen Solidaritäts-gefühle in Die Rundschau*, January 1913. Hapsburg Imperialism has none the less acted as a detonator in the explosion of Germanic Imperialism.

² Treitschke (Heinrich von), *Politics* (Constable), vol. i. p. 32.

³ *Ibidem*, vol. i. p. 34. It is not surprising that the development of these principles should lead the Pan-Germanists of the present day to express regrets like the following: “In the good old days, a strong nation would expel a weak nation from its native territory by violent and destructive warfare. At the present day, such measures of

These philosophic principles had been absorbed without difficulty into the German mentality, wholly impregnated as it was with the identity of Right and physical Might; and the theorists of Pan-Germanism were even incensed at the sight of the happy and prosperous existence of those states at the foot of the Alps and the mouths of the Rhine and the Scheldt, peaceable by nature and tradition, no matter how good-natured the welcome and how generous the facilities which they might accord to natives of Germany. Switzerland, naturally protected by her mountains and—even more formidably—by a military tradition which has enabled her to raise a very elaborate system of militia to the standard of an excellent army, gave Germany food for reflections, which she found no difficulty in justifying by philosophic arguments: “So long as the present grouping of the Powers continues, Switzerland may look forward to prolonged existence.”¹ And we may conjecture that the Emperor William II and his suite were confirmed in this opinion on the occasion of the celebrated visit paid by His Imperial Majesty to the Swiss army at the time of their great manœuvres in the year 1911. But it seems that the military organisation of Holland and Belgium provoked no such respect. Tannenberg, in fact, in a chapter entitled “Holland in Need,”² did not scruple to enlarge at length on the impossibility of the Low Countries preserving their independence, in the economic and political conditions of the modern world, for, he declared—

“The Dutch are practical people, who, in everything they do, have an eye to their advantage, and they must

violence are no longer employed. In this wretched world of the present day, only peaceful weapons are employed; and those who hold the advantage are the advocates of peace. The small nations and the fragments of nations have invented a new phrase—‘International Law,’ which is in reality just the same as saying that they rely on our good-natured stupidity” (Tannenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 74).

¹ Treitschke (Heinrich von), *Politics* (Constable), vol. i. p. 33.

² “Holland im Not” (*Gross-Deutschland*, pp. 88–107).

admit that, at the present day, it would be in their interest to belong to the German empire.

"There are three reasons which support this notion. The first is the consideration that small economic states are no longer able to hold their ground efficaciously in the twentieth century. The world is no longer a domain of free trade, as it was in the year 1600, when Amsterdam was the leading commercial city in the world and Batavia the chief centre of commerce in the Far East. . . ." ¹

The economic expansion of the English has, he explains, exposed the Dutch to a formidable rivalry, and the latter have gradually been excluded from the more or less protectionist territories of Russia, France, and, in particular, the United States of America—

" . . . where the hypocrisy of the Anglo-Saxon, allied with the callous cruelty of the Indian, has won for the North American diplomat a certain celebrity for the unvarnished politeness with which he will uphold in the courts of Europe the most childishly presumptuous claims." ²

"A further reason for the incorporation of the Low Countries in the German Empire is the fact that the two dialects—Dutch with 5 million representatives and Flemish with 3½ millions, are too insignificant to allow of an independent intellectual development. . . ." ³

By force of circumstances, then, the culture of the Netherlands ought, according to Tannenberg, to apply for assistance, in respect of its books, periodicals and pedagogy, to German rather than Latin masters.

"The third reason for this union is the impossibility of the insignificant population of the Low Countries

¹ *Gross-Deutschland*, p. 88.

² Nord Amerika, wo sich die scheinheilige Heuchelei der Angelsachsen mit der kalthblütigen Grausamkeit des Indianers verbindet, und der nordamerikanische Diplomat geniesst in Europe in seiner unübertünchten Höflichkeit mit der er an den Höfen die kindlich unverfrorendsten Zumutungen stellt, schon eine gewisse Berühmtheit, *loc. cit.*, p. 90.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 93.

playing an independent political rôle in a world under arms.¹ . . . In the nineteenth century the Low Countries were only preserved from France by the progressive increase of the power of Germany. The vain attempts of Napoleon III opened their eyes once again to the danger of their situation. In 1870 Germany had plenty of reasons for making war on Holland, since it was the King of Holland who, by his attempt to secure Luxemburg for Napoleon III, was the immediate cause of the war. The francophile tendencies of King William III of Holland were at that time well known to all the Powers. Unfortunately, the minister Thorbecke succeeded in preventing the King of Holland from ranging himself openly on the side of France, thereby postponing the annexation of the Low Countries by Germany, and preserving their independence a little longer. It is a great pity that this opportunity should have been missed. If the inevitable had been accomplished there and then, the hardships inseparable from any transformation of this nature would have been forgotten by now, as has happened in the case of Hanover, where the most that the Guelphs achieve at the present day is the occasional winning of a seat at the elections by means of Socialist support. . . ."²

And Tannenberg does not hesitate to conclude, gathering together all the scattered offspring of Germanism in his visions of the future—

“It is imperative that Holland, with her royal family, her European territory and her colonies in South America and the East and West Indies, should enter the German empire as a State of the “Bund.” The same applies to Belgium. The Congo State ought to become a German colony. By the entrance of Belgium into the German Empire, the ancient German frontier by the Scheldt, of the time of Charles V, will be re-established.³ This will be a first step in the reconstitution of our ancient western frontier. We settled accounts with the French Republic and the Napoleonic dynasty in 1871; but we have not yet settled our

¹ *Ibidem*, p. 96.

² *Ibidem*, pp. 97–98.

³ *Ibidem*, pp. 105–6.



Pan-Germanist Africa.

accounts with the kings of France, and in particular Louis XIV. The continental customs frontier between Germany and the Low Countries will thus be suppressed, and the ports on the Meuse and the Rhine will reconquer their ancient inland territory and will wake to a new prosperity. Luxemburg and Switzerland will also enter the new empire, at the same time preserving their existing constitution. But they will be obliged to furnish their contingent to the defence of the empire (which has already long been protecting them), in accordance with the necessities of Greater Germany.”¹

Frymann went a stage further, employing not insinuation but outspoken threats and even insults, directed against both Belgium and Holland; and the ideas which he develops are too interesting not to be quoted here in full—

“As regards Belgium and Holland, these two nations ought to realise quite clearly that the next war will decide their future. In view of the course which events are taking in Europe, we may declare flatly that the small states have forfeited their right of existence; for a state can only maintain its right to an independent existence if it is capable of defending that right by the sword. In these two countries the importance of the next war is realised; but it is evident—such is the lack of wisdom in the world’s government—that they incline to take their stand on the side of the opponents of the German Empire. We have no intention of lapsing into sentimentalism, and of referring to ‘the Low-German branch of the Teutonic race’; but, if they once get rid of their imbecile hatred of Germany, we shall hold them as dear as we do the High-Germans of Alsace, notwithstanding their inexplicable hostility. It is not their

¹ This theory of the frontiers of Greater Germany is one of the most curious manifestations of Germanism. Fichte regarded as the “natural frontiers” of a state those frontiers which secured for it economic autonomy (*productive Selbständigkeit und Selbstgenügsamkeit*), and maintained that a State had the right to conquer these frontiers by force. Other authors have successively supported the claim of Germany to this or that portion of Europe by historical or ethnological arguments, as the case might be. By an adroit application of one or other of these considerations, according to circumstances, it would be possible to find justification for any territorial ambition.

blood-relationship, but their interest, their egoism, rightly understood, which ought to bring Belgium and Holland to the side of Germany. For we guarantee the continued political existence of these two states, even if it be an existence somewhat restricted, and incorporated with the existence of the German empire; whilst, if we were vanquished, they would be in danger of a complete political annihilation. It is highly probable—considering merely the government of the two little states, their representation in Parliament and their Press, which is opposed to everything German—that if some day they had to choose between Germany, France and England, they would finally decide in favour of the last two, thereby following the example furnished in 1866 by Hanover, Hesse and Nassau at the time of the Austro-Prussian conflict. They will have no cause for surprise, therefore, if the consequences are the same in their case.

“To speak frankly, however, the annexation of Belgium and Holland would by no means be a source of pleasure to us Germans. The inhabitants of Holland have so deteriorated, as a result of centuries of a narrow, petty existence; they have become so selfish, and—a certain portion of them—so shameless, under the Government of empty-headed small shopkeepers, that their admission to a closer participation in the existence of the empire is in no way desirable. We may well question whether these people, as a result of sharing the life of a great State, could be restored to decency and the spirit of discipline and self-sacrifice. The same may be said of Belgium, though for other motives. Her population has been corrupted by the clerical régime, and, where clericalism does not reign supreme, society is undermined by socialist theories. In short, these people would hardly be a welcome addition to the empire. The Flemish movement does not affect the question, for its successes only exist on paper; and the Walloons are still the dominant race. They govern the State; their sympathies are law; and the Flemish merely record a mechanical consent. It is quite clear, then, to any one who knows Belgium and Holland, that there is no reason to waste any enthusiasm over them. If, none the less, we perceive it to be our duty to annex these two countries, in some form or other, to the



Pan-Germanist Europe

(or "Europe in 1950." from Tannenbergl: Gross Deutschland.)

German Empire, it will not be for the sake of their inhabitants, but in spite of them and under the scourge of necessity.

"It is absolutely impossible that we should leave the mouths of the Rhine under Anglo-French domination, or even Anglo-French influence, especially as it is in any case absurd that, at the present day, Germany should still be deprived of the possession of her most important line of transit. It is impossible that we should allow the coasts of the North Sea to remain in the hands of enemy states; it is impossible that we should allow the continued existence on our north-west frontier of two little states, who not only possess no means of defence against a violation of their neutrality by England and France, but would, moreover, in the case of a *vis haud ingrata*, join our enemies and afford them a base of operations.

"Therefore, as soon as our antagonism to England and France—or one of these nations, culminates in an armed conflict, we must compel Holland and Belgium to choose between our adversaries and ourselves. If these two states listen to reason and decide in our favour, we will guarantee their independence on the same terms as the other states confederated in the German Empire; if, on the other hand, they join the ranks of our enemies, we shall, in the event of a victory of the German armies, simply annex them.

"In the case of annexation, these states would be incorporated with Prussia in such a fashion that they should realise that we have profited by our experience with our Danish, Polish and Alsace-Lorraine subjects. In the first case, these two states would be confederated in accordance with the principles of the Imperial constitution, stipulating, for example, that the situation of the new states, as regards their defence by land and sea, should be no less well secured than that of Bavaria, and according them the greatest possible latitude in their internal self-government. Their colonies would be under the Imperial administration, but the latter would, on the other hand, defray the attendant expenses. By this means, the Belgian and Dutch colonies, which are far too large for such little states, would be developed as they deserve. If these changes could be effected, the faults of the Hapsburgs and of

the Congress of Vienna would be made good, and the German nation would have finally reconquered, without enthusiasm, without sentimentalism and without illusions—her ancient possessions on the shores of the North Sea.

“We must consider, moreover, that, from our point of view and what we have said above, it would also be the moment for effecting a final settlement of our quarrel with France, a settlement which does not in any case admit of a long postponement.

“The above proposals regarding our two small neighbours may appear somewhat brutal, but I have taken my stand only on the ground of facts and not of sympathy, and, after all, what I have said on these questions is an expression of theories which are current at the present day in certain well-informed and cultivated circles in Holland and Belgium. It is beside the question that if such an event (incorporation with Germany) did take place, the Dutch language would still be preserved. In Belgium, Flemish would be given the precedence, and it would only be in the army that German would be absolutely compulsory. Thus should we Germans of the empire enable these derelict states to develop once more a vigorous and fruitful policy.”¹

These pages date from 1911 and 1912, and, in order properly to understand the full significance of the threats which they contain, we must consider them in connection with the first steps towards their execution which have since been taken. We know what an important part had been played, especially in Belgium, by German traders, German financiers and German productions in the intellectual as well as the industrial domain. Not only were Belgium and Holland among the best clients of Germany, but also, notwithstanding the density of their native population, they had been the seat of a prosperous German colonisation. In view of the immense disproportion in their relative economic resources, a little diplomacy would have doubtless sufficed to secure for Germany advantages in connec-

¹ *Wenn ich der Kaiser wär!* pp. 152-6.

tion with those colonies in Africa and the Far East, which she envied her two little neighbours, almost equivalent to those to be derived from actual possession. But Germanic pride would not consent to any collaboration of this nature.¹ German Imperialism demanded a political hegemony; this hegemony would be imposed in due course by a formal demand, courteously expressed, but backed by a force fully prepared to insist on its acceptance.

*Und kommst du nicht willig so Brauch ich Gewalt!*²

This demand was not a matter of urgency in the case of Holland, where the ground was better prepared, owing, in the first place, to the intimate relations which had grown up between German and Dutch business men as a result of the common commercial waterway of the Rhine, and, in the second place, to the presence for the last fifteen years of a German prince among the leaders of the Dutch Army.³ But, in the case of Belgium, there was considerable cause for taking military precautions. Was it not well known that one section at least of Belgian opinion would be strongly opposed to a "combination" of this nature, and that, moreover, the perpetual neutrality of Belgium was a matter of interest to England and France, especially the latter, in so much that, in case Germany should declare her intention of revising the treaty of 1832 for her own advantage, this proceeding would probably provoke the armed hostility of

¹ Bernhardt even claims to prove that there could not be any genuine equality in the policy of the open door to the colonies and territories under the protectorate, and that therefore a "colonial" war will be forced upon Germany (*Germany and the Next War*).


² And if you do not come willingly, I will use force.

³ We know with what ingenuity William II had persisted in making the most flattering advances to the Dutch nobility. For instance, the order of St. John, which he had restored in memory of the order of Malta, and of which he was the Grand Master, was widely bestowed on the Dutch aristocracy, who might be seen side by side with the Germans, arrayed in their sumptuous costume at the grand ceremonies of the Court of Berlin.

the Triple Entente, and certainly that of France and Russia. The anxiety which was evinced in Belgium at the time of the Franco-German tension created by the Morocco affair, revealed to the leaders of the German Empire the supreme importance, in the case of an international conflict, of acting quickly in Belgium, and of avoiding any painful discussion by presenting Europe with an accomplished fact. For this purpose, the plans for the general mobilisation of the German armies were modified in the direction of the Belgian frontier, the end in view being no longer to concentrate an army on this side with a view to a possible French attack, but to ensure that henceforth, from the very first day, or even, perhaps, before any actual declaration of war, it would be possible to overwhelm the coveted prey by the terrific onslaught of an invasion in force.

For some time, the creation of an instruction camp by the German military staff at Malmédy, a few kilometres from the Belgian frontier, had been giving rise to a good deal of anxiety, both in France and Belgium. But the Germans could always plead in excuse their wish to utilise an extensive and comparatively barren piece of country for drilling the garrisons of Rhenish Prussia, as well as the numerous similar camps scattered all over the empire.¹ Therefore, the mere existence of this camp would not have had any special significance, apart from the singular commentary upon it furnished by the systematic plan which the Germans revealed in their purchase of the Luxemburg railways, and in their construction of new and obviously strategic railways in the Eifel and along the Belgian frontier. From the time of the Franco-German tension resulting from the Morocco affair,

¹ We know that it is the rule that every corps of the German empire should possess at least one large instruction camp, covering several thousands of acres. But certain corps, such as the 16th and 21st defensive corps in Lorraine, have no such special camps, and it was easy, under some pretext or other, to concentrate a large effective force in time of peace, without attracting the attention of the foreigner, who was to be taken by surprise.



German Designs on Belgium.—1. Railways before 1910.

Germany had at her disposal, for the purpose of mobilisation, four railways directly connecting the valley of the Rhine with that of the Meuse. The first, from Cologne to Aix-la-Chapelle, extended a branch to Malmédy which was apparently useless, but really explicable by the fact that it was capable of serving as a prolongation of the Belgian line from Stavelot to Dinant; the second branched off at Saint-With on the transverse line from Aix-la-Chapelle to Trêves, then proceeded perpendicularly to the Meuse, viâ Bastogne, across Belgian Luxemburg; the third left the line from Trêves to Luxemburg at Wasserbillig, branching off to join the Belgian Arlon-Virton railway, which terminates in France, at Montmédy; the fourth and last was the main line between Coblenz, Trêves, Luxemburg and Longwy. This network of railways was, moreover, all the more effectively at the disposal of Germany since the latter had secured the financial control of the Luxemburg railways, the most important of which, belonging to the Guillaume-Luxemburg Company, had been made over to her by the French Compagnie de l'Est after the Treaty of Frankfurt, while the others were controlled by the Prince-Henri Company, of Luxemburg, and the Winterthur Company, supported by German capital.


As a result of this situation, Germany was enabled to improve this network of communications to a degree out of all proportion with the economic returns. Finally, in 1910, she obtained from Belgium authorisation to construct the junction from Malmédy to Stavelot, which henceforward enabled military trains to run directly from Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle to Dinant, passing round the square of Liège. At the same time, she doubled the advantage from this railway and that from Saint-With to Bastogne, by the construction of a double line joining Butgenbach to Linz on the Rhine, by way of the barren and mountainous region of the Eifel. Finally, a transverse line from Ulflingen to Luxemburg along the frontier, connected the three lines of penetra-

tion. The last, in spite of the very meagre traffic in time of peace, was a double line, and a line was constructed from Ettelbruck to Bitburg, which put Neuwied in direct communication with Arlon-Virton and Montmédy.¹ The weapon was now forged; all that remained was to make good use of it.

§ 4. THE GERMAN ATTACK OF AUGUST 1914 WAS IN CONFORMITY WITH PRUSSIAN TRADITIONS AND PROPHECIES

The fact of having made every preparation with a view to a war, even an offensive war, is not in itself sufficient to ensure the outbreak of that war. On the contrary, the saying is *Si vis pacem para bellum*, and, indeed, the chief and most valuable result of the high degree of military preparedness of the Great Powers of Europe was that they enjoyed a half-century of peace. The demands and declamations of the Pan-Germanists, as well as the preparatory measures taken by the German Government in response to their appeals, were regarded by the pacifists of both hemispheres as negligible and void of immediate significance, when, to the surprise of almost the whole world, the German Government proceeded to carry out in all its details the programme which had been drawn up for it with such painstaking minuteness. For its complete realisation, the following conditions were essential: (1) the creation of a diplomatic conflict, which should force France and Russia into an unavoidable war, at the same time as far as possible obviating a breach with England; (2) the compelling of Belgium and Luxemburg to declare either

¹ Cf. General Langlois, *La Belgique et la Hollande devant le Pan-Germanisme*. Paris (Berger-Levrault), 1906, and General Maitrot, *Nos frontières de l'Est et du Nord*, third edition, Paris (Berger-Levrault), 1915. The above diagrams are based on the statements contained in the latter volume. The author's "revelations" in regard to the German plans of attack via Belgium were in fact published as early as 1911, and in fact it was only incorrigible idealists who were surprised at the direction of the German thrust.



German Designs on Belgium.—II. Railways in 1914.

(The heavy black lines represent the lines constructed or doubled since 1910.)

for or against the empire, without regard to the treaties concerning their neutrality; (3) the setting in motion of this whole mechanism between the spring and the summer of 1914 at the latest, for special reasons of a technical nature. Thus it happened. It might have been foreseen; and Germany had foreseen it, long since as regards the general plan, and for at least a year as regards the plan in all its details.¹

It would be difficult for any one unacquainted with the theories of German Imperialism described above to understand why the crushing of France should have been judged a primary necessity for German expansion, which might seem to be far more seriously threatened by the vast empires of Great Britain and Russia. This is not the place to investigate the historical and psychological factors of this "hatred of the French" (*Franzosenhass*), systematically inculcated in German children from their schooldays, with an affectation of contempt which served as a cloak for jealousy, and a violent abusiveness which was evidently rooted in fear. Whether this campaign was intended as an antidote against a possible seduction of the German elector by French ideas, and a stimulus to a willing acceptance of the military expenditure, or whether it was simply the instinctive and traditional reflex of Germanic *Kultur* against Latin culture, in any case the results are the same, namely: (1) that the whole German people regarded France as the chief enemy, whom it was necessary in any case to vanquish completely before proceeding to carve up the rest of Europe; (2) that the leaders of Germanism shared this view, for reasons at once military, political and economic.

¹ The French Government was well aware of these warlike preparations, which had certainly not escaped its agents. See Yellow Book, Chapter I. 1-16. It is unnecessary to quote these documents here, since they are universally accessible. It is sufficient to refer to them as one more demonstration of the closeness with which the evolution of German policy followed the injunctions of the Pan-Germanist advance guard.

Bernhardi, for example, prophesies that: "In one way or another we shall have to settle our account with France, if we want to have our hands free for our world policy," and he declares—¹

"It is the first and most indispensable condition for a healthy German policy, and since it is absolutely impossible to dispel French hostility by peaceful methods it must be wiped out by force of arms. It is essential that France should be vanquished so completely that she will never again be able to set a barrier across our path."

Tannenberg speaks to the same effect:² "France has made England our enemy, and she must bear the consequences of her actions" and pay the whole expense of the war. Frymann shares this view, and the phrase: "*Frankreich muss zerschmettert sein*" ("France must be crushed") is, as it were, the *delenda est Carthago* of all the Catos of contemporary Germanism. And it was necessary to act quickly. What was the use of prolonging a dangerous peace, as a result of which the warlike sentiments of the German people were losing their vigour, whilst the enemies of Germany were employing this lost time for the perfecting of their military equipment! Already the Russians, warned by the threats of Austro-German policy in 1908 and 1912, at the time of the Balkan entanglements, were improving their armaments, increasing their effective force—in short, developing the systematic plan which would make their army the largest and one of the best equipped in Europe. Belgium, alarmed by the German preparations along her frontier, was deciding to establish the principle of compulsory military service for all her citizens, and would shortly have at her disposal such an effective force as would render a surprise attack on her territory impossible. England even was considering, at her leisure, but with growing attention, the means of increasing her

¹ *Germany and the Next War*.

² *Gross-Deutschland*, p. 82.


Bevölkerung



Schweiz
2,3 Millionen



Montenegro
400 Tausend



Rußland
160 Millionen



Serbien
5,1 Millionen

Feldheer

Feldtruppen und Feldreferatruppen



Deutschland
2 713 000 Mann



Österreich-Ungarn
1 200 000 Mann



Rußland
3 623 000 Mann



Frankreich
2 963 000 Mann

Comparative Populations and Armies
(From the Wehrkalender, 1914.)

army; and France, by the re-establishment of the three years' service, would shortly have at her disposal the largest active army that she had ever possessed. It was necessary, therefore, to forestall the consolidation of this living barrier, which was bristling round the existing frontiers of the German Empire; otherwise it would be difficult to extend them without incalculable losses. It was necessary to stir up public opinion against this "danger," for the summer of 1914 was the last in which the respective operations of the new military laws in Russia, Germany, France and Belgium would still leave the German army with an advantage in case of mobilisation, especially on the western front. Therefore one of the leaders of the *Wehrverein*, Lieut.-Colonel Frobenius, declared frankly—¹

"The introduction of the three years' service in France has been carried out in a remarkable fashion which is very significant as regards the next few years. As the class born in 1890 and then performing its second year refused to remain with the colours yet another year and had already expressed this refusal by means of violent agitations and mutinies,² it was decided to release this class in the autumn of 1913, and to make up for this by calling up two classes at once, namely, those born in 1892 and 1893. Therefore two classes at once will have to be trained simultaneously with the

¹ *Des Deutschen Reiches Schicksalsstunde*, pp. 72-4.

² We may note by the way the malicious interpretation placed upon the temporary measures which were adopted in France, without any reference to a few trifling incidents in the barracks. The lack of discipline in the French Army is, moreover, a favourite theme of the German Press; and there is a certain ironical zest in the reading in 1915, after the rude test of the most stupendous war in history, the criticisms and the heavy pleasantries which the German publicists showered upon the French soldiers and officers . . . before they knew them. Read, for example, the graceful suggestions of the *Post*, such as: "France has undoubtedly had her periods of political greatness, but . . . she has since sunk into a state of such corruption of all those qualities which distinguish a strong and proud nation, that, at the present day, from the military point of view, it would be at most a very dubious pleasure to have to fight with her!"—*Die Post*, April 21, 1913. Cf. Schiemann, *Deutschland und die grosse Politik*, 1913. Berlin (Reimer), 1914.

class which has performed one year's service, a circumstance which would render it almost impossible for the French army to engage in a war at that moment. But, in order to furnish a legal justification for the premature summoning of the class born in 1893, the age for the commencement of military service has been reduced by a year; so that, instead of waiting till the completion of their twenty-first year, the class born in 1894 will be summoned in the autumn of 1914. But, as the class born in 1891 and now going through its second year is subject to the three years' term of service, it will be possible to keep this class in the army in 1915. Hence next year the active forces will include not three but four classes—that is to say, an army of larger dimensions than would be requisite in time of war. Therefore, a mobilisation might be effected next year with all the more ease and rapidity, because not only would all the troops be on a war footing, but also it would be possible to spare a considerable portion of them for the purpose of strengthening the reserve forces.

“ . . . The thirst of France for vengeance on the German empire, the fierce hatred of Russia for Austro-Hungary as an obstacle to her expansion, have driven these two countries to increase their military preparations to a point at which they could not be maintained for very long. Indeed, this military preparation is almost equivalent to a war footing, and in the spring of 1915 it will be so complete that we may then expect at any moment the opening of a campaign involving the most powerful armies that Europe has ever seen. *Then it will be that the fatal hour will strike for the German empire and her allies; then we shall need to fight more fiercely than ever before; but then also we shall reveal to the world an enthusiasm, a devotion, a spirit of sacrifice, even more lofty and strenuous than we revealed in the Wars of Independence. . . .*”¹

We see, then, that the aim of the German patriots was to neglect no means of kindling the national senti-

¹ It is not uninteresting to compare this very biassed account, representing the military precautions adopted by France as aggressive measures, with the cool statements of *Die Welt am Montag*, quoted above, pp. 81-2.

Erkranktes Jahr im Süden.

Deutschland:
700 000 Mann



Frankreich:
840 000 Mann



Russland:
1 207 000 Mann



Österreich-Ungarn
445 000 Mann

Infanterie.



Deutschland:
669 Bataillone



Österreich-Ungarn:
477 Bataillone
214 Halbbataillone



Russland:
1273 Bataillone
4000
226 Bataillone
in Asien



Frankreich:
675 Bataillone

ment of the German people, so as to ensure their immediate consent to any new military sacrifices that might be demanded, and to lead them to express a spontaneous and enthusiastic appeal for a wonderful and sacred war. By the side of Colonel Frobenius, and by the employment of similar arguments, the organisers of the *Wehrverein* multiply lectures, articles and pamphlets designed to represent Germany as threatened without any justification by more powerful and perfidious neighbours. The diagrams here reproduced from the almanac of the Military League,¹ afford an illustration of the remarkable representations of the military situation of Europe in 1913, which were from this time placed before the great German public. The agitation was continued from 1912 to 1914, increasing in intensity with every month. We have already seen what powerful organisations² this agitation had at its command, and, by their aid, a campaign of hatred, of increasing virulence, was developed all over Germany. Maximilian Harden, the free lance, the unsparing censor of the scandals of the Imperial Court, assumed the rôle of the people's tribune, and insisted in public meetings on the necessity of a policy aimed either at coming to terms with England, or at crushing her continental allies; and he naturally preferred the second alternative.³ Inflamed, doubtless, by the brilliant prospects opened out by General von Bernhardi, the German military leaders, even those in active service, such as General

¹ *Wehrkalender*, 1914. Cf. above, p. 64, note 1. It is unnecessary to point out the ironic symbol by which the little French republic is represented opposite the tranquil and gigantic figure of the honest German. But we must call special attention to the figures given for the armies of the two groups. The figures for the peace footing are obviously juggled. As for the figures for the war footing, the war itself has furnished sanguinary proof of their falsity.

² See above, p. 62.

³ See the *Münchener Zeitung* of February 17, 1913, which contains a rather ironical account of these lectures under the title *Zwischen Frieden und Krieg*. Cf. Nippold, *Der Deutsche Chauvinismus*, pp. 95, 97.

von Eichhorn, seized every opportunity to make the most violent speeches.¹

The military party even discovered in the Zabern incident a proof of their strength, public opinion expressing a very slight disapprobation of the excess of zeal of Lieutenant von Forstner and his superiors. Therefore, General Keim could feel perfectly safe in preaching a sacred war, in the name of that great gospel of hate which is part of the Germanism of Nietzsche and Haeckel, and in declaiming—

“The young men no less than the young women of Germany must learn this lesson : you have the right to hate the enemies of your country ! ”²

And this sort of fanaticism, of which we find examples in the history of certain Mussulman wars, this strange mysticism of violence and brutality, found expression in works intended for juvenile reading, in extraordinary conceptions, in which Wotan and Jehovah, the Walhalla and the Christian heaven were confused in the most bewildering fashion—

“Yes ! It will be a joyful and a great hour, such as we may well yearn for in our hearts. The loud-voiced appeal for war may easily degenerate into vain bombast and an empty rattling of sabres. But in silence and deep down there must live in the German heart the joy of war and the passionate desire for war. . . . On

¹ General von Eichhorn, inspector of the 7th army inspection, was taken to task by a certain section of the Press for a particularly violent speech which he made at Saarbruck in November 1912. *Vide* Nippold, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-3.

² This doctrine of hate roused the indignation of the moderates, like H. von Gerlach (see his article “Hass !” in *Die Welt am Montag* of June 2, 1913) ; and earned for the General, according to the *Berliner Morgenzeitung* (February 8, 1913), the striking and agreeable nickname of “Kriegskeim” (*i. e.* War-germ). Unfortunately, too many others still considered that “the sacred lust of hatred and victory” (*Die Lust am Hasse und die Lust am Siege*) was still not sufficiently developed in Germany ; and the deficiency was deplored, for instance, by Dr. W. Fuchs, in a pamphlet bearing the curious title : “. . . weil wir nicht kriegsbereit sind ! Eine psychologische Studie.” Berlin (Schwetschke), 1914.

this round ant-heap of our earth, our only value is as members of a community, our Fatherland. Germany alone must live and flourish and prosper after a war. What may be the fate of us individuals ought to be a matter of indifference to us ! . . .”

And the publicist, carried away by his lyrical ardour, promises to the young German who shall have died for his country the entry into the paradise of the brave, where, amid the clouds, Frederick II, Blücher, the Great Emperor, Moltke, Roon and Bismarck will greet the young heroes to the accompaniment of drums sounding a military salute !¹ . . . When the mind of Germany's youth was fed on such doctrines as these, when such efforts were made to inflame public opinion, it might be expected that the most terrible political events would be joyfully welcomed. The Pan-Germanists, who were a natural consequence of the general evolution of Germanism, in their turn reacted on the latter, and assisted in bringing it to a crisis. All that remained was to invent, with more or less adroitness, the fatal pretext.

As for the motives that would be pleaded, the incidents that would be contrived, in order to justify, or in any case provoke the necessary rupture, this was entirely a secondary matter; and it was not imagined that they would be difficult to discover. Thus Frymann perceived in the Morocco question an excellent source of disputes, which might be turned to account.

“ The Morocco affair,” he said, “ has already cost us so much, that we may insist that every syllable of the

¹ *Jungdeutschland Post. Wochenschrift für Deutschlands Jugend herausgegeben vom Bunde Jungdeutschland und der Deutschen Turnerschaft*, 1913, No. 4 (January 25), *Der Krieg*, by Otto von Gottberg. The remarkable development during the last few years in Germany of those athletic societies for the young organised on the lines of the English boy scouts, is well known. *Jungdeutschland* is the name of the most important federation of these societies, and is essentially patriotic and militarist in character.

second part of the (Moroccan) treaty should be held sacred by France. . . . If this were not the case, and if our Minister for Foreign Affairs became acquainted with an act contrary to the treaty, he ought not to hesitate to demand satisfaction at all costs. If this satisfaction were refused, the treaty would be cancelled forthwith, and our renunciation of Morocco would be legally annulled. The whole question would then have to be re-considered from the beginning. We should then claim our share of this territory, and the question of who should possess it would be decided by force of arms. We should then take the offensive, without troubling ourselves about the Austro-German and Franco-Russian alliances, and without any consideration for England's attitude. That which is bound to happen cannot be prevented. Diplomacy and its intrigues are mere idle toys. Nothing would induce us to forego our claims. Should the result be a rupture, we will confront our destiny, at the same time securing for ourselves all the advantages of an offensive. Morally the right is on our side.

“And even if France observed her engagements so faithfully as to furnish us no ground for complaint, there would still be ground for a dispute in our relations with England, of whom France has become the vassal. In case the dispute should arise, we have to consider the various eventualities to which the struggle would expose us. In the event of this struggle, we must offer France the choice between ourselves and England. In this struggle, in which our destiny will be at stake, it is clear that ‘he who is not for us is against us’! And war would be the immediate result, if France decided against Germany. In the latter case also, it would be for us to take the offensive. However that may be, if it comes to war, we shall know what is at stake. But France also must know it. Our diplomats have forgotten how to speak German to a foreigner, and, particularly since the fall of Bismarck, the French do not understand us when we speak firmly. Consequently, it would not do them any harm if a voice should be heard from the German people, telling them that the very existence of France is in the balance. We have a long account to settle since the 10th of March, 1871.

“Certain French publicists speak so frankly of the fate which will await the German empire, when it is exposed to an Anglo-Russian-French attack, that we feel under no obligation to exercise a greater discretion. The German nation, if it is victorious, will be in a position to insist that the French menace shall cease forever: France must be crushed. Moreover, we must demand as much French territory as is necessary for our safety, bearing in mind what we have said touching an evacuation. In regard to the (French) colonies, we shall appropriate those we require, on the principle that, after all, when we consider the relative situations of the two nations, the French occupy the place which belongs of right to the Germans. However sad and painful these considerations may be, they are none the less the exact truth. There will be few in Germany who will not regret the humiliation of the French nation, but they can do no more than murmur, not without pity: ‘Tu l’as voulu, Georges Dandin.’”¹

This is absolutely the spirit which presided at the famous dinner at Ems, at which Bismarck, before altering, in such a manner as to render war inevitable, the text of the telegram which was to decide one way or the other the crisis provoked by the question of Luxemburg, consulted, not his sovereign, his people, or even his individual conscience, but the Prussian Minister of

¹ *Wenn ich der Kaiser wär!* pp. 151 et seq. The quotation, “Tu l’as voulu, Georges Dandin,” is given in the text in French, and it is interesting to compare these threats with those which emanated from the Berlin Press on the very eve of the war, July 31, 1914. In fact, the *National Zeitung* on that day wrote in almost exactly the same terms, and even concluded with the same French quotation. “Whatever destiny Providence may have in store for her, it will be from France that Germany will exact compensation, but on a different scale from that of forty-four years ago. It will not be *five* billion that she will demand as ransom, but perhaps *thirty*. The Holy Virgin of Lourdes, the worker of miracles, will have a mighty task before her, if she is to mend all the bones that our soldiers will have broken for those poor fellows on the other side of the Vosges. Poor France! There is still time for her to change her mind, but in a few hours it will be too late. And then she will receive a thrashing from which she will smart for many generations. But “Tu l’as voulu, Georges Dandin!”

War and the Chief of the General Staff.¹ And his individual conscience as a man and a Christian never reproached him, absolved as it was by the collective conscience which he felt in himself as a Prussian statesman, a representative of Might, whom a national success would justify, even against justice. His work had been fruitful, and had sown in the empire which it founded seeds that are now bearing fruit. In order that he might have Germany at the back of him in 1870, Bismarck had felt no scruple about lying. Twenty years later, he decided that the lie no longer served any purpose, and he disclosed his subterfuge, which has indeed been regarded by the apostles of modern Germanism since that time, not as a crime, but as a stroke of genius. Treitschke, Nietzsche, Lasson and others have, in fact, trained new generations. In 1870, the talk was all of the defence of Germany. Soon it came to be accepted that it was necessary to "forestall" possible attacks.² In 1914, need was no longer felt of

¹ We know how, on July 13, 1870, Moltke and Roon were dining with Bismarck, when this famous telegram arrived, the conciliatory tone of which destroyed all the bellicose dreams of the three terrible collaborators. But at the present moment it is not out of place to recall the words in which, twenty-two years later, Bismarck communicated to the *Neue Freie Presse* of November 20, 1892, what had taken place: "We had a feeling," he said, "that the affair was disappearing in smoke. I first of all addressed Moltke, putting this question to him: 'With regard to the weapon which we require for war, our army, is it really so good that we may embark on a war with every probability of success?' Moltke's confidence was firm as a rock: 'We have never had a better weapon than we have at this moment,' he said. Roon, in whom, to speak the truth, I had less confidence than in Moltke, fully confirmed what Moltke had said. 'Very well,' I said to my companions, 'go on eating your dinner quietly.' I sat down at a little round marble table, which was placed by the side of the table where they were eating. I carefully re-read the telegram. I took my pencil, and I deliberately struck out the whole passage in which it was stated that Benedetti had asked for a further audience, etc. . . . I only left the beginning and the end of it. Now the telegram wore quite a different aspect. I read it to Moltke and Roon in the new form which I had given to it. They both exclaimed: 'Splendid! That will produce the right effect!' We continued our dinner with improved appetites. . . ."

² This was a principle of Frederick the Great. See below, p. 120.

pretexts, or diplomatic ingenuity, or empty phrases. We are strong; we are able to take; then we *must* take; we are ready; then we *must* act.¹

Therefore, from the year 1913, we observe the occurrence of unlooked-for incidents, which, if France had herself been in the mood for war, might easily have precipitated matters. In the present state of our knowledge, it would be difficult to pronounce a judgment concerning the true reasons for the landing of a zeppelin at Lunéville, on the night of April 3, 1913, or for certain altercations between some Frenchmen and Germans, less than three weeks later, in a café concert and in the railway station at Nancy.² But it is difficult not to connect these facts, insignificant in themselves, with the Press campaign which preceded them, accompanied them and followed them. As early as March 10, a violent article in the *Kölnische Zeitung* loudly accused France of being the disturber of the peace of Europe,³ and this in such outrageous language that, notwithstanding the applause of the inflammatory press, an official rebuke was thought necessary. France had received all these provocations with a courteous and somewhat haughty silence, which had enabled the Government of the republic to preserve its calm and presence of mind, and to return a moderate answer appropriate to the situation. But at least it was henceforth clear to the world at large that the extreme irritability of public opinion in Germany⁴ would render

¹ This is what Bernhardi called the duty of making war (*Germany and the Next War*, Chapter II). His theory is nothing less than a justification of political knavery, since he admits that "the relations between two states may often be considered as a state of latent war, assuming for the time being a character of pacific rivalry. Such a state justifies the employment of hostile weapons, of cunning and trickery, just as much as war itself, for in such a case both parties are prepared for a resort to arms."

² As to the exaggerated language of the German Press at this time, see Nippold, *Der Deutsche Chauvinismus*, *passim*.

³ *Kölnische Zeitung*, March 10, 1913, *Der Störenfried*

⁴ "An intoxication appeared to have seized the whole of Germany . . . artificially produced by the fiery beverages which an unscrupulous

it easy for her to engage in a popular war, but that this required some other pretext than a mere tavern-brawl or an aeronautical blunder.¹ The drama of Sarajevo furnished, a year later, this external and hypocritical pretext, but the world knows now that it is not here that we must look for the true cause of the war.

And, doubtless, if the results do not conform to their hopes, there will be no lack of theorists, even in Germany, who will resort to trickery and evasion, and endeavour to put a new interpretation upon documents and events, deeds and words. But here again it will be easy to confront these tricksters with documents and dates which will restore order in their own recollections and those of the world. Indeed, for the purpose of explaining the war of 1914 there is no point in discussing the documents which are alleged to have been discovered at Brussels² since the outbreak of hostilities, nor in multiplying diffuse and, moreover, contradictory explanations of words and situations which are perfectly

patriotic Press had for many a year and day poured out to the German nation. Even those occupying the highest positions were unable to escape this condition of intoxication."—*J'Accuse!* (Hodder and Stoughton), p. 119.

¹ According to the author of *J'Accuse!* the war, which was from that moment decided upon in principle, was only deferred for a few months for reasons of military technique (*op. cit.*, p. 111); and most authors and documents are in agreement upon this point.

² For instance, the so-called Barnardiston document, found by the Germans in Brussels, in the archives of the Belgian Government, from which they have endeavoured to deduce a scheme of Anglo-Belgian aggression against Germany. Until the exact import of the conversations on military questions which have taken place since 1906 between Belgium, France and England has been revealed by genuinely official documents, it is sufficient to remark: (1) That the state of the Belgian army between 1906 and 1913 was the best guarantee of the pacific intentions and the neutrality of Belgium; (2) that the German invasion of Belgium, in August 1914, spared itself the pains of invoking and spares us the pains of discussing any of the pretexts subsequently pleaded in its justification. Moreover, the final refutation of the miserable pretexts discovered by Germany after the event is to be found stated clearly and concisely in the book, *La Belgique Neutre et Loyale*, by M. E. Maxweiler. Paris and Lausanne (Payot), 1915

clear in themselves. To be brutally frank, in the judgment of all men, of whatever nationality, possessed of ordinary common sense, the question of the responsibility for the Great War is quite simple and may be summed up in this one interrogation: "Was there, in the state of Europe and of the world on August 1, 1914, a latent danger sufficiently serious to justify Germany in violating the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, and in kindling a general war?"

To this question the facts established by the official documents have answered: No! Germany was not hampered in her peaceful expansion in Africa by France, since the latter had concluded with her the agreement of November 1911, by which she secured equality of economic treatment in Morocco and a cession of territories in the Congo, more important even for the future than for the present. She had no longer any ground for dispute with France in the East, since, on the initiative of France, the agreement of February 15, 1914, had just satisfied all her requirements in Turkey. She realised perfectly well that the three years' military service had only been restored in France after the German military law of 1912, and was thus in the nature of a defensive and not of an offensive measure. She had then no serious grievance against France, save the mere fact of being France, a country more sparsely populated than herself and more richly endowed by nature, too richly endowed not to excite Germany's jealous greed, and yet too proud to allow herself to be subjugated without a struggle, and too noble ever to make herself accessory to a crime. It is only fair to admit that the publicist, Maximilian Harden, did not hesitate to repudiate with contempt all the pretexts invented by the Imperial Chancellerie, as unworthy of the great task which Germany had undertaken—

"On whose side is the right?" he said. "Yes, if this were the only question at issue, we might be content to follow the advice of those blockheads who would

drag great international controversies before a supreme European tribunal. But to apply this question of right to the present case is madness. Ask the beech by what right it raises its crest above the pine and the fir, the birch and the palm. Summon it before the areopagus presided over by toothless and pendent jaws. From the foliage of the beech, the answer will resound like a tempest: 'My right is my might.' The right which every nation has acquired at its baptism of living, developing, pressing heavenwards, is not dependent on any judge. On whose side is right? Right is on the side of the strong. Right or none, we will stand fast, or we will fall for our country. We mean to triumph; we must triumph. It is in vain to embroider; it is in vain for diplomats in their frock coats and spectacles to argue that we are honest and peaceable folk. Cecil Rhodes said once: 'This war is just because it serves my nation, because it increases the power of my country.' Let us din this maxim into every heart. It is worth more than hundreds of White Books. Our enemies hate us mortally. A bastard (the Frenchman) cherishes the fond illusion that he can crush the grandson of the great Conqueror. Let us draw the sword and slay him. History will not ask for our reasons." ¹

It is unnecessary, then, to demonstrate once again the emptiness of the pretexts pleaded *in extremis* by Germany against France: no more than Herr Bethmann-Hollweg will Europe believe for a moment that French aeroplanes could drop bombs on German towns in time of peace, flying over 600 kilometres of territory, without being either seen or heard, and could kill civilians in Nuremberg in broad daylight, without it being possible to discover even the names of these unfortunate victims! ²

Since the outbreak of the war, it is true that German aeroplanes have more than once visited France and killed women and children; but they have not conjured away the bodies of their victims, and the names

¹ *Zukunft*, October 1914.

² We shall have occasion to revert to the genesis of this legend when we discuss the campaigns of opinion organised by Germany.

of these are known. Besides, they have scarcely ever been able to venture more than 100 kilometres from their base. And, even if their French and English rivals have shown themselves more daring or more skilful, they have never, even in the course of their longest flights into Germany, flown over whole provinces without being perceived and peppered with shot, and the traces of their attacks have only disappeared from the German official newspapers. When, at the end of the tenth month of the war, a squadron of French aeroplanes, for the first time, and as an exceptional measure of reprisals, reluctantly dropped a few bombs on the town of Karlsruhe, the German Press forthwith, without waiting for official instructions, and with a remarkable wealth of detail, discharged the torrents of its wrath against French "barbarism." Can it be credited for a single moment that an attack of the same kind could have been perpetrated in time of peace by aerial skirmishers without all Germany's professional journalists and philanthropic reporters mobilising *ipso facto* for the purpose of inundating the world with a profusion of sensational details relating to this monstrous proceeding?

There is involved here an improbability such that no friend of Germany in a foreign country can ever accept it. If the general public in Germany adopted on this matter the point of view imposed on it by the Government, this is one proof the more that the general state of mind, which had been prepared with so much skill, had resulted in the loss of that critical intelligence of which German science none the less boasts so proudly; unless we are here again to recognise a patriotism so absolute and so fierce as to place deliberately the interests of Germanism above those of pure truth. To minds which are too Latin, or simply too human, for such conceptions, the brutal candour of Nietzsche, Treitschke and Harden will doubtless appear preferable; but, in contradiction to the anticipation of the last of

these, it will remain for history to judge finally the reasons and pretexts for all this bloodshed and ruin and sorrow.

§ 5. GERMAN POLICY, WHICH WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WAR, HAS IN ADDITION VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW

No valid reason justified the Kaiser in declaring war on France. Was there any valid reason for violating the solemn engagement made by his own ancestor, William I, to respect the neutrality of Luxemburg, or that made by Frederick William IV, his great-uncle, to respect that of Belgium? There have been many lengthy animadversions on the phrase "scrap of paper,"¹ which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg is said to have applied to the treaty of 1832 entered into with England by Prussia and France. But, even if they do not indulge in such freedom of language, surely it is common knowledge that the statesmen of Germany all hold similar views in the matter of treaties, views derived from the teachings of Treitschke, from the laws of evolution, and, above all, from Germanic Imperialism, shaped on the traditions of Frederick II. In his *Politik*, Treitschke, in fact, declares—

"States which conclude treaties with one another thereby curtail their absolute authority to some extent. But the rule still stands, for every treaty is a voluntary curb upon the power of each, and all international agreements are prefaced by the clause "*Rebus sic stantibus*." No State can pledge its future to another. It knows no arbiter, and draws up all its treaties with this implied reservation. This is supported by the axiom that so long as international law exists all treaties lose their force at the very moment when war is declared

¹ See correspondence of the British Government (Blue Book No. 160, note from Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, August 8, 1914). The expression "scrap of paper" has not been seriously disputed. It has become symbolic and the subject of a whole literature.

between the contracting parties; moreover, every sovereign State has the undoubted right to declare war at its pleasure, and is consequently entitled to repudiate its treaties. Upon this constantly recurring alteration of treaties the progress of history depends; every State must take care that its treaties do not survive their effective value, lest another Power should denounce them by a declaration of war; for antiquated treaties must necessarily be denounced and replaced by others more consonant with circumstances.”¹

“No State ever has or ever will be in a position to pledge its whole hereafter to a treaty, which cannot fail to be a limitation of its sovereignty.”²

And Bernhardi, his pupil, merely develops this principle when he writes—

“There is no standing still in the world’s history. All is growth and development. It is obviously impossible to keep things in the *status quo*, as diplomacy has so often attempted. No true statesman will ever seriously count on such a possibility; he will only make the outward and temporary maintenance of existing conditions a duty when he wishes to gain time and deceive an opponent, or when he cannot see what is the trend of events. He will use such diplomatic means only as inferior tools; in reality he will only reckon with natural forces, and with the powers of a continuous development.”³

These inferior tools, represented by the treaties guaranteeing the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, had doubtless served their turn, in the eyes of German statesmen. The effective forces of the Belgian and English armies did not appear to them sufficient to impede the “forces of the evolution of Germanism in their progress towards the extinction of French civilisation. The German Empire, being possessed of the indisputable right to declare war when it pleased her,” and consequently to “suspend treaties which she had signed,” had only to choose her time, in accordance with the principles of a prudent political strategy; for

¹ Treitschke, *Politics* (Constable), I. 28–9. ² *Ibid.*, II. 596.

³ Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, p. 104.

"No man," wrote Frederick II, "if he has a grain of sense, will leave his enemies leisure to make all preparations in order to destroy him. He will rather take advantage of his start to put himself in a favourable position."¹ Thus, after having negotiated with France from 1911 to 1914, and twice even entered into treaties with her "for the purpose of gaining time and deceiving her opponent," Germany followed point by point, and almost to the prescribed day, the programme of the Pan-Germanists, which she only disavowed officially before the war, in order the better to prepare the fulfilment of their ambitions.

If any one still has doubts on this point, he need only compare the extracts which have just been quoted with the speeches and writings published since August 1914 by the most representative personages of modern Germany. He will discover the most perfect agreement between them, both as regards the aim pursued by the empire and also as regards approval of the ways and means adopted. Whether it be the official statement of Count Bernstorff,² German ambassador to the United States of America, a diplomat under the necessity of maintaining some reserve, a statesman in touch with imperial ideas; whether it be the tone of the letters of old Professor Lasson³ to his Dutch friends, or the

¹ Letter of Frederick II, quoted by Bernhardt, *ibidem*, p. 112.

² It is particularly interesting to compare the conditions which, in September 1914, this official personage considered ought to be imposed on Europe by victorious Germany with those which Tannenberg considered ought to be consecrated at some future date by the ideal treaty which he anticipated would be signed at Brussels.

³ These letters, which were written at the end of September, were not at first destined for the publicity which they obtained, when their strange and arrogant language was made known through the *Revue Hollandaise*, of Amsterdam. Such was the sensation produced in the cultured world of the two hemispheres by these brutal and contemptuous expressions of German Imperialism, that the Berlin Academy of Science judged it prudent to rebuke the intemperate language of the eminent professor. When we read the specimens quoted above (pp. 51-3) of what this leader of German thought had been teaching since 1868, we can only wonder that his recent expressions should have surprised any one.

“interviews” of Professor Ostwald¹ in Scandinavia. The unanimity is striking, and, in spite of their relative moderation, due to the new circumstances resulting from a war which proved more arduous than had been anticipated, the same similitude of principles is to be found in the words of Herr Zimmermann, addressing the Dutch socialist readers of *Het Volk*, and of Herr Dernburg, addressing the German-Americans of the United States. The programme is the same, and it contains four items: (1) The defeat and spoliation of France; (2) the annexation of Luxemburg, Belgium and Holland, first economically, and then—with more or less circumspection—politically; (3) the pressing back of the Russians, so as to crush the small Slavonic states; (4) revenge on England for refusing to countenance these proceedings.²

¹ It was in the *Dagen*, of Stockholm, that Professor Ostwald, in November 1914, made those remarkable statements concerning the right of conquest conferred on Germany by her superiority as regards the “organisation factor.” Like Lasson, Ostwald was to some extent denounced by his peers, and the Senate of the University of Leipzig saw fit to express to the foreign universities some regret at the want of tact exhibited by the great chemist. But at the same time, Professor Haeckel continued with impunity to develop in his review, *Monistische Jahrhundert*, in equally aggressive terms, the “biological” arguments, which proved, in the eyes of Germany, the “scientific” legitimacy of Pan-Germanism.

² This hatred of England, in spite of the intensity of its manifestation in Germany at the present day, is none the less a sentiment of comparatively recent date. For a long time the Pan-Germanists believed in the possibility of a division of the sovereignty of the world between the British and German empires, which they represented, for the purposes of their case, as a general victory for Germanism, the qualities of the English being evidently derived from their Saxon ancestors, just as their defects were derived from their Celtic or other ancestors. The protection guaranteed by England to Belgium—the destined prey of German appetites, was regarded by the whole of Germany as a crime. On this point reference may be made to the following: Ernst Haeckel, *Englands Blutschuld am Weltkrieg* (“England’s Blood-guilt in the World-War”) (Eisenach, O. Kayser, 1914); Georges Irmer, *Los vom Englischen Weltjoch* (“Away from the English World-Yoke”) (Leipzig, Hirzel, 1914); Karl Rathgn, *Deutschland, die Weltmächte und der Krieg* (“Germany, the World-Powers and the War”) (Hamburg, Frederiksen, 1914); K. L. A. Schmidt, *Das Ende Englands* (“The End of England”) (Dresden, Erich Leonhardt, 1914), etc.

This rapacious policy is quite in the Bismarck tradition, though it lacked, for its success, the diplomatic genius of a Bismarck. As a result of having scorned the art of diplomatic preliminaries, and of having lied too clumsily, the statesmen of modern Germanism have only succeeded in spreading uneasiness in honest souls, without gaining for themselves the disinterested sympathy of any one. It is not for us to discuss here in detail the events which served as a sanguinary prelude to this war. History will doubtless discover later what lies behind the mystery still surrounding the tragedy of Sarajevo, and whether the end of the Hapsburgs is to rival in horror that of the Atrides. It is sufficient, in this limited account of Germany and International Law, to show how the principles of Germanic Imperialism were bound to lead the German empire to violate the treaties which it had signed, without other reason than the will to conquest, and why Germany's attack on Belgium was thus a logical and conscious act, the result of mature reflection. The actual facts are to be found in the diplomatic documents, which have now been published by all the states actually at war. We know that England refused the shameful bargain which was proposed to her for assisting in the dismemberment of France;¹ how all attempts at mediation were repulsed by Austria, the accomplice of Germany, when there was still time for them to be effective; how, in the presence of a resolutely pacific Triple Entente, refusing to take even ordinary measures of precaution,² because they might possibly have provoked "incidents," Germany had no other

¹ With regard to the proposal made by Germany to England to "compensate" her in case she would consent to remain neutral, see the correspondence of the British Government (Blue Book No. 85, dispatch from Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, July 29, 1914).

² It will be remembered that, in order to avoid any frontier incident, in which, by the fault of a few subalterns, small parties of troops might have come to blows, the French Government had ordered all the troops stationed at the frontier to withdraw ten kilometres to the rear of the actual frontier (Yellow Book, Article 136).

resource than to declare war herself on Belgium, France and Russia. The mere chronology of events is more significant than detailed arguments, and posterity will neglect the litter of apologetic publications, and will decide the question of responsibility by reference to a small number of important facts.

Now this decision, the decision of impartial public opinion, has already been given by a magistrate of a neutral country, who proceeded to investigate the whole question, as he would have investigated any other lawsuit submitted to his judgment. Taking, then, as the basis of proceedings, the White, Yellow, Blue, Grey and Red Books published by the governments interested, Mr. James M. Beck, formerly assistant attorney-general of the United States, concludes as follows—

“ In the first place, the Court would be profoundly impressed, not only by the documents revealed, but also by the significant omission of documents, the existence of which is known. It does not appear that England and Russia omitted to submit to the world any of the documents in their possession; but the German White Book, on the contrary, discloses on its very face the suppression of documents of vital importance. The fact that communications passed between Berlin and Vienna, the text of which has never been disclosed, is not a matter of conjecture. Germany asserts as part of its defence that it faithfully exercised its mediatory influence on Austria, but not only is such influence not disclosed by any practical results, such as we would expect, in view of her dominating relations with Austria, but the *text* of these vital communications is still kept in the secret archives of Berlin and Vienna. Germany has carefully selected a part of her diplomatic records for publication, but withheld others. Austria has withheld all.

“ Thus, in the official apology for Germany, it is stated that, in spite of the refusal of Austria to accept the proposition of Sir Edward Grey to treat the Servian reply ‘as a basis for further conversations,’ we (Germany) continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost

and *advised* Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the monarchy.¹

“The communications which passed between the German Foreign Office and its ambassadors in St. Petersburg, Paris and London, are given *in extenso*, but among the twenty-seven communications appended to the German White Paper, it is most significant that not a single communication is given of the many which passed from the Foreign Office of Berlin to that of Vienna and only two which passed from the German ambassador in Vienna to the German Chancellor. . . . This cannot be an accident. The German Foreign Office has seen fit to throw the veil of secrecy over the text of its communications to Vienna, although professing to give the purport of a few of them. The purpose of this suppression is even more clearly indicated by the complete failure of Austria to submit any of its diplomatic records to the scrutiny of a candid world. Until Germany and Austria are willing to put the most important documents in their possession in evidence, they must not be surprised that the world, remembering Bismarck’s garbling of the Ems dispatch, which precipitated the Franco-Prussian War, will be incredulous as to the sincerity of their pacific protestations.”

And he summarises the conclusions as follows—

“(1) That Germany and Austria, in a time of profound peace, secretly concerted to impose their will upon Europe in a matter affecting the balance of power. Whether in so doing they intended to precipitate a European war to determine the hegemony of Europe is not satisfactorily established, although their whole course of conduct suggests this as a possibility. They made war almost inevitable by (*a*) issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and disproportionate to any grievance that Austria may have had, and (*b*) by giving to Servia and Europe insufficient time to consider the rights and obligations of all interested nations.

“(2) That Germany had at all times the power to induce Austria to preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course, but at no time effectively exerted its influence.

¹ German White Book.

On the contrary, it certainly abetted, and possibly instigated Austria in its unreasonable course.

“(3) That England, France, Italy and Russia, throughout the diplomatic controversy sincerely worked for peace, and in this spirit not only overlooked the original misconduct of Austria, but made every reasonable concession in the hope of preserving peace.

“(4) That Austria, having mobilised its army, Russia was reasonably justified in mobilising its forces. Such act of mobilization was the right of any sovereign state, and as long as the Russian armies did not cross the border or take any aggressive action, no other nation had any just right to complain, each having the same right to make similar preparations.

“(5) That Germany, in abruptly declaring war against Russia for failure to demobilise, when the other Powers had offered to make any reasonable concession and peace parleys were still in progress, precipitated the war . . .”¹

It is beyond dispute, then, that the political responsibility for the Great War rests with Germany; but it does not follow that the empire, by deliberately attacking Russia and France, would necessarily have placed herself outside the law of nations. It was not the refusal to consider two-sided treaties as immutable, which will be condemned by history. The international legitimacy of demands, even exorbitant demands, imposed by one nation on another, and the appeal to arms to decide their differences, is scarcely contestable nor contested by lawyers. But it is quite otherwise with the treaties concluded between two nations at the end of a war, like the Treaty of Frankfort, for example; it is quite otherwise with the solemn engagements entered into jointly by several states to guarantee a position of fact or right which concerns others besides themselves. That which is born of violence is liable to relapses into violence, and during the thousand years since the division of Charlemagne's empire made of the intermediary belt

¹ James M. Beck, *The Evidence in the Case*. New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons.

of country stretching from the Mediterranean to the mouths of the Rhine ¹ a stake to be played for between France and Germany, wars and treaties succeeded one another from generation to generation, without bringing humanity any other advantage than renewed horror and renewed disappointments. But this melancholy historic fact, to which Treitschke resigns himself so contentedly and which his pupils greet with acclamation, cannot in any way excuse either dishonesty in international relations, which is a moral fault, or the violation of engagements, of which all the civilised nations have been guarantors and of which they are still the judges.²

Judged by this standard, the treaties establishing the perpetual neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium were among those which did not permit a third party—and above all one of their guarantors—to revise them, *sponte sua*, unless directly compelled to do so by a failure to observe their provisions on the part of one of the beneficiaries.³

Thus, if Belgium, before any declaration of war, had summoned an English or French army to occupy certain points of her territory, Germany might have been to some extent justified in feeling suspicions regarding the purely defensive character of such an intervention, and in addressing a threatening ultimatum to the King

¹ It will be remembered that the Treaty of Verdun in 843 divided the empire of Charlemagne into three kingdoms—one purely Germanic, one purely French, the third—Lothaire or Lotharingia (Lothringen, Lorraine)—comprising both French-speaking and German-speaking or even bi-lingual districts. This act has governed the whole history of the Middle Ages and of modern times in western Europe, and the present war is another remote consequence of it, since all the districts coveted by Germany are fragments of the great intermediary kingdom; and the same applies to the Italian provinces still held by Austria.

² The neutrality of Luxemburg is guaranteed by Article 2 of the Treaty of London of May 11, 1867, which was signed by Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, Prussia and Russia.

³ The neutrality of Belgium had been guaranteed by the governments of Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, according to Articles 7 and 25 of the Treaty of London of December 15, 1831, confirmed by Article 7 of the Treaty of London of April 19, 1839.

of Belgium. But we know that this was not the case, and that, far from having summoned French or English troops to his aid on the smallest provocation, King Albert proudly refused their assistance until the German army had actually perpetrated its crime and definitely violated the frontiers of the kingdom.¹ The German attack, therefore, was not due to any provocation on the part of Luxemburg or Belgium. It could not be justified *jure belli*, since the war had not even commenced. As for the notion which the Germans subsequently tried to maintain: namely, that Belgium had herself violated her neutrality by refusing to the Imperial armies a peaceful passage across her territory, it is the more remarkable to find her putting forward this argument, because it is one which she has always opposed. In fact, at the time when Germany was much more occupied with the fear of a French intervention in Belgium than with the plan of attempting one herself, it was her lawyers who were the most eloquent in defending the rights and duties of neutrality.

At the end of the eighteenth century the German theorists of International Law—Schmidlin, Püttmann, etc.—denied to neutral states the right to submit voluntarily to one of the belligerent parties committing acts of hostility on her neutral territory, for example,

¹ The dispatch of Sir F. Villiers, Minister of Great Britain at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey, of August 3, 1914, declared: "French Government have offered through their military attaché, the support of five French Army Corps to the Belgian Government. Following reply has been received to-day: We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take" (Blue Book No. 151). This fact is confirmed by the Yellow Book No. 142, in which M. Klobukowski, on the same day and in the same terms, conveys the reply of the Belgian Government to the French proposals, but without mentioning the number of army corps offered by France. Now, the ultimatum which had been delivered to Belgium by Germany the evening before had expired at 7 o'clock that morning. A few hours later, the German army crossed the frontier at Gemmenich (Grey Book Nos. 20-30).

effecting a concentration or passage of troops.¹ Moser wrote: "Neutral states ought not to allow the passage of armies or whole army corps across their territory: otherwise they risk forfeiting their condition of neutrality."² Kübler, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, even admitted that: "The neutral state has the right to exact, if necessary by force, that the belligerent Powers should not use her neutral territory for purposes of war, and that no division of their troops, whether armed or unarmed, should pass over it."³ And, as an illustration of these general principles, German authors naturally take the case of Belgium, subsequently to the Treaty of London, which guaranteed her perpetual neutrality. This respect for territory is just as much a dogma for German lawyers as it is for the Belgian, Arend.⁴ Bluntschli, professor at the University of Heidelberg, declares that the neutral state must not allow the belligerents to use her territory for the purpose of attaining the ends for which they are making war—

"The neutral state ought to enforce the respect due to her neutral territory. This would not be the case if one of the belligerents either made war on this neutral territory or made use of it for attaining her ends. Passage across neutral territory ought, therefore, to be denied to belligerent troops, even when the regular lines of communication between the two states at war traverse this territory."⁵

And Bluntschli, who did not then foresee the quibbles of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, went so far as to conclude—

"The act of defending neutral territory sword in hand, or of repelling an attack, does not cancel neu-

¹ Püttmann, *Dissertatio de jure recipiendi hostes alienos*. Leipzig, 1878.

² Moser, *Essays*, vol. x. p. 238.

³ Kübler, *Modern International Law in Europe*, § 285.

⁴ *Essay on the Neutrality of Belgium*, p. 121. Leipzig, 1845.

⁵ *Droit International codifié*, paragraphs 769–70.

trality; it confirms it. As a rule, in order to secure the respect due to neutrality, it is sufficient to repel the offenders by force of arms. This act does not amount to a declaration of war, although there has been recourse to arms; for the intention of declaring war does not exist. The neutral state desires to preserve the peace, and only has recourse to arms for the purpose of insisting on the respect due to her neutrality and proving her intention to take no part in the hostilities.”¹

But, most amusing of all, perhaps, is to find Tannenberg himself expressly declaring that the passage of foreign troops through Belgium would suffice to bring upon this country the accusation of having violated her neutrality. Tannenberg regrets, indeed, that similar pretexts have not been utilised for the purpose of occupying this territory.

“If,” he says, “in September 1870 the German commander had pressed back the French army from Sedan to the Belgian frontier, instead of forcing it to surrender, Belgium, with her 25,000 conscripts, would not have been able either to disarm these 82,000 Frenchmen or to prevent the victorious German army from entering Belgium. This country would have been the theatre of new military events. The Germans know the way from Belle Alliance to Paris as well as that from Metz and Strasbourg to Paris, and perhaps this would have been the best way.”²

Thus the arguments which Germany intended to employ against France, or even against Belgium in case the French army should violate the Belgian frontier, recoil upon the imperial policy with overwhelming force. The proved premeditation of a conquest of Belgium by the German armies reduces to vain pretexts all the elaborately constructed inductions and arguments of the apologists of Germanism. The indisputable historical fact is that the German empire knowingly broke solemn engagements in regard to Luxemburg

¹ *Ibidem*, paragraph 790 and note 3.

² *Gross-Deutschland*, p. 98.

and Belgium, which she had entered into previously, of her own free will and without compulsion; and this is more than the repudiation of a treaty; it is an attack on International Law. And this attack is all the more serious because it also infringes those, if possible, even more solemn engagements entered into reciprocally and unanimously at the Hague by the forty-four principal civilised states of the world, for the purpose of setting limits to the horrors of war. Convention V, signed on October 18, 1907, defining once again, in positive terms, "the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in war on land,"¹ decreed in fact—

"Art. 1. The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable.

"Art. 2. Belligerents are forbidden to move across the territory of a neutral power troops or convoys either of munitions of war or of supplies.

"Art. 10. The fact of a neutral Power repelling, even by force, attacks on its neutrality, cannot be considered as a hostile act."

It is not, then, merely the opinions of lawyers, even of German lawyers, which have been transgressed by Germanic Imperialism, but formal documents, documents holding the force of law for the whole world, and the respect of which ought to be insisted on by the whole world. By these acts, the whole German empire, responsible for the policy of her leaders, has thus incurred not only a moral guilt, but also a material responsibility, which the co-signatories of the treaties of London and of the conventions of the Hague will be one day or other in a position to determine. The violations of territory which

¹ This convention was signed by the plenipotentiaries of Germany, the United States, the Argentine Republic, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, the Republic of Cuba, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Holland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Mexico, Montenegro, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Persia, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Salvador, Siam, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. It was accepted by Nicaragua on December 16, 1909, and by China on January 15, 1910.

have taken place cannot be compensated merely by the damages awarded to the injured party (a civil party)—in this instance, Luxemburg and Belgium.¹ A crime or misdemeanour involves, beyond the compensation for the damage caused, a punishment proportionate not to the extent of the damage but to the gravity of the fault. It is for the civilised world to constitute itself criminal jury in this trial, a trial without precedent in history. If any further light on it were necessary, we might quote a Germanic author, Baron von Neumann, a lawyer attached to the Austrian Court, Privy Counsellor, Professor at the University of Vienna, and member of the Institute of International Law, who declares—

“There is no law against law. The State is not the supreme legal tribunal on earth, for the whole of humanity is not contained in one State. . . . The superior and supreme legal tribunal is the international tribunal. A universal monarchy or the dictatorship of one all-powerful State would be in contradiction with the international comity, as well as with the independence” of the nations.²

¹ The German Government had, moreover, declared its readiness to “give compensation for any damage caused in Belgium by German troops,” but only if Belgium allowed them passage (Grey Book No. 20).

² Neumann (Baron Leopold von), *The Elements of Modern European International Law*, paragraph 50.

CHAPTER III

THE GERMAN WAR AND SPOLIATION

*“Der Krieg . . . ist eine kapitalistische Aktion.”*¹
NAUMANN.

§ 1. THE EXCESSES OF WHICH THE GERMAN ARMIES HAVE BEEN ACCUSED ARE ONLY A MILITARY APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GERMANIC IMPERIALISM

AT every epoch and in every country, war has always created, both for individuals and for nations, conditions which react profoundly on their normal morality. Men who have only escaped death by dealing it to others lose their respect for human life, even outside the actual military struggle. Authorised to destroy the property of others in their own defence, they are tempted to appropriate or squander it to excess. Exasperated by the severe physical and moral strain, they are in danger of yielding sometimes to the reaction of their most brutal instincts. It is only the prolonged education, the special training, which is comprised in military discipline that makes it possible for highly civilised nations to impose on their soldiers, even in war, respect for those principles of general humanity which are formulated in International Law.

These principles, founded on the Christian ideal of the hereditary warrior knights of the Middle Ages, and observed more or less by the ancient mercenary armies, are powerless to curb the violent appetites engendered by war, unless assisted by severity on the part of the leaders, and, on the part of the men, by a natural

¹ War is an economic action.

humanity and a civilised instinct, which has become rooted in them in the course of their ordinary life. Even in the latter case, the recruiting of modern armies from the whole mass of the nation always involves the risk of introducing into the army degenerates and feeble-minded individuals, slaves of impulse, who, under the exceptional circumstances of the conflict, may be momentarily transformed into criminals.

It would not be just, therefore, to indict a whole army or a race, as a result of certain repulsive individual offences. All wars have presented examples of such crimes, and the belligerent nations are no more dishonoured in war by the excesses of a few small groups of their soldiers than they are in peace by the scandal of this or that crime committed in their midst. For the purpose of instituting comparisons here, it would be necessary in the first place to take statistics; and such a task would certainly be beyond the capacities of a single individual. But it is quite a different matter, if we pass over individual crimes and proceed to the study of collective acts, that is to say, of brutal attacks on property or persons committed by the order and with the expressed approval of the military authorities. Here, indeed, far from constituting criminal exceptions, infractions (individuals and collective) of the established discipline, these acts are imputable to that discipline itself, and consequently to the system of government, to the whole social and moral creed, of which that discipline is the expression, the consequence, and the support.

Even if an isolated example may be excused as the result of an error or fault on the part of an officer, subsequently denounced by his superiors or by public opinion, the accumulation of a certain number of facts of the same nature assumes a very serious aspect; for it allows us, as it were, to trace the curve of a system, point by point, and to mount logically from the basis thus determined to the summit of the pyramid formed

by the hierarchic framework of the nation; and it is evident that, the more coherent the national discipline, the greater the force of these inductions. Thus, pursuing our geometric comparison, we may say that, if the action of a soldier is a point in space, the order of an officer is a line, the importance of which increases with the degree of proximity of that officer to the supreme command. By this method, we may almost draw a diagram representing the whole system, and this may reveal that such-and-such an individual act, possessing no special significance in itself, falls naturally into a logical series of acts, which are undoubtedly governed by directions from superiors. But the significance of this synthetic grouping of facts, which have been duly verified, is strikingly increased, if the law which is deduced from them coincides with the principles already proclaimed by the actual perpetrators of these acts or by their educators. The system constructed by induction is hardly open to dispute, if it may be equally deduced from general and logical data; and this is why, although the present work was intended to be an analytical study of precise and documented facts, it became necessary, for a proper comprehension of these facts, to go back to those general ideas of Germanic Imperialism, which explain their origin. We have examined the foundations upon which the mentality of the leaders of Germanism has developed; we have shown how the general policy of contemporary Germany took its origin from these conceptions. It can hardly be doubted that the methods of warfare employed by the German armies towards the countries which they invaded are equally logical applications of these same principles. German Imperialism is seen to have as its basis the notion of a "biological" superiority of the Germanic race, the conviction that this race should extend its frontiers by a process of conquest, accompanied by elimination, and the almost mystical belief that it was its right, its duty even, to engage in a

“ sacred ” war, for the purpose of dominating the other races. It might have been foreseen, then, how these principles would be applied by Germany under arms. We, know, in fact, that the supreme leaders of the German army, which expresses the offensive force of the nation, are economists whose arguments are *a priori* ; we know that the mechanism of this army is as inflexible as wheels of iron, its officers more or less imbued by the teachings of Haeckel, and its whole mass systematically trained to renounce every individual thought and to obey blindly the demands of collective interests, and wholly impregnated with the idea that Germany, from the moment that she unsheathes her sword, is sole arbiter of all rights !

Thus it is the philosophers, the economists, in fact all the educators of German thought and the directors of her policy, who are responsible for the proceedings of the national armies in regard to the property and inhabitants of the countries invaded by them. Doubtless it will be objected that German thought, above all in the domain of pure idea, is far from exhibiting a uniformity of theory ; and we know that the most daring conceptions of pacifism, internationalism and communism have found and find still ingenious champions in Germany. But academic debates of a more or less revolutionary character are one thing in Germany, and the practical teaching inculcated in the masses by professors of high reputation are another thing. It is these professors, with their remarkably uniform doctrine, who have produced that condition of the Germanic mind which has resulted in the present war. They have done this not only by drilling the minds of the ignorant masses, so that they have hurled themselves towards an imagined victory, filled with utter scorn of the foreigner, but also by systematically influencing these masses in accordance with a plan which, though contrary to the established principles of International Law, is none the less coherent, methodical and clearly

expounded. Nothing could serve better to reveal the guiding ideas of this new method than the very novel and very daring conception of war itself, expounded by Frederic Naumann, the economist and sociologist, as follows—

“On the whole, modern war may be regarded as a capitalistic enterprise.¹ This is a point of view which ought not to be disguised, but, on the contrary, fully and frankly upheld, if we are to find economic justification for war and armaments. At the root of all the wars of recent times are the wars of succession of the monarchical epoch. In such wars, the object at stake is perfectly clear: Two princes fight with the object of increasing their wealth by acquiring taxable territories. But, even the wars of Frederick II of Prussia are wars of acquisition, in the full sense of the term. We see in them a struggle between the Treasury of Berlin and the Treasury of Vienna, contending for the taxpayers of Silesia, a struggle which may be compared with the commercial war of the German and American shipping companies, the only difference being that the latter are prohibited by the states to which they belong from equipping themselves with the implements of war, as was done by the Hanseatic League and the East India Company. The nature of this domestic economy of war is transformed with the continual evolution of the state and the army.

“The separation of the public domain from the private domain of princes, as well as the institution of universal military service, have deprived war of its fiscal character. War is no longer waged in the interests of the public treasury, but in the interests of the economic development of the State. It is waged with the object of intervening in the general economic conflict. This object is less easily ascertained than the yield of taxes from Silesia, but it is none the less per-

¹ *Der Krieg ist eine kapitalistische Aktion.* It is probable that the word “capitalistic” should here be understood in its most general sense, that is to say *economic*, and not in the limited sense in which it is employed by socialists, to contrast the interests of labour and capital. The author has in mind the general advantages of the nations, considered as economic communities.

fectly clear to any one who examines the articles of the peace treaties in which the results of wars have been formulated. We must judge wars not by the speeches with which they are opened, but by the paragraphs with which they are closed.”¹

We do not intend to discuss here this remarkable theory, but it deserves to be reflected upon very seriously, since it implies consequences of the highest importance. If, in fact, modern war is no longer to be regarded as a conflict between two governments concerning their rights in respect to certain populations, but as a conflict between two nations concerning their rights in respect to certain territories, it becomes evident that the attitude of the belligerents towards the enemy populations must be radically changed. When it was a case of obtaining fresh taxpayers, it was important not to diminish their taxpaying capacity, and hence to injure neither persons nor property. It was important, in fact, that a war should not exhaust the fiscal resources of provinces, since these were not only the objective of the war, but were expected also to defray its expenses. To be sure, as it is universally recognised that war must provide the necessities of war, the populations of the invaded countries were obliged, during hostilities, to aid in the maintenance of the troops by contributions either in cash or in kind; but these contributions were repayable, and the burden of them was to fall ultimately not on these contributors alone, but on the whole taxable population of the conquered districts. For the war indemnity exacted from the latter was applied first of all to payment for requisitioned goods, this payment being distributed among the civil population in accordance with the various supplies they had furnished. If, as the last example of a war conducted in accordance with these traditions, we take the campaign of 1870-1, we find that the inhabitants of the provinces of Alsace

¹ F. Naumann, *Das Blaue Buch von Vaterland und Freiheit*. Leipzig (K. R. Langewiesche), 1913, pp. 263-4.

and Lorraine, which were annexed to Germany by the Treaty of Frankfort, were not ruined by the sojourn of the German armies in their midst, and that the material ravages of war were repaired as completely as possible, with a view to restoring their wealth and thereby serving the interests of the empire.

The new financial and "biological" conception of war, which is upheld in modern Germany and already implied in Naumann's phrase, is an entirely different matter. If war is indeed an economic enterprise, designed to further the economic development of the State, it may come to be regarded as much less important to deal gently with the future taxpayer than to seize the actual wealth of the invaded territories. Now, to any one acquainted not only with the demographic increase of contemporary Germany, but also with the very important influence exercised by her consciousness of this increase on her ideas concerning the present subject, it becomes evident that her ambition to secure new taxpayers will be overruled by her ambition to secure new territories and new spheres of economic activity for her annual increase of population and therefore of labour. On the other hand, it is sufficiently clear that the participation of the whole population in the deadly risks of warfare, which were formerly restricted to professional soldiers, hirelings in the service of the public treasury of a state, involves the exposure of the private property of all these citizens to the material risks which formerly affected only the property of the Crown.

This confusion of private and public property is a natural counterpart to the "distinction between the public domain and the private domain of princes." Although Naumann did not himself go so far as to deduce these actual and extreme consequences, the Pan-Germanists, whose redoubtable prophecies we have already quoted, clearly expressed the principles in regard to these matters which should form the foundation of that "new international law" which Germany

was to observe herself and to impose upon others in modern war. Here again, the Pan-Germanist declarations have been for the most part greeted with the contemptuous indifference accorded to insignificant fire-eaters. Here again, the world was deceived, for, since the outbreak of the great war, events (that is to say, the conduct of the German armies and navy) have proved once again that it was the ideas expressed by the Pan-Germanists which were in closest conformity with the true conceptions of Germanism in general. These conceptions, in so far as they relate to the effects of war on the property of the vanquished, may be summed up as follows—

(1) The object of modern war is the economic subordination of the conquered nation to its conqueror;

(2) The economic wealth of a nation is the sum total of the private wealth of its citizens, national communities (societies, parishes, etc.) and the State itself (rights over colonies or protectorates are included among the private possessions of the colonising country);

(3) Thus the object and end of war is the transference to the victorious nation of part of the private wealth of the defeated nation.

Assuming it, then, as proved that the situation of the Germanic race compels it, as a question of life or death, to a war of conquest or hegemony, the practical measures which the German armies would apply to the countries which they desired to annex (that is to say, as we know, Belgium and certain districts in the north and north-east of France) might logically have been predicted in view of the above principles. In order to secure a more extensive habitat for the German population, it will be necessary to effect the evacuation of at least a portion of the conquered territory, for the purposes of portioning out the domains thus rendered vacant to genuinely Germanic subjects. This system of evacuation (*Evakuirung*) has already been practised for several years

past in the Polish domains of the German empire.¹ In order to secure for the German state the greatest possible wealth of resources, without imposing too severe a check on the economic life of Germany, the troops were to seize, as soon as war was declared, all the money and material wealth of every kind which they could lay their hands upon in the invaded districts. This is an extension of the ancient system of "contributions" and "requisitions," but without any proportion to the immediate necessities of the troops. In order to compensate in some degree for the economic disturbances in the empire resulting from the scarcity of labour and raw materials, it would be possible to seize *manu militari* the existing supplies of materials necessary for the industry of the invaded districts, and even to transport into Germany, under divers pretexts, such of the working population as remained in those districts (this last proceeding would doubtless be promptly justified under the head of military necessities). In order to pay the expenses of the war, in addition to the seizure by the invaders of "evacuated" territory, it might be anticipated that, when negotiating the final treaty, they would claim also any private property which might be available, and in particular any debts owing to the vanquished population by foreign nations, the vanquished state being charged with the compensation, according to its resources, of the losses suffered by those of its dependants who had been driven from their houses or deprived of their office. It is obvious, moreover, that the victorious state would claim the colonial domains of the conquered nation; it would reap advantage for its own trade by a favourable commercial

¹ In regard to the Polish question and Prussian proceedings in Posen, Silesia and East Prussia, see J. Buzek, *Historya Polityki rządu pruskiego wobec Polaków*, Lwow (Altenberg); Nicaise, *Allemands et Polonais*, Paris (Marches de l'Est, 1911); *Une Armée de Persécution en Pologne*, Paris (Agence polonaise de presse), 1912-13, 2 vols. Cf. Ludwig Bernhard, *Die Polenfrage*, Leipzig (Duncker and Humblot), second edition, 1910.

treaty; and, in fact, war was to supply the opportunity for German trade to rid itself of many of its rivals, if only hostilities could be pushed into the enemy's country, where big guns are fatal to factories !

And it must not be imagined that the above deductions were merely logical suppositions, rendered seductive by the interpretation of certain military events reported in the Press. The Pan-Germanists had not waited for a state of war, to establish, in some sense officially, the reign of violence, before attacking, in the name of the superior interests of the Germanic race, principles regarded hitherto, even in Prussia, as absolutely unimpeachable laws concerning the rights of property. We may recall the systematic process by which, during the last forty years, these remarkable descendants of the Teutonic knights have planned to expel the hereditary owners from their estates in Prussian Poland. Without recounting in detail the administrative and moral annoyances of every description, by means of which the Prussian authorities attempted, no less unsuccessfully, to subjugate or dishearten the Poles,¹ we may recall the fact that, in order to facilitate the expulsion of refractory individuals, they did not scruple to establish laws and regulations, which were intended to give a semblance of legality to arbitrary measures, but which were none the less contrary to all the recognised principles of legality. Such were the laws which allowed the expulsion from Germany, without any form of trial, of any subject reputed of foreign *origin*, even if he were legally a Prussian subject. Such was the law prohibiting a Pole from building on land which belonged to him, or even repairing his house, if it were falling into ruins. Such, finally, was the famous law of dispossession (*Enteignungsgesetz*) which, in 1908, permitted the administrative authorities to seize the estates of a Polish

¹ We may recall the heroic resistance of the Polish children, who, in spite of blows and privations, refused to say their prayers at school in German.

landowner against his will, in return for an arbitrary indemnification, to expel from the land thus obtained all subjects of Slav origin, and to parcel it into lots to be colonised by pure Germans. This law excited animated protests, even among Prussian proprietors, and was only passed through the enthusiasm of the socialists, who were delighted at this first attack on the impregnability of private property. But the Pan-Germanists wished at any price to conquer this district, which they regarded as dangerous because, owing to the vitality of the Polish nation, the genuinely Germanic subjects among the rural population of Posen and East Prussia were in a minority.

And, however unusual such measures might be, however brutal and cruel their application, the publicists in the pay of the Pan-German League deemed them still not sufficiently effective and energetic. In their books and their papers they clamoured incessantly for fresh Polish proscriptions, thus very effectively preparing the mass of the German people for entirely unprecedented legal and moral conceptions in regard to the rights of private property belonging to enemies, or even to aliens.¹ For if, in time of complete peace, such arbitrary and exceptional treatment, such inquisitions and spoliations, were sanctioned in the case of subjects annexed to the empire, it might have been logically anticipated that no greater scrupulousness would be displayed in time of war! The evolution of the German conscience between 1870 and 1914 is thus revealed as the same in its Polish policy and in its methods of warfare in Belgium and France. In the name of the superior rights of threatened Germanism, the Pan-Germanists succeeded, in 1908, in securing legal conse-

¹ In addition to the works of Tannenberg and Frymann already quoted, see *Zwanzig Jahre alldeutscher Arbeit und Kämpfe*, Leipzig (Dietrich), 1910; and, above all, in addition to the *Post* and the other leading Pan-Germanist newspapers, the local Press, such as the *Danziger Neueste Nachrichten*, the *Ostdeutsche Warte*, of Posen, the *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* of Bremberg, etc.

eration for the principle of the nullity of any claims to property put forward by Slav subjects. In the name of the same rights, Tannenberg, in 1911, brutally declared the necessity for Germany to modify international conceptions touching private property in land warfare; and he does so by the following arguments—

“Great Britain regards it as her special right to recognise no private property in maritime war. As an equally Germanic power, let us accept her point of view, and transport it into the domain which belongs to us—continental war. At the time of the Thirty Years War and of the Napoleonic struggle, our neighbours treated German territories as if they were goods without an owner. The towns of eastern Germany are still suffering at the present day from the confiscation of their forests by Napoleon. It is only a few years since Elbing and Königsberg paid off their last debts from 1807. The wrong that we have suffered is so gigantic that it would suffice to justify a revenge. But a far greater wrong is involved in the attempt to block the way to German expansion. This crime is so great that the most rigorous measures are scarcely adequate as a retort to such a persecution of Germanism. We need a new law of nations. We can find it a name without seeking far afield. We will call it the English maritime law.”¹

Nothing could express more clearly the idea of systematic seizure of the private property of the vanquished, and we must admit that there is some piquancy in the argument drawn from the legitimacy of this practice in maritime war! It is only to be regretted that the German delegates to the Hague Conference did not see fit to bring forward this idea at the time of the codification of the regulations concerning the conduct of land warfare! It may have been that at that time the conception had not yet sufficiently matured in German public opinion. It may have been that the official attitude of Germany in this instance was inspired by the


¹ *Gross-Deutschland*, pp. 82–3.

doctrine of Bernhardi already quoted, which regards deceit and trickery as normal methods of "pacific rivalry."¹ This is a question of psychology which may be construed in various ways; but it cannot be disputed that, for the last few years, ideas of this nature have been widely propagated in Germany, and that they form a striking commentary on the events of the war of 1914. Tannenberg himself, moreover, at the end of his book, *Gross-Deutschland*, outlined the ideal claims of Pan-Germanism, in the form of articles of treaties, which a victorious Germany might conceivably impose upon the world. Thus, applying the theory of Naumann, according to which the inmost causes of wars are to be sought in the "paragraphs by which they are closed," we may reflect with advantage on the articles of the Treaty of Brussels, which Tannenberg imagined as closing the future Franco-German war. Here we find set out in detail the application of the principle of the confiscation of private property, both real property and movable property.

§ 1. France cedes to Germany the departments of: The Vosges with Epinal, Meurthe-et-Moselle with Nancy and Lunéville, the eastern half of the Meuse with Verdun, and of the Ardennes with Sedan; total about 17,114 km.² This country is at present sparsely populated—sixty-nine inhabitants to the kilometre. This is scarcely half the density of the population of Germany. This region of the lofty basins of the Meuse and the Moselle to be ceded to Germany only comprises 1,192,453 inhabitants. This new province receives the name of West Franconia, with its capital and the administrative authorities for its new army corps and a university at Nancy. The chief towns of the district will be: in the north, Verdun on the Meuse; and, in the south, Epinal on the Moselle. The new western frontier follows the line dividing the land watered by the

¹ See above, p. 119.

² i. e. the Argonne, undoubtedly an excellent strategic frontier from the German point of view.



Some of the evacuated Population from Lorraine.

Meuse from that watered by the tributaries on the right bank of the Seine.

§ 2. France takes the inhabitants of these territories, and instals them elsewhere. This migration must be effected in the space of one year dating from the signature of the peace treaty. The country will be divided into rural estates of from sixty to ninety acres, according to their quality, which will be bestowed as a reward on those German soldiers who shall have distinguished themselves during the war. The landed property in towns shall also be distributed in lots of about the same value. Those soldiers who took part in the war of 1870-1 shall also benefit by this distribution. The creation of the new province of West Franconia is necessary to repair the mistake which we made in 1871, when we were mad enough to concede to the inhabitants of these districts, because they spoke German, all the rights of Germans, and when we under-estimated the influence of France. We must have, to the west of Alsace-Lorraine, a purely German province; and then the question of Alsace-Lorraine will be settled for a long time to come.¹

§ 3. France declares her agreement to the entry of Holland and Belgium into the German empire. Thus the ancient frontiers of the empire of Charles V have almost been restored, not yet entirely, for there still lack some territories on the upper Scheldt; but, as we have more pressing obligations on our southern and eastern frontiers, we must content ourselves for the moment, in regard to our western frontier, with what we have gained. Holland, with her royal house, enters into the German empire as a confederated state, with full rights. She contributes, in accordance with the figures of her population, two army corps, having, as their respective centres, Rotterdam in the south and Groningen in the north. The Dutch universities are

¹ We may compare with this very detailed prophecy the actual methods adopted by the German military authorities for "evacuating" these very districts of their entire populations. The fact that these proceedings have excited no disapprobation or even surprise in the German people is attested by German postcards like that reproduced here. In spite of the description *Flüchtlinge* (fugitives), it is not difficult to recognise in these unoffending women some of the "evacuated" population guarded by soldiers with fixed bayonets.

recognised, and accept the constitution of the German universities. Holland enters into the German Customs Union (*Zollverein*) without paying any indemnity or incurring any special obligations, this representing a very considerable advantage to all the industries of the country, and especially to its horticulture and agriculture, which, in the region of the mouths of the Rhine, are blessed with such favourable climatic conditions. Java is reserved to Holland as a private colony. The other colonies—the East Indies, Surinam and Oceania—become the property of the German empire. The Dutch schools teach German as a second national language, not only in the higher schools, but also in the popular schools. For the internal affairs of the kingdom Dutch continues to be employed. For intercourse with the German empire, as well as with foreign nations, the German language must be employed. The same terms will be conceded to Belgium. She contributes two army corps, with their centres at Antwerp and at Liège on the Meuse respectively. In the case of the appropriation of Belgium's colonies, there is no question of private advantage. On the contrary, it may be regarded as a public benefit that the Congo state, which is much too large for this little country, should come wholly under the authority and protection of the great German nation and empire.

§ 4. The Walloon inhabitants of Belgium shall be adopted by France for the colonising of her uninhabited territories. The migration shall be completed in three years. The estates of the Walloons and of the inhabitants of those districts on the upper Moselle and the upper Meuse incorporated in the new province of West Franconia, both as regards houses and lands, shall be valued by experts, and compensation shall be made to the former owners by the republic, out of the War Indemnity to be paid by France to Germany. The frontier regions thus evacuated on the middle course of the Meuse shall receive an immigration of German soldiers, who shall have distinguished themselves during the war, in such a manner that, in the course of a few years, the population of this frontier province shall be purely German. The absurd customs frontier between the German empire and its ports on the Meuse and the Rhine will thus be suppressed.

§ 5. France cedes to Germany her claims to the millions that she has lent to Russia.¹

§ 6. France pays to Germany thirty-five thousand million marks in cash. This is half the amount which France boasts of possessing. This loss will hit France just where she is most sensitive and at the same time most capable of responding. Since the close of the First Empire, money has been both the idol and the curse of the French people. If France had not more available money than any other nation in the world, she would never have succeeded in playing the part of a benevolent banker for the rest and in making advances to our enemies. Let us deprive France of this accursed money, and we shall at length have peace; we shall be able to continue our peaceful development and to deem ourselves very happy in our system of six children.

§ 7. France declares her agreement to the entrance of Luxemburg and Switzerland into the German Empire.

§ 8. France accepts the modifications which the German nation has made in her southern and eastern frontiers.

§ 9. France surrenders her fleet, which passes into the possession of the German Empire.

§ 10. France surrenders her colonies (with the exception of Algeria) to Germany.

§ 11. France signs the treaties made between Germany and the other Powers: England, the United States, Japan and Russia.

§ 12. France signs the new commercial treaty with Germany, which is adapted to the conditions created by the transference of powers from one to the other.

Such are the twelve articles of the Peace of Brussels between Germany and France. They assert the definite

¹ We cannot reflect too much on this entirely new conception of the transference, to the victorious State, of debts due to individuals in the defeated country. It is a rigorously logical application of Naumann's principle. Doubtless Tannenberg assumes, in the case of this personal property, as in the case of landed property, that the French State would indemnify the expropriated. However that may be, the principle, which has already been put into practice in various ways by the German authorities, is of a nature to revolutionise international customs and to involve astonishing applications at the final conclusion of the war.

superiority of the German nation, with its high birth-rate, over the French nation, with its low birth-rate. The race of armaments since the Treaty of Frankfort has come to an end.¹

Doubtless such a programme of spoliation, so brutally expounded, did not fail to shock even the German nation, at the time of its publication. But we must not lose sight of the fact that this has been the case with all new ideas, and that their success ought to be measured less by the words than by the deeds which have succeeded their utterance. Now, a short time afterwards, Frymann, in an appreciation of Tannenberg's recent book, pronounced it to be "rather too fantastic,"² but at the same time admitted that the nationalist reviews now and then express analogous ideas, so that it must certainly be admitted that they are in the air.³ And he adds—

"Since we have touched in passing on the 'question of evacuation,' let us remark here, that it is not perhaps out of the place after all to refer to it openly now and again, in order that our adversaries may know that such desperate measures already find their defenders in Germany; they will realise the necessity for exercising some prudence; for it is not advisable to excite too far the *furor teutonicus*.

"If it should be demanded of any one who has learnt to think historically (*wer historisch denken gelernt hat*) that a country inhabited by Europeans should be 'evacuated,' that is to say, should suffer a violent interruption of a development which has been going on for centuries, his hair would stand on end. Moreover, this idea shocks the instincts of the cultured man, and it is in contradiction with modern International Law, which safeguards the property of private individuals belonging to belligerent nations. But, if we examine deeply enough the particular situation of the

¹ *Gross-Deutschland*, pp. 237-9.

² *Etwas reichlich phantastisch*.

³ Further expressions of them may be found in the extracts from the Pan-Germanist Press collected by Nippold in *Der Deutsche Chauvinismus*. See especially pp. 26-7.

German nation; if we consider that it is completely encircled in Europe, and that, if it continues its vigorous development, it would be in danger of suffocation for want of air; we must admit that the case may present itself when Germany will have to exact from her adversary depopulated territory, either on the west or the east, unless we have inhabitable colonies overseas, or else are resolved to tolerate a further emigration of Germans to foreign countries.

"In any case, evacuation need only be regarded as an extreme measure provoked by necessity, and one so alien to the sentiments of our age, from the point of view of civilisation, right and morality, that it would only be resorted to in case we were attacked by insolent enemies, whom we finally defeated. In other words, we ought not to imagine an offensive war, for the purpose of occupying foreign territories and then of evacuating them; but we must accustom ourselves to regard such measures as admissible, in reply to a hostile attack. A war of plunder (*Raubkrieg*) is repugnant to our ideas, but punishment for a criminal act of aggression seems to us justified; even if it takes this very rigorous form; for necessity knows no law. We may, moreover, regard in the same light—that is to say, as equivalent to a defensive war—any war which might be waged offensively on the part of the German people, but which had to be undertaken in order to forestall our enemies."¹

We may remark the curious subtlety of this argument, according to which a war of plunder is contrary to international law as well as to morality, but which gives the name of a defensive war, justifying any spoliations, to political and military acts of aggression undertaken in order to "forestall enemies." This line of argument, which dates from 1912, does not seem to have escaped the notice of the Prussian statesmen and generals of 1914.²

¹ *Wenn ich der Kaiser wär!* pp. 140-1.

² Since the first German victories in Belgium and in France in 1914, the Germanic Press has taken the opportunity to revive and develop the ideas of Tannenberg and Frymann. Without multiplying here quotations, which would necessarily repeat themselves, we may mention, among the most curious expositions of these theories of

It remains to be seen how they proposed to put it into practice, without contradicting too flagrantly the letter of the German Army Regulations.

§ 2. THE GERMAN ARMY REGULATIONS FORBID
“PILLAGE” BUT AUTHORISE “REQUISITION”

Apparently certain misconceptions in regard to the military regulations at present in force in the German army have on several occasions found their way into the Press. Certain authors have quoted from texts which have been superseded, like that of the *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege* of 1902, in which the soldiers are exhorted to disregard the prescriptions of International Law. Others have drawn attention to the flagrant contradiction between the regulations contained in the official texts and the actions laid to the charge of the German soldiery, and have judged that the latter must have yielded to savage instincts of rapine and undisciplined violence. We may perceive here a twofold inaccuracy. We know that the *Kriegsbrauch* of 1902, which scandalised the diplomatic world of that epoch, was definitely repudiated by the German delegates at the Conference of 1907, and that these delegates, so far from upholding the theories which had been taken exception to in this manual, on the contrary, took the initiative in the measures designed to emphasise the binding character of the precepts of International Law; and it is, moreover, important to remember that the official instructions which have been published since that date and have been in use among the German officers and soldiers, are in perfect harmony at any rate with the letter of the regulations concerning the laws and customs of land warfare. For instance, in the 28 *Kriegsartikel*,

“evacuation” and “dispossession,” the pamphlet of Arthur Dix, *Der Weltwirtschaftskrieg*, No. 3 of the series, “Zwischen Krieg und Frieden,” published at Leipzig (S. Hirzel), 1914-15, under the patronage of Georg Irmer, Karl Lamprecht and Franz von Liszt.

which constitute, as it were, the military catechism of the German soldier, we may note the following—

Art. 17. Im Felde darf der Soldat nie vergessen dass der Krieg nur mit der bewaffneten Macht des Feindes geführt wird. Hab und Gut der Bewohner des feindlichen Landes, der Verwundeten, Kranken und Kriegsgefangenen stehen unter dem besonderen Schutz des Gesetzes, ebenso das Eigentum von gebliebenen Angehörigen der deutschen oder verbündeten Truppen.

Eigenmächtiges Beutemachen, Plünderung, boshafte oder mutwillige Beschädigung oder Vernichtung fremder Sachen im Felde, Bedrückung der Landesbewohner werden mit den schwersten Strafen belegt. Als Plünderung ist es nicht anzusehen, wenn die Aneignung sich nur auf Lebensmittel, Heilmittel, Bekleidungsgegenstände, Feuerungsmittel, Futter und Beförderungsmittel erstreckt und dem vorhandenen Bedürfnis entspricht.

Art. 18. Der Soldat darf seine Waffen nur in Erfüllung seines Berufes oder in rechtmässiger Selbstverteidigung gebrauchen. Rechtswidriger Waffengebrauch wird schwer bestraft; dergleichen die unvorsichtige Behandlung von Waffen und Munition, wenn dadurch ein Mensch körperlich verletzt oder getötet worden ist.

Art. 17. In the field the soldier must not forget that war is only waged against the armed forces of the enemy. The property of the inhabitants of the hostile country, of the wounded, sick, and prisoners, is under the special protection of the law, and the same applies to the property of the slain belonging to the German or allied troops.

Arbitrary plundering and pillaging, malicious or wanton damage, or destruction of property in foreign countries during the campaign, oppression of the inhabitants, will meet with the severest punishment. It is not to be considered as pillage, if the appropriation is confined to means of subsistence, medical necessities, clothing, fuel, fodder, and means of transport, and is in conformity with the actual needs of the moment.

Art. 18. The soldier ought only to employ his weapons in the exercise of his calling or in legitimate self-defence. Any illegitimate use of weapons will be severely punished. The same applies to any incautious handling of weapons and munitions, which results in the death or injury of any person.

Art. 24. Der Soldat soll ein ordentliches Leben führen und darf weder Schulden machen, noch dem Trunke, dem Spiel oder anderen Ausschweifungen sich ergeben. Auch muss er vom Zapfenstreich bis zum Wecken in seinem Quartier sein, wenn er nicht im Dienst sich befindet oder von seinem Vorgesetzten Erlaubnis erhalten hat, sich anderswo aufzuhalten.

Bei strafbaren Handlungen gegen die Pflichten der militärischen Unterordnung, bei allen in Ausübung des Dienstes begangenen strafbaren Handlungen bildet die selbstverschuldete Trunkenheit des Täters keinen Mildergrund.

Wer im Dienst oder nachdem er zum Dienst befehligt worden ist, durch Trunkenheit zur Ausführung seiner Dienstverrichtung sich untauglich macht, wird mit harter Freiheitstrafe belegt.

Art. 26. Strenge Redlichkeit gehört zu den besonderen Pflichten des Soldaten.

Diebstähle oder Unterschlagungen bei Ausübung des Dienstes oder unter Verletzung des militärischen Dienstverhältnisses werden mit Freiheits- und Ehrenstrafe belegt. In gleicher Weise bestraft wird derjenige, der einen Diebstahl oder eine Unterschlagung gegen einen Vorgesetzten oder einen Kameraden oder gegen seinen

Art. 24. The soldier must lead an orderly life, and must not incur debts, or indulge in gambling, drinking or other excesses. From the tattoo to the reveillé he must remain in his quarters, unless he is engaged in the performance of his duties, or has received permission from his superior officer to absent himself.

In case of infringements of the obligations of military discipline, in the case of misconduct in the performance of duties, the fact that the offender was drunk, by his own fault, shall not be regarded as an extenuating circumstance.

Any one who, while on duty, or after he has been ordered to go on duty, renders himself incapable through drunkenness of performing his functions, shall be punished with a severe sentence of imprisonment.

Art. 26. A scrupulous honesty is one of the special obligations of a soldier.

Thefts or frauds committed in the exercise of duties, or in violation of the conditions pertaining to military service, will be punished with imprisonment and disgrace. In the same way, any one guilty of theft or fraud, to the detriment of a superior officer, or a fellow-soldier, or the person on whom he is quartered, or any

Quartierwirt oder eine zu dessen Hausstand gehörige Person begeht. Strafe tritt auch dann ein, wenn der Wert der gestohlenen oder veruntreuten Gegenstandes unbedeutend ist, oder die Tat auch nur versucht wurde.

one belonging to the household of the latter, shall be punished. And he shall be punished, even if the value of the object stolen or misappropriated is insignificant, or if the act was only attempted.

Similar instructions are contained in the manuals destined for the use of officers, such as that of Michaelis, published in 1908,¹ or of Captain A. Nicolai, in the last edition of his book edited in 1912 by Major Hein.² We find in the latter, among other extracts from the new *Kriegsbrauch*, the following statements—

“The inhabitants of the conquered country are not to be regarded as enemies, although, as a result of the condition of war, they are subject to restrictions, exactions and coercive measures, and are bound to obey the power temporarily placed over them. No attack should be made either on their person or their life, their honour or their liberty. Naturally, the right of the inhabitants to this consideration is contingent upon their behaving in an absolutely pacific manner and not refusing obedience to the enemy administration. Failing in this, the inhabitants shall be treated and punished in conformity with the laws of war. Even if the enemy troops exact from the inhabitants services necessitated by the war, the rules above mentioned shall not be modified in any way. . . .

“The property of private individuals ought to be spared, in time of war. Every kind of wanton destruction is absolutely forbidden. The soldier who acts contrary to this prohibition is punished as a criminal. On the contrary, any destruction which is necessitated for the conduct of the war, or results from it as a necessary consequence, is permissible. Further, private property which at the same time comes under the heading of instruments of war—such as weapons, carriages, cycles, motor-cars, geographical maps, and, in particular also, supplies of the means of subsistence—may be

¹ Michaelis, *Der Dienstunterricht des Infanterie-Offiziers*.

² Nicolai-Hein, *Der Infanterie-Leutnant im Felde*. Berlin, 1912.

requisitioned. In addition to these, objects required to satisfy a temporary need of the troops, such as the materials and instruments necessary for the construction of fortresses, bridges, railways, etc., may also be demanded. In order to secure that the owners of the objects requisitioned shall receive an indemnity from their government later, a certificate must be given to them, as an act of justice, of the seizure that has been made.

“In any case it is not permissible to pillage—that is to say, to despoil—the inhabitants of the country, by resorting to intimidation and abuse of military authority. But the appropriation of means of subsistence, medical remedies, fuel, clothing, fodder or means of transport, is not to be regarded as pillage, provided this appropriation is not out of proportion with the needs of the situation. The real property of the State may be legitimately made use of by the enemy. Movable property belonging to the State may be declared booty of war. But from this right of appropriation are exempted all objects employed for the purpose of religious worship, education, science and the arts, philanthropy and the care of the sick.

“It is important to distinguish between requisitions and contributions. By the latter is understood money payments exacted from the inhabitants of the occupied territory. These can only be ordered by superior officers, and must be collected with the co-operation of the administrative authorities of the district. A receipt must be given for the amount levied.

“The conception of the method and conduct of war has already changed many times and is still subject to change (witness the Russo-Japanese war). But, although the history of war teaches us that the only really humane proceedings are often those which appear the most merciless, it ought not to be forgotten that the spirit of chivalry and Christianity will generally reveal the right course to adopt in regard to any particular question.”¹

These recommendations are obviously very correct, and the last proposition, in particular, is irreproachable.

¹ Nicolai-Hein, *op. cit.*, pp. 214–20.

Instructed in this fashion, the German officer and soldier are undoubtedly inexcusable if they resort to violence or plunder, to the detriment of the population of the occupied districts. But we know that it is of the essence of German culture to emphasise the profound and inevitable distinction between individual ideas, intentions and actions, and collective ideas, intentions and actions (that is to say, prescribed by or simply in conformity with the ends of the collectivity). An American journalist who journeyed through Belgium after the massacres of Aerschot and Louvain, spoke with appreciation of the perfect courtesies of the German officers, but could not help remarking—

“ But, when all is said and done, they impressed me not as human beings, who have weaknesses and virtues, likes and dislikes of their own, but rather as parts, more or less important, of a mighty and highly efficient machine which is directed and controlled by a cold and calculating intelligence in far-away Berlin. That machine has about as much of the human element as a meat chopper, as a steam roller, as the death chair at Sing-Sing. Its mission is to crush, obliterate, destroy, and no considerations of civilisation or chivalry or humanity will affect it.” ¹

To be the impassive steel mechanism of an immense machine, that is, in fact, the whole patriotic ambition of the German, moulded by Prussian, Hegelian and Haeckelian culture; and this ambition is exactly realised in the good Prussian soldier. But, then, it becomes essential that the machine should always glide over fixed rails; and it is here, as we have been able to observe already, that the official prescriptions become disquietingly vague, both as regards the respect due to individuals, and also as regards the safeguarding of private property. We shall see later how circumstances induced the German commanders to interpret the advice “to take the most merciless measures”

¹ Alexis Powell, *Fighting in Flanders* (Heinemann), p. 131.

against "rebellion" on the part of the inhabitants. We may remark in the first place the curious assemblage of objects susceptible of requisition by the troops: "means of subsistence, medical remedies, clothing, fuel, fodder, means of transport, materials and implements necessary for the construction of fortresses, bridges, railways . . ."; and, in general, "objects required to satisfy a temporary necessity of the troops." When such vague instructions are left to the private interpretation of subalterns, it is inevitable that the distinction between a "temporary necessity" and a caprice of the troops, between an individual "requisition" and collective pillage, should rapidly be lost sight of. The way is prepared for a subtle casuistry, in cases where the fatigue and enervation of the men, no less than the arrogance of their leaders, are opposed to any delay for the purpose of making distinctions. The soldier ends by believing that everything is permitted to him, provided that he acts in a "collective" spirit, and insensibly he abandons himself to acts of the utmost brutality.

For a minor inconvenience of this system, and of the contemptuous attitude towards the enemy population with which it is too frequently applied, is that, nevertheless, it destroys discipline. It is in vain for pillage to be treated as requisition, to be systematised and so to speak official; it is inevitably accompanied with excesses. The argument that these excesses have sometimes been considered by the German leaders as an adequate punishment of the guilty population is one which no more admits of justification than that of the "evacuation" of a district merely for having dared to present itself on the path of German expansion. But, without discussing these lofty conceptions here, it will be sufficient to state one fact, which in itself explains many things: namely, that in a country in which, as in the case of France and Belgium, the vaults and cellars are full of excellent wines, it is inevitable that soldiers,

hungry and harassed by heat and fatigue, should abandon themselves to dangerous potations, as soon as they are ordered by their leaders to lay violent hands on the property of the inhabitants. This *requisition*, it is only fair to mention, has often commenced under supervision and in orderly fashion, the best wines (notably champagne) being reserved for the officers, and the remainder distributed more or less methodically among the troops.¹ But, in the precipitation "justified" by the order to proceed to the destruction of the village, most of the detachments commenced by making abundant individual appropriations upon the reserves of the inhabitants. This practice, on the part of men who are fatigued, ill-nourished and little habituated to the wines and liqueurs of France, has resulted in fits of drunkenness, frequently of a terrible character, to which superior officers have generally closed their eyes, either through impotence to restrain them, or haughty indifference, or complicity.

Many impartial writers thoroughly acquainted with modern Germany, while paying homage to the great qualities of the German army, have felt compelled to admit the deplorably intemperate habits of too many of the officers. The traditions of the students of old Germany had raised great beer-drinkings to the height of an institution. The prosperity of modern Germany, and the increasing elegance of military circles (notably of the Prussian Guard, which is the arbiter in these matters), have, it would seem, only changed the nature of the liquid consumed at these gatherings. The wines, especially sparkling wines, substituted for harmless beer, but consumed in equally large quantities, have already given rise in time of peace to numerous scandals, even in Germany. It is not in the least surprising that with such precedents, German officers in an enemy

¹ See below, § 4, and also Chapter IV for numerous examples of these distributions of wines seized in the villages and small towns of France and Belgium.

country should have shown a great indulgence for the excesses of their men and even of their fellow-officers. But, unfortunately, on these Germanic temperaments, hereditarily unprepared for this form of intoxication, these generous wines appear sometimes to produce psychological reactions of extraordinary violence. At any rate, this is affirmed by more than one of the officers themselves. For instance, Hans Pommer, a retired captain, writes as follows—

“I, for my part, have been present more than once at scenes of vandalism which would defy description. During a farewell dinner given by the officers’ corps of the camp at Elsenborn to a division of cavalry, I was the witness of a mad frenzy of destruction, which extended not only to all the china, but also to the stoves, the statues, the frames, the tables and the chairs of the banqueting hall and the adjoining rooms. In applying the aphorism *in vino veritas* to the conduct of this corps of officers—which might be looked upon as embodying the flower of Germany, for it included representatives of the supreme aristocracy, and even a prince of the blood—we are forced to take note of the lamentable fact that the veneer of civilisation is only deposited in a very thin layer over the upper ranks of our society. The least excess of alcoholic potations is sufficient to transform the members of a nationality who pride themselves above all in a consciousness of their superiority into veritable barbarians, and into barbarians who, far from regretting their lamentable exploits when they have recovered from the effects of their potations, only regard them as matter for pride. Only imagine the overwhelming impression which cannot but have been produced on the orderlies of the officers by the spectacle of this horde, abandoning themselves freely to the vehemence of their *furor teutonicus*! Certainly these witnesses will have described the whole scene to their comrades, so that the drama enacted by these civilised human beings, temporarily transformed into savages, will have by no means been confined within the walls surrounding the intimacy of a circle of officers. In fact, it is high time to put an end to the passion for drinking prevalent in the officers’ corps of the German

army; and it is high time, above all, that the vehemence of this passion should cease to be honoured in an officer as the noblest of manly virtues ! ”¹

It does not surprise us, then, that, endowed as they are by their military regulations with an absolute authority, with an unrestricted power of life or death over unarmed men, women and children, young German soldiers should have exercised it without restraint, and that, under the stimulus of intoxication, they should have been capable of every kind of misdemeanour and abuse. In such a case, their individual responsibility is diminished almost to extinction, while that of the system which allows such things is correspondingly increased. The more perfect the mechanism of the German military hierarchy, the more insignificant the initiative of its inferior ranks in relation to the higher command, and that rigorous and universal subordination, which aims at the annihilation of the individual will, bestows on the commanding officers not only the most complete liberty of action, but also the sole and total responsibility for their subordinates.

And whatever applies to the leaders applies to the men; for the latter have only been trained to collective obedience, and not to the personal interpretation of their instructions. Now the latter, as we have seen, were purposely couched in ambiguous terms, so as to leave the greatest possible latitude to commanding officers; and thus the conduct of the troops is not even regulated by rules which they have learnt by heart, but by the inclinations of their officer. Hence the striking contrast between the conduct of the various sections of the German army towards the inhabitants

¹ Hans Pommer, *Zwanzig Jahre als Infanterie-Offizier in den Reichslanden*, Frankfort-on-the-Main (Neuer Frankfurter Verlag), 1914, 8vo. It is very interesting to compare the testimony of this officer with older works, such as Beyerlein's famous novel, *Jena oder Sedan*, the courageous and patriotic attacks of which, against the narrow Prussian military formalism, procured for it such an extraordinary success (Berlin, Vita. 249th thousand in 1914).

of Belgium and France, who, in some instances, have been treated with consideration, and, in other instances, brutally abused. First of all, this was attributed to the different characteristics of the Prussian, Saxon, Bavarian and other races composing the German army. But the difference would appear to depend rather upon the dispositions of the various leaders, especially of the generals and superior officers, some of whom have reserved strictly to themselves the right of deciding when it was necessary to make regular requisitions, while others have systematically allowed their troops to lay violent hands on the property of the inhabitants. We find, in fact, that it is almost always the same corps who are guilty of the worst excesses, while others are consistently correct in their behaviour. In the case of the latter, it has even happened that soldiers who have been found guilty of theft have, upon the complaint of the inhabitants, been punished and compelled to make restitution. Whenever, that is to say, the German generals and officers have endeavoured to impose on their men respect for the inhabitants, in accordance with the traditional principles of International Law, they have succeeded in doing so, with the exercise, of course, of a little severity. Whenever the conduct of the troops has been wanting in this respect, the real culprits have been the officers placed over them, as well as the generals, their responsible superiors; and, even more, perhaps, the commanders of the armies, who, by their general instructions and their example, gave the most formidable direction to private interpretations.

§ 3. THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND REQUISITIONS OFFICIALLY IMPOSED BY THE GERMAN COMMANDERS ARE IN THE NATURE OF SPOLIATION

It is instructive to observe that the actions of the German commanders seem to be governed by the same principle as that which is offered as an excuse for the

excesses of their subordinates, a principle which they invariably express by the pretended French formula: *c'est la guerre*.¹ By the troops and the inferior officers, this excuse is used to cover all individual requisitions. By the generals, it is used to justify, in addition to collective requisitions, the levy of exorbitant contributions. In both cases, it is, in fact, merely an application of the system of the spoliation of the defeated enemy, which, as we have said, is the whole object of Germanic war. This spoliation is made under two pretexts, very different in theory, but in practice admitting very analogous applications. Sometimes it is excused by "the temporary needs of the troops," which include money for the leaders and provisions in kind for the men and horses. Sometimes the motive is alleged to be the duty of chastising a "rebellious" population, by imposing on it heavy penalties. We shall see that these penalties often extend to the massacre of peaceful inhabitants of both sexes and of all ages, and to the burning of villages and towns, which have previously been, as far as possible, denuded of all their valuable contents.

A detailed account of the contributions of war thus levied by the German armies, both in Belgium and France, would entail disclosures exceeding the limits of the present work. Moreover the most remarkable of these have been described in the Press of both hemispheres at the time of their occurrence, and we may recall the amazement with which the world received the news, retailed by the German agencies and newspapers themselves, of the enormous sums levied by the invaders, even in the towns most submissive to their

¹ This expression occurs in a great number of the German diaries of the campaign. It seems as if it had become part of the German military code, with the same authority as most of the technical phrases concerning the army. But, as happens very frequently in the case of French words imported into Germany, it seems to be applied, above all in modern war, in a sense very different from the original.

authority, like Brussels.¹ The amount of these impositions is without precedent in history, and cannot be justified by any of the reasons pleaded by conquerors in a similar case. There are two arguments which are ordinarily pleaded in justification of the ancient custom of contributions of war. Sometimes they are regarded as the ransom of a town which the enemy might otherwise have bombarded, taken by assault and given over to pillage (this is the historic excuse); sometimes they are regarded simply as a requisition of the money necessary to the commanders of the victorious army for obtaining means of subsistence for their troops (this is the modern conception, which is, in fact, simply an extension of the right of requisition). Thus, whether regarded as a penalty or a necessity, we see that the contribution of war imposed on a town must either have been justified by the hostile attitude of the latter, or else be duly proportioned to the immediate necessities of the troops which occupy it. Save in exceptional cases, therefore, these exactions would be fairly moderate in relation to the resources of the inhabitants; and this custom was, for the most part, observed by the German armies in their victorious campaigns up to and including 1870-1. From this point of view, the present war exhibits a very remarkable development in the ambition of the German commanders to secure for the victorious troops the largest possible proportion of the private property of the defeated.

These contributions are sometimes imposed by the commanders immediately upon their arrival in an undefended town or district, under pretext of meeting the immediate necessities of the troops. This is the contingency provided for, and it is correct in principle; but the amount of the sums exacted is generally exorbitant in proportion to the population; and, moreover, when the amount has once been furnished, the in-

¹ The city of Brussels never offered the least resistance to the entry of the German troops; yet a no less heavy ransom was exacted from it.

habitants are none the less subjected to every kind of requisition. Sometimes, without the smallest pretext, the contribution, described as a fine or a ransom, is raised without any mercy, until it becomes a general confiscation of all the money belonging to the inhabitants; and even this is not sufficient to prevent pillage and devastation. In the first category we may place the well-known occurrences at Brussels, where the energy and ability of Burgomaster Max, supported by influential intercessions, scarcely availed to secure the reduction of the original German demands. It was the same with Lille, Rheims, and even the smallest villages of France. To the second group belong the contributions levied, for instance, at Antwerp, where a payment of forty millions was demanded by the enemy, in spite of the sufferings and privations resulting from the siege and the blockade;¹ at Wavre, from which three million francs was demanded between August 22 and September 1, under pretext that the German troops had been attacked;² at Lunéville, which was ordered to pay 650,000 francs upon the same pretext, on September 3, after a portion of the town had been burnt on August 26 for the same reason. The difficulty of obtaining reliable, precise and complete information concerning the localities occupied by the enemy make it impossible to fully expose the systematic spoliation which is covered by these German exactions. But the examples which we are now in a position to verify are sufficiently characteristic to enable us to realise the ruling principle of the methods of warfare employed by the majority of the present leaders of the Germanic armies: namely, to impoverish the defeated country, and, at the same time, to enrich the conqueror.

This system, when it is systematically applied by

¹ The payment of this contribution was not completed until February 1915.

² See the official publication of the Belgian Government, *La Violation du Droit des Gens en Belgique*, p. 81.

means of collective impositions, wears an aspect of comparative regularity, if not of justice, and hence does not so much disgrace the good fame of the troops entrusted with its application. But, here again, the spirit prevails over the letter of the methods adopted : the rate of the contribution is in harmony with the exaggerations of the requisitions in kind, and leaders thus accustomed to treat occupied territories without any mercy, but to compel them to furnish the maximum, will be the more inclined to excuse, tolerate and even encourage, partial or individual excesses inspired by the same principle. Moreover, the economic exhaustion of the occupied territories is completed by other collective proceedings, some of which, such as requisitions of raw materials and of machinery, are unexpected innovations, while others, such as the transportation of the civilian population, recall the worst abuses of ancient times, abandoned centuries ago, at any rate by the civilised nations of Europe. As in the case of the contributions, it is hardly possible as yet to obtain exact data concerning the more or less disguised confiscations which the German authorities have seen fit to make of the supplies of industrial materials discovered in the occupied Belgian and French territories. The newspapers have repeatedly made reference to textiles seized in Flanders, machines taken from Belgium, etc.¹ Whatever the extent of these confiscations which may be revealed by subsequent official investigations, we will confine ourselves here to describing a fresh application of the Pan-Germanist theories of conquest singularly in harmony with the theories expressed by Tannenberg in the extracts already quoted.²

As regards transportation, the official documents

¹ Confiscations of this nature have been applied principally to things which would be specially useful for supplying the needs of the army, such as raw or manufactured woollens, and various metals, especially copper and brass, but also to machine tools.

² This is, moreover, the interpretation accepted by the Germans themselves. See below, § 5.

furnish evidence of arbitrary arrests by the German troops of members of the civilian population, without any charge whatever being brought against them. These arrests have sometimes taken the form of brutal requisitions of labour, for instance, for the purpose of burying the dead. Sometimes they have been made under the pretext that the whole locality must be chastised and therefore burnt or bombarded, a form of repression which we shall discuss in detail.¹ But it has happened also that, without any idea of repression, without any military necessity, without even the excuse of the disorder of battle, the populations of whole districts have been dispersed, by orders from a superior officer, as in the old days of slavery. The men have been conveyed to a distance, the women have been left where they were or transported to another place. This is what happened at Valenciennes, on September 26, 1914, when a soldier, Heinrich B., of the 1st Regiment of Engineers, enters in his diary ²—

“ 26th. Morning. Set out at nine o'clock for the east entrance to Valenciennes, in order to occupy the town and prevent fugitives from escaping. All the male inhabitants, from eighteen to forty-eight years, were arrested and sent to Germany.”³

And on the same day, another soldier, Konrad B., belonging to the same corps, writes—

“ September 26, 8.30. Reveillé and coffee. Ten o'clock set out to occupy the exits from the town of Valenciennes till five o'clock in the evening. During

¹ See below, Chapter IV.


² French War Office: Diary of the reservist, H. B——, 1st Regiment of Bavarian Engineers, 2nd Company (Ingolstadt). Bound in black moleskin, red edges, size 163 × 114 mm., ruled in blue, 7 mm., 20 lines, gothic handwriting, black and red pencil, 13 manuscript leaves and 39 blank leaves, = 52 leaves. Date, August 11 to October 1, 1914.

³ Morgens Abmarsch 9 Uhr nach dem Osteingang von Valenciennes zur Besetzung der Stadt um Flüchtlinge einzuhalten. Alle männlichen Personen von 18–48 Jahren werden verhaftet und nach Deutschland befördert.

this time we had to drive the male civilians out of their houses and deliver them at the railway station. Cantonment and supper at the hospital.”¹

The male population, without distinction, were thus “delivered” at the railway station, doubtless with the intention of dispatching them into Germany. It will be claimed, perhaps, in excuse that these civilians of from eighteen to forty-eight years were of an age to bear arms, and, therefore, ought to be considered and treated as soldiers. This is a very questionable theory, and one which is authorised neither by the spirit nor the letter of the rules laid down at the Hague. The definition of “belligerent” in these regulations is perfectly clear: individuals liable to mobilisation are not belligerents, as long as they have not been actually organised for military purposes. The Germans made a rigorous application of this theory in Belgium, and even in France, since in every case they treated as *francs-tireurs* and shot the civilians of fighting age whom they merely suspected of having attempted any resistance to them; moreover, they employed everywhere, from the moment of their arrival, the most rigorous measures for seizing all weapons, and for chastising cruelly and immediately any “rebellion” on the part of civilians. They had no need nor right to seize inoffensive inhabitants, merely on a standard of age, no matter whether they compelled them to work for the victorious army, or whether they simply deprived them of their liberty. In either case, it was a servitude incompatible with modern International Law. It is a *confiscation of labour* which no law has either anticipated or sanctioned. Apart from the moral injury caused to individuals and families by such violence and injustice, it represents an economic spolia-

¹ 26 Sept. $\frac{1}{2}$ 9. Wecken und Kaffee fassen. 10 Uhr Abmarsch zum Besetzen der Ausgänge der Stadt Valencines bis abend 5 Uhr. Unterdessen mussten wir die Civilisten aus die Häusser austreiben [*sic*] und am Bahnhof einliefern. Quartier und Abendessen im Lazaret.



More Evacuated Population from Loraine.

tion inflicted on the country in general and on the town of Valenciennes in particular. We do not know yet whether this ravished human capital has been utilised by the enemy; but the country which has been deprived of it has suffered a loss, which will be added to her credit account, when the great settlement takes place.

And what are we to say of the multitude of old men, women and children, who have been torn from their homes, and deported first of all into Germany, to be subsequently flung, denuded of all their possessions, on the hospitable soil of Switzerland? Sometimes these brutal measures have been actuated, at any rate officially, by the desire to save from destitution a population incapable of subsisting in the districts devastated by the war; but this pretext of humanity is strikingly contradicted by the state of utter misery and want in which the impartial Swiss have discovered these unfortunate people, upon their release from internment in Germany! Sometimes military reasons may have required this evacuation, but, in any case, these did not justify the brutalities with which it was accompanied. It is not necessary to describe yet again the legal and moral reasons which have provoked the indignation of the civilised world at the sight of the sufferings callously inflicted on inoffensive people by the rigour of Prussian methods. It is not even necessary to quote any of the numerous and melancholy testimonies of the innocent victims of these wholesale deportations. The official reports have summarised the depositions of these unfortunate creatures, and thousands of neutral and disinterested spectators have been able to see and approach and question them. What crime or what suspicion of crime had been charged against them which could justify such a cruel captivity? They had no knowledge of any, and doubtless the impassive agents charged with the execution of their punishment were equally ignorant. They belonged to those of whom Tannenberg declared that "the most rigorous measures

are scarcely adequate to chastise them for their mere existence." And German women have been able to gaze without any emotion or pity on women and little children enduring the pangs of cold and hunger; and the publishers of German postcards have been allowed to popularise the tragic faces of these old men with white hair, weeping silently for their home, their country and their liberty, while over them a sentry stands on guard.

Unfortunately for the ingenious pretexts with which the official interpreters of the pure intentions of Germanism condone the actions of the German armies, the *enfants terribles* of Pan-Germanism had too long beforehand been expressing principles so consistent and definite that it is difficult not to see in these acts their logical consequence. Contributions, requisitions and evacuations were gentle and systematic expressions of the system which aimed at the transference of the greatest possible proportion of the property of the enemy into the hands of the conqueror. We shall see that, in addition to these comparatively moderate measures, this system involved more brutal proceedings. But the system is there, none the less, with its essentially Germanic characteristics of studied method and implacable precision.

§ 4. THE GERMANS HAVE TOO OFTEN INTERPRETED THEIR MILITARY REGULATIONS IN A SENSE FAVOURABLE TO PLUNDER

Less justified theoretically than collective contributions or evacuations, but sometimes quite as painful to the inhabitants, have been the innumerable levies in kind which the German troops have made in the regions occupied or traversed, levies made on the abandoned houses, as well as on the inhabited villages or towns, and even on the pockets of prisoners and the

slain. For from collective requisition to pillage and even theft is such an easy descent that, inspired by Pan-Germanist principles, officers and men glide down it insensibly. Articles of food are naturally the first things to be seized upon, and it is not very surprising that young soldiers, harassed with hunger and fatigue, show a lack of discretion and discernment in making this kind of requisition on the inhabitants, when their officers show no anxiety to enforce a severe discipline. Hunger and thirst appear, moreover, to have been the chief preoccupations of German soldiers and officers during the campaign. Doubtless, it is more or less the same in all armies and in all ages. But, in the case of the German, this preoccupation assumes very striking proportions, at any rate if we are to judge by the remarkable quantity of food which he requires, as well as by the care with which he records daily the hour and the constituents of his meals. These "menus" are to be found in the diaries of officers, even of superior officers, as well as in those of common soldiers, only that the latter are generally more concerned about the quantity than the quality of what they consume, which partly explains their astonishing wastefulness. "O. L——," a non-commissioned officer of the 177th Infantry Regiment, ingenuously describes his choicest recollections as follows :¹ The scene was Pont-Faverger (Marne), September 2, and the evening after a battle.

"Together with Gefreiter Schönfelder, I set off to requisition on my own account. Our booty was a large piece of bacon, which, wrapped in a child's bodice, was stowed into my knapsack. We divided it up in the kitchen. Bacon is generally an article very much in request here. Then, in company with Möbins, I

¹ Diary of a non-commissioned officer, O. L——, 177th Regiment of Infantry, 12th Saxon, 7th Company. Bound in black moleskin, red edges, ruled in blue, 7 mm., 19 lines, right-hand top corner torn by a bullet, size 152 × 90 mm., gothic writing, black or red pencil, 16 written pages + 57 blank pages = 73 pages + 3 of various notes. Date, August 5 to September 5, 1914.

visited a house, where I feasted on preserved French vegetables. Moreover, on that day I ate fifteen different kinds of things, one after the other. There was plenty of wine, and also handkerchiefs. About 9 we installed ourselves in a large house, the third section in a large room, where we lay very comfortably. About 9.30 came the field-breakfast. There were still some preserved vegetables left. That day, at any rate, I ate my fill.”¹

We are not surprised at this admission! It appears, however, that this good cheer and good wine did not bring good fortune to this gifted boon companion; for, on the last page of his notebook, he describes a supreme orgy, which he appears to have only survived by a few hours. It was on the evening of September 4, in a village in the Champagne district—

“I stayed behind with Captain Maas, Leutnant Baring, Bellert and Otto Richter, to drink champagne until we were full and lay down to sleep. . . .”

With the result that next morning, September 5, he woke late and felt very uncomfortable.

“After a heavy sleep, got up at six o’clock. Wrote to catch the post: cards and letters to Mary, Willi, grandparents and F. Haase. I felt very wretched after yesterday’s debauch. There is more talk of peace, and my thoughts are with my darling. In the afternoon, we roasted potatoes with Gefreiter Schönfelder. There were five posts: grandparents, R. Zscharnack, Willi.”²

¹ Mit Gefr. Schönfelder ging ich dann auf eigene Faust requirieren. Wir erbeuteten ein grosses Stück Speck das, in ein Kinderlätzchen eingewickelt, in meinem Tornister Platz fand. In der Küche wurde geteilt. Speck ist hier überhaupt ein sehr gesuchter Artikel. Mit Moebins fütterte ich dann in einem Hause frz. Gemüsekonserven. Ueberhaupt habe ich den Tag 15 erlei Sachen durcheinander gegessen. Viel Wein gab es, auch Taschentücher. Um 9 rückten wir ein grösseres Haus, der III Zug in ein grosses Zimmer, wo wir sehr bequem lagen, um 9.30 kam die Goulasch-Kanone; es gab nochmals Gemüsekonserven. Diesen Tag habe ich mich mal satt gegessen.

² Ich sass dann noch mit Hpt. (Hauptmann) Mass, Lt. (Leutnant) Baring, Bellert, Otto Richter zusammen und tranken Sekt, bis wir

After they had slept off the effects of their orgy, were these troops taken by surprise? From the ugly rent made by a bullet through the top corner of the notebook, we imagine that this young man, who combined family feeling with so hearty an appetite, came to a premature end. His requisitions, after all, were not very criminal. Others of his comrades, like himself, content themselves with eatables and some indispensable linen, even in the abandoned villages. Franz T——, a volunteer, of the 237th Regiment of Infantry, makes the following entry on October 19, in a locality of which he does not give the name—¹

“ We enter the village. The whole place is searched, but this large village is deserted. We go to our quarters, which we make for ourselves. Wine, champagne, cognac, liqueurs, cigars, beer, bread, all in profusion. Handkerchiefs, shirts, everything, and all in vain. I cannot steal; I shall only take food. So I filled my flask with a fine liqueur “ Vie de la Brunelles ” (*sic*). . . . ²

voll warren und uns schlafen legten. Hpt. Mass führt wieder die Komp. Baring kommt zur 8 K. als Komp. Führer.

5 ix. 14. Nach festem Schlaf, um 6 aufgestanden, Feldpost geschrieben: Karte u. Brief an Mary, Willi, Grosseltern und F. Haase. Mir war von dem vorhergehenden Gelage sehr elend zu Mute. Es wird wieder von Frieden geredet und meine Gedanken sind bei meinem Liebling. Mit Gefr. Schönfelder haben wir am Nachmittag Kartoffeln gebraten. Es gab 5 mal Feldpost; Grosseltern, R. Zscharnack, Willi. . . .

¹ Diary of the volunteer F. T——, 327th Regiment of Infantry of the Reserves. Bound in red paper boards, red back and corners, much damaged, size 160 × 100 mm., ruled in grey, 21 lines, 7 mm., gothic writing, black and fuchsine pencil, white flyleaves, 14 written pages (right-hand) + 43 blank pages + 1 page with notes = 58 pages. Date, October 13–24, 1914.

² 19 x. Jetzt gehts in den Ort, alles wird durchsucht, aber der grosse Ort ist verlassen. Jetzt gehts in die Quartiere, welche wir uns selbs machen. Wein, Sekt, Kognak, Liköre, Cigarren, Bier, Brot, alles in Hülle und Fülle, Taschentücher, Hemde, Alles, alles umsonst. Ich kann nicht stehlen nur Mundvorrat werde ich nehmen. So habe ich jetzt meine Feldflasche fein gefüllt mit einem feinem Liqueur, “ Vie de la Brunelles.” In dem Hotel, im letzten Zimmer liegt meine Korporalschaft.

In the same way a reservist, of the 12th Regiment of Infantry of the Reserves,¹ deplores the depredations of which he finds traces—

“On September 18, I was ordered by the Captain to look for some pigs and other provisions at Humbeck. We killed the pigs in the middle of the village street. In addition, our booty comprised: oats, linen, 100 bottles of wine, fruits, jellies, preserved fruits, biscuits, woollen coverings, candles, matches and other useful articles. In Humbeck, we found that the houses had already been searched and everything turned topsy-turvy. Some evil hands had broken up everything, even the iron safe. Apparently, these people were only looking for valuables; for the provisions had been left. In most of the stalls, I found the animals half starving. We let out the cows, pigs, dogs and horses, and so saved them from dying of starvation.”²

Unfortunately, the distinction made by this worthy soldier between articles of food, which it is legitimate to take, and objects of value, the appropriation of which amounts to theft, was soon lost sight of by too many of his comrades. Observe the word “booty,” by which he describes the fruits of his requisition. Is it astonishing that others, less honest, should turn their requisition

¹ Diary of Reservist A——, of the 12th Regiment of Reserve Infantry 1st Battalion, 8th Company. Bound in grey cloth, with a pocket inside, and pencil-holder, grey edges, white flyleaves, size 153 × 98 mm., ruled in blue, 7 mm., 19 lines, gothic writing, black pencil, 25 written pages + 11 blank pages + 81 written pages = 117 pages. (The narrative is discontinued at page 21, but is re-commenced without any break at the other end of the book.) Date, July 28 to Nov. 9, 1914.

² Am 8 ix. wurde ich von Hauptmann dazu bestimmt um einige Schweine und andere Lebensmittel aus Humbeck zu holen. Schweine haben wir mitte auf der Dorfstrasse geschlachtet. Auch Hafer, Wäsche, 100 Fl. Wein, Obst, Gelee, eingemachte Früchte, Gebäck, wollene Decken, Lichte, Streichhölzer u. anderes Nützliche mehr waren unsere Beute. In Humbeck fanden wir die Häuser schon durchsucht und verwuchert. Böse Menschenhände hatten alles, auch die Geldschränke erbrochen, Anscheinend sind diese nur auf Wertsachen gewandert, denn Lebensmittel standen noch ueberall herum. Das Vieh habe ich in den meisten Ställen halb verhungert vorgefunden, Kühe, Schweine, Hunde u. Pferde haben wir aus ihr Gefangenschaft befreit und so von dem Tode des Verhungerns gerettet.

into a veritable hunt for booty? On August 28, Rudolf R——, a Saxon Grenadier,¹ writes at Laval-Morancy—²

“Apparently a day of rest. Seizure of all the provisions : bread, marmalade, wine, cigars. Killed geese, chickens, rabbits, played the piano ; plundered hard ! ”³

And this mere conjuncture of words, conjuring up at the same time the art of a Bach or a Beethoven and the methods of war of the Goths or the Cimbri, is like a strange symbol of that neo-Germanic culture, which has certainly not been understood by the more or less latinised civilisations ! For the most part, indeed, the “seizure” of all the provisions in a village is accompanied by rapine, degenerating rapidly into disorder and devastations. The official Belgian and French reports furnish details of quantities of examples of this nature, where requisition, which has sometimes commenced in an orderly fashion, has rapidly degenerated into pillage, although the inhabitants have done nothing to justify the brutality to which they have been subjected. Cupboards ransacked, furniture wrecked, safes broken open ; all these mark the passage of the German troops in most of the localities in which they have commenced by emptying the wine cellars. Drunkenness and pillage go hand in hand, and the best of the officers sometimes deplore it. At Rethel, on September 2, young Baron von H——, of the 1st Regiment of Saxon Grenadiers, notes in his diary—

“Alas ! discipline is relaxing more and more. Spirits, wine and plunder are the order of the day. The

¹ Notebook of the Grenadier R. R——, 101st Regiment of Infantry (2nd Saxon Grenadiers), 3rd Company. Bound sheepskin, checkered in red, red edges, pencil-holder and inside pocket ; checkered blue 4 mm., 39 written pages + 13 blank pages + 4 written pages = 56 pages. Date, August 8 to September 7, 1914.

² On the Sormonne, department of Mézières.

³ Freitag 28 viii., Laval Morancy. Anscheinend Ruhetag Fassen alle Lebensmittel, Brod, Marmelade, Wein, Zig., schlachten Gänse, Hühner, Karnickel, spiele Klavier, plündere feste.

fault of the Infantry. The columns are particularly bad." ¹

Similarly, Lieutenant I——, a very good officer, of the 5th Battalion of the Reserves of the Prussian Guard,² notes on August 25, at Cirey—

"In the night incredible things happened: shops pillaged, money stolen, violations, simply enough to make your hair stand on end." ³

Doubtless, some of these facts are to be explained by the heat of battle. Thus non-commissioned officer Sch——, of the 69th Regiment of Infantry Reserves,⁴ tells us that—

"The village of Sensenruth was taken by assault and pillaged. Cigarettes, cream, honey, handkerchiefs, stockings. The men rob and plunder the houses energetically. At the schoolmaster's house, the cellar was emptied: red wine, champagne, then we go off to prepare our meal." ⁵

But, for the most part, this plundering is done in cold blood. Sometimes a troop makes a halt, in order

¹ Rethel. Seit 4 Wochen, schönes Wetter, auch heut wieder heiss u. schön leider lässt die Disciplin mehr und mehr nach. Schnaps, Wein u. Plündern sind an der Tagesordnung. Eine Schuld der Inf. Namentlich die Kolonnen sind schlimm.

² Diary of Lieutenant I——, 5th Battalion of Reserves of the Guards. Binding, paper boards, with black back in cloth, inside pocket and pencil-holder, marbled edges, fancy flyleaf in grey, checkered in grey, size 157 × 100 mm., Latin characters, red and black pencil, 32 written pages and 118 blank pages = 150 pages. Date, August 1 to September 4, 1914.

³ 24 viii., Cirey. In der Nacht sind unglaubliche Sachen passiert. Läden ausgeplündert, Geld gestohlen, Vergewaltigungen. Einfach haarsträubend.

⁴ Notebook of non-commissioned officer Sch——, 8th Corps of Reserves, 69th Regiment of Infantry. Sides and back green leather. Inside pocket and pencil-holder. Grey flyleaves, marbled edges. gothic characters, red pencil; size 160 × 98 mm., 45 pages (unnumbered) + 111 written pages = 156 pages; ruled 7 mm., 19 lines. Date, July 31 to September 26, 1914.

⁵ Das Dorf Sensenruth wird in Sturm genommen und geplündert. Cigaretten, Sahne, Honig, Taschentücher, Strümpfe. Die Leute rauben und hausen in den einzelnen Wohnungen stark. Beim Lehrer wird der Keller geleert, Rotwein, Sekt; dann rücken wir ab zum Kochen.

to visit a château, as was the case with the soldier, Konrad B——, of the 1st Regiment of Engineers, who confesses on September 27—

“ Arrived at 7 o'clock and disembarked at 12 o'clock. Then marched on past Vermant towards Péronne, 30 km. distance. On the way, plundered a château. Arrived at Péronne at 7 o'clock in the evening and quartered there.”¹

Sometimes this pillage is even the object of the expedition, and generally accompanied or followed by systematic burning. This was the case with Orchies, the devastation of which is related by the same engineer in the following terms—

“ Set out for Orchies, past Rosult, 25 km. Sacking and burning this charming town till 6 o'clock in the evening. Then back past Rosult and by the electric tram to Valenciennes (*sic*), 12 o'clock midnight quarters in the hospital.”²

The preciseness of these documents leaves nothing to be added by the French and Belgian reports, and neither the descriptions nor the passionate complaints of the victims could be more expressive than the very words of a German officer. A lieutenant of the 17th Regiment of Infantry,³ on August 17, in Belgium, in the neighbourhood of Montleban, writes as follows—

¹ 27 ix. Ankunft 7 Uhr und ausgeladen 12 Uhr dann weiter marschieren ueber Vermant nach 30 km., entfernten Péronne, unterwegs ausplündern eines Schlosses. Ankunft in Péronne um 7 Uhr abends, daselbst einquartiert.

² Abmarsch ueber Rosult nach Orchies 25 km. zum ausplündern und anzünden der wunderschönen Stadt bis 6 Uhr abends, dann wieder Rückmarsch ueber Rosult und Fahrt mit der elektrischen Bahn nach Valenciennes (*sic*), nachts 12 Uhr Quartier im Lazaret.

³ Diary of an officer of the 178th Regiment of Infantry (Saxon), 8th Company. Bound in black moleskin (with a blue and white ribbon threaded through all the leaves), size 146 × 85 mm., checkered in grey, 4 mm., roman characters, red pencil, 60 written pages, 33 blank pages, 2 with various notes. Red edges. Date, August 8 to September 25, 1914.

“Last night it rained in torrents. It is still raining heavily. So that our soldiers shall not get wet, we are to remain here another day. We write letters. In the afternoon, visited a little château, belonging to a secretary of the King, where our Landwehr made havoc like vandals. First the wine cellar was plundered. Then they proceeded to the living rooms, and turned upside-down boxes and chests (as well as a safe, after vain attempts to break it open). A wild confusion of beautiful silk-covered rococo furniture, oak chairs covered with stamped leather, sideboards still half full of china and glass and boxes emptied of their contents. This is what happens when the requisitioning is left to the soldiers. Doubtless, a number of useless things have been carried off from the sheer lust of plundering.”¹

This officer, at any rate, evinces some honourable scruples, and does not seem to have felt an easy conscience, at any rate at the beginning, with regard to the depredations which he witnessed. Does this disapproval imply that the officers had all received orders to let the troops do as they liked, and even to profit on their own account by the good opportunities which might present themselves? Only a complete investigation, conducted at the end of the war, in regard to this special point, a kind of statistics of the plundering and outrages committed by the various corps of the German army, would enable us to judge exactly how far the spoliation of the inhabitants in

¹ 17 viii. Nachts goss es in Strömen. Es regnet immer noch kräftig. Damit unsere Soldaten nicht nass werden, bleiben wir noch einen Tag da. Man schreibt Briefe. Nachmittags ein kleines Chateau besichtigt das einem secrétaire du roi gehört (verduftet) und in dem unsre Landwehr wie die Vandalen gehaust haben. Zunächst hat man den Weinkeller geplündert, sich dann aber den Wohnräumen zugewandt u. dort Kisten und Kasten umgestürzt (sogar einem Geldschrank nach vergeblichen Erbrechungsversuchen). Ein wüstes Durcheinander von schönen Rokokomöbeln, gepressten eichenen Lederstühlen, Buffets noch halb voll Porzellan u. Glasgeschirre, u. vom Inhalt ausgeleerten Kästen. So geht es, wenn man das Requiriren den Leuten ueberlässt. Zweifellos sind viele ueberflüssige Sachen weggeschleppt w. aus blosser Lust am Marodieren.

the invaded territory was a system, and how far an accident of the Germanic conquest. But there can be hardly any question that those military requisitions which took the form of systematic pillage were, for the most part, tolerated by the officers; and this invites the conjecture that this—to say the least—unusual interpretation of the military regulations is to be attributed to orders received from the higher command. And it is equally beyond question that, far from reproving this conduct by themselves showing an example of strict probity, many officers, even of the best education, where they were not actually the first to begin, at any rate ended by taking part. In this connection we have the most curious confessions from some of them. For instance, Major B——, commanding the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Regiment of Infantry,¹ confesses on August 27, at Ecurey (Meuse)—

“Took up our quarters at the house of the veterinary surgeon, Raoul Morriau, a country house, beautifully fitted up. As a souvenir, I appropriated a little ash tray, of no value.”²

From the fact that he takes the trouble to mention the worthlessness of his souvenir, we may conjecture that this officer was not altogether easy in his conscience about the proceeding. A few days later, the same officer confesses to similar but equally ineffectual scruples. True, in this case, it is a question of a combined action, from which he only profited as a result of a general distribution, which, if it was not officially

¹ Diary of Major B——, commanding the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Regiment of Infantry, subsequently appointed to the command of the 144th Regiment of Infantry. Bound in black shagreened cloth, with title “Notes,” gilt, pencil-holder and inside pocket *in-fine*, red edges, checkered blue, 4 mm. Size 15 × 9 cm. Gothic writing. Black pencil, 40 written pages, 40 blank pages. Date, August 1 to September 30, 1914.

² Ecurey, 27 August. Nehme Quartier mit Btl. Stb. Tierarzt Raul Morriau ein schön angerichtetes Landhaus. Zum Andenken eigne ich mir einen kleinen nichtswerten Cigarrenaschteller an. Wasche u. rasire mich. Um 305 kommt Befehl.

ordered, was at any rate systematic. This was on September 3—

“The requisition at Etain was a great success; wines, liqueurs, etc. I got a red silk counterpane and a table cloth. I haven’t made up my mind to take the stuff away with me. It is repugnant to me; but *c’est la guerre*. The French would have done much worse at Lauban. In any case, from now onwards, I shall lie very comfortably, even without my sleeping sack.”¹

At any rate, this individual confined himself to appropriating (apart from a few little souvenirs “of no value”) objects of real military utility. We will merely draw attention to the singular excuse with which he silences his scruples. It is not the plea of necessity which consoles him for thus transgressing his habits of honesty, but the idea that the French would have done even more. There could be no better illustration of the sinister influence which the anti-French theories of the Pan-Germanists have exercised in Germany, even on men of comparatively distinguished intellect. The invasion of Belgium, in order to forestall the purely supposititious eventuality of a French attack, robbery of French civilians by force of arms, upon the pretext that, in the event of a French invasion, German civilians might have suffered similar inflictions—these things are part of the same system of what might be described as anticipatory revenge, unless they are to be ascribed to that state of mind which Heinrich Heine referred to more than sixty years ago, when he declared that his compatriots were eager to wipe out in the blood of the French the stain left for ever on history by the death of Conrad of Hohenstaufen, in 1268! It is evident

¹ September 3. Die Requisition in Etain hatte gewaltigen Erfolg. Wein, Liqueur, etc. Eine seidene rote Schlafdecke und eine Tischdecke für mich. Ob ich das Zeug mitschleppe weiss ich noch nicht, es widerstrebt mir, doch *c’est la guerre*. Die Franz (osen) hätten in Lauban noch ganz anders gehaust. Jedenfalls werde ich von jetzt ab auch ohne Schlafsack recht gut liegen.

that, by the aid of such pretexts as these, it would be possible to justify every kind of violence, just as certain militant propagandists, who have become the tragic heroes of anarchy, justify their individual acts of reprisal against a capitalist society. We must remember, moreover, that most of the German plunderers in France did not even attempt to shelter themselves behind the excuses set down by the pencil of Major B. Some of them do their work in cold blood, without argument, without commentary, as if they were carrying out perfectly natural instructions; others, of finer sensibility, seem to have been seduced by the general intoxication, and, at the same time, to have shown considerable discrimination in enriching their private collections, by means of valuable objects "found" in Belgium and France. The most literary of the latter, if not the most culpable, is perhaps that same officer of the 178th Regiment of Infantry, whose scruples of the month of August seem to have completely disappeared by the beginning of September. On the 3rd of this month, when he is quartered at Rethel, a part of which had been burnt, he writes as follows—

"In the meantime, I visited a few of the better-class houses, and also some little old châteaux; and I have not recovered from my amazement. French comfort has a strong tendency to luxuriance. Evidently as a result of the sedentary habits of the French, there is still to be found here some wonderful old furniture, even among the ordinary middle classes. Not a salon without rococo empire chairs, covered in rich silk. But the state of these rooms! The furniture all overturned, mirrors smashed; the vandals could have done no more. It is a stain on our army. Of course, the inhabitants who have fled will have realised that, with the passage of such immense bodies of troops, everything would not be left intact. In any case, it is the camp-followers who have most on their conscience. For they have the necessary time for plundering and destroying. Property to the value of millions has been

destroyed. They did not even keep their hands off the safes. I came to the house of a lawyer situated a little way off. Very pretty, and furnished with exceptional taste; evidently a collector of old pottery and oriental objects. This house had not yet been pillaged. Here, also, there was some *Veuve Cliquot*. I could not refrain from appropriating a trifle here and there as a souvenir. Finally, I had to requisition an old leather trunk in an ancient *château*, which likewise showed signs of terrible havoc. Most elegant of all was a perfectly new house by the side of our *Hôtel Moderne*. The whole of the vestibule, as well as the doors, in light oak, and heavily carved banisters. I found here a silk waterproof cloak and a camera for Felix. . . ." ¹

Apart from the picturesque qualities of this narrative, which has already been quoted elsewhere, we must draw attention to the charge which this officer brings against the non-military escort which accompanied the troops (die Begleiter der Kolonnen). The armies of

¹ . . . einige bessere Häuser (auch kleine alte Schlösser) besucht und aus dem Staunen nicht herausgekommen. Der Französischer Comfort hat einen starken Strich ins üppige. Offenbar infolge der Sesshaftigkeit der Franzosen giebt es hier auch im kleinen Mittelstand noch wundervolle alte Möbel. Keine Salons ohne Rokoko-Empire Stühle, etc., mit schweren Seidenbezügen. Aber wie sah es in den Räumen aus! Alles Mob. (?) ist gekehrt (?). Spiegel eingeschlagen, die Vandalen konnten es nicht besser. Ein Schandfleck für unsere Armee, Allerdings hätten die geflüchteten Einwohner denken sollen dass bei so starken Truppendurchzügen nicht alles intakt bleibt. Immerhin haben das meiste die Begleiter der Kolonne auf dem Gewissen, die zum Plündern und zerstören die nötige Musse haben. Millionen werthe sind da zerstört w. (orden) man hat auch vor Geldschränken nicht Halt gemacht. Ich kam in die etwas abgelegene Wohnung eines *avoué* der wunderhübsch u. ausnahmsweise geschmackvoll eingerichtet war; offenbar ein Sammler alter Fayencen und orientalischer Arbeiten. Hier hatte man noch nicht gewühlt. Hier fand sich auch die Witwe *Cliquot* ein. Ich konnte mich nicht enthalten, ab und zu eine Kleinigkeit als Andenken mitzunehmen. Schliesslich musste ich in einem alten Schloss, wo es ebenfalls schrecklich aussah, einen alten Lederkoffer requiriren. Am elegantesten war ein ganz neues Haus neben unserem *Hôtel moderne* eingerichtet. Das ganze Vestibul nebst Türen in heller angestrichene Eiche, an den Treppengeländer, schwere Schnitzereien. Hier fand ich e. seidenen Regenmantel u. e. Photogr. Apparat für Felix.

former days were, to be sure, too often plagued with bands of non-combatants, who, under various pretexts, followed the troops on their march, in quest of easily earned profits, either from the troops themselves or under their protection. These camp followers, vagabonds and rogues of both sexes, were able to render certain services in the days when trains were scarce, and the means of procuring food deplorable. But it has been an important task of the organisers of the modern military system to get rid of these unofficial dependents of the armies, so as to allow access to the zone of operations—or even to the neighbourhood of the belligerent armies—only to those who are actual members of the military or official organisation. It might have been imagined that the Prussian army, with its rigorous tradition of severe discipline, would have made it a point of honour to keep at a distance all those factors of demoralisation which an army attracts only too easily. This was done for the most part in 1870–71, as well as in the most recent wars in Europe and elsewhere. Except in the case of certain colonial campaigns, in which lack of transport and of victuals for the troops sometimes renders a certain amount of indulgence practically inevitable, it is in fact comparatively easy, with an abundance of officers and the rigours of martial law, to keep away from the Front in modern war any undesirable members of the civilian population, or to punish them with the utmost severity in case of misconduct. If, then, we are to accept, on behalf of the German invading army, the excuse or explanation given by the Saxon officer for certain instances of pillage, we are faced with this formidable dilemma: Either these camp-followers are a vain pretext invented in order to conceal certain faults, which ought in reality to be attributed to the troops themselves; or else these non-military elements of disorder and pillage did really exist, and in that case an even more serious responsibility rests

with the staff of the Germanic armies for the indulgence with which it covered these depredations.

In this connection we cannot refrain from comparing the remarkable confession given above with certain formal accusations brought by the Belgians and the French against civilian individuals of German nationality whom they declare to have visited their houses, in the sight and with the knowledge of the German officers themselves, for the purpose of selecting and carrying off any pieces of furniture which especially took their fancy. The absence of any German official statements has rendered it impossible, up to the present, to determine whether this was a case of "individual reprisals," or of recognised agents, acting in the name and in the interests of the German authorities. It is possible that it was a combination of the two. In certain instances, the collective requisitions carried on in the rear of the firing-line, to the detriment of the manufacturers, traders and even inoffensive private people, may well have been carried out with the co-operation of German civilians, who would be more competent in these matters than the military authorities. The latter may also have thought fit to seek advice concerning the objects of their private "requisitions": for instance, to consult women when it was a question of "requisitioning" linen, millinery or articles of dress.¹ These are only various applications of the same principle, namely: the existence in war of a right of prize or booty over the private property of the inhabitants of the invaded territories.

We shall see that the existence of this novel theory, both among the leaders of the German army and also among a large section of the public—at any rate among the docile disciples of Pan-Germanist inspirations, is proved by incontestable documents. But it is scarcely less certain—and we are very glad to acknowledge the

¹ This is, at any rate, attested in the depositions collected by the Belgian and French Commissions of Investigation.

fact here—that this innovation, so contrary to the military traditions of modern Europe and to the moral principles of Christian civilisation, which are at any rate still preached in Germany, has more than once roused the disgust of certain honest members of the Prussian armies, who, though too sternly disciplined to offer active resistance, have none the less preserved sufficient independence of mind to express their indignation on paper. Among the latter, it will be sufficient to quote here a very characteristic extract from the diary of a non-commissioned officer of the Landwehr, who, up to the end of November 1914, served in the campaign with the 46th Regiment of the Reserve Infantry.¹

While this record does honour to its author, it is equally precious for the valuable description which it gives of those unhappy villages of Lorraine, wantonly plundered and devastated, and emptied of their “evacuated” inhabitants, as well as for the moving prophecy which it hazards and of which we accept the augury—

“We were first of all told that we were to take up our quarters at Billy, from which the whole of the

¹ Diary of non-commissioned officer S——, of the Landwehr, Reserve Regiment No. 46, 9th Company, contained in two notebooks. The first, measuring 89×145 mm., is bound in grey cloth, with a red border, fancy end-papers, inside pocket torn, red edges. The paper is checkered in blue, 4 mm. It contains 50 unnumbered pages of narrative and 7 pages of various notes. There are traces of pages having been torn out after pages 44, 50, 51, 53 and 56. The writing is in gothic characters in black or red pencil. The narrative extends from August 5 to October 13, 1914. The second notebook, measuring 102×165 mm., is bound in brown paper boards, with black cloth back, white end-papers; and it has a title page inside with the printed words “Conto-Buch.” The paper is ruled in blue, 7 mm., 20 lines to a page; also rules for accounts in red, a double horizontal line at the top and 5 vertical lines. It consists of 19 unnumbered pages containing the narrative, 7 blank pages, and 2 pages and the end-papers covered with various notes. There are traces of a leaf having been torn out before the last but one. Total, 28 pages + 2 end-papers, = 30 pages in all. The writing is the same as that of the first notebook. The narrative extends from October 14 to November 22, 1914. The passage quoted occupies 2 left-hand and 3 right-hand pages of the second notebook.

civilian population had already been evicted, and the furniture either carried off or rendered useless. This method of making war is absolutely barbarous. I am amazed that we can express indignation at the conduct of the Russians, when we are behaving far worse in France, and burning and plundering upon every opportunity and upon any pretext. But God is just, and He sees it all. His mills grind slowly, but terribly small.

“ 16. 10. I am going with a section of our company to the neighbourhood of Billy, to beg for potatoes. At Billy we only stopped a short time, in order to buy something at the canteen there. The civilian population has been driven from here; everything which could be carried off has been removed by the troops; in addition, a great deal of furniture belonging to the inhabitants has been smashed up out of pure vandalism. The deserted streets, in which only a few soldiers are to be seen here and there, create an impression of desolation, which is further accentuated by the numerous houses that have been burnt. . . .”¹

Non-commissioned officer S—— was evidently a belated idealist of the old school, and must have been regarded as a depraved spirit. It is none the less

¹ Es hiess zuerst dass wir ins Quartier nach Billy kommen sollten, wo die ganze Civilbevölkerung bereits vertrieben und has Mobiliar theils genommen, theils unbrauchbar gemacht worden ist. Diese Art Kriegführung ist direkt barbarisch, ich wundere mich wie wir ueber das Verhalten der Russen schimpfen können, hausen ja in Frankreich weit schlimmer, und bei jeder Gelegenheit wird unter irgend einem Vorwande gebrannt und geplündert. Aber Gott ist gerecht, und sieht alles. Seine Mühlen mahlen langsam, aber schrecklich klein.

16/x. Ich gehe mit einem Zuge unserer Compagnie in die Umgegend von Billy um dort Kartoffeln zu betteln. In Billy halten wir uns kurze Zeit auf, um aus der dort befindlichen Kantin etwas zu kaufen. Die Zivilbevölkerung ist von hier vertrieben worden, alles, was mit zu nehmen war, ist von Militär genommen worden, ausserdem wurden aus Vandalismus den Einwohnern viele Möbel entzweischlagen. Die öden Strassen, auf denen wir hier und da einige Soldaten zu sehen sind, sehen traurig aus, welcher Eindruck durch die vielen abgebrannten Häuser verstärkt wird. Von Billy marschierten wir nach Mangiennes um die dort von Pionieren musterhaft angelegten Schützengräben zu besichtigen. Im gegenteil zu Billy ist Mangiennes unversehrt geblieben, und ich kann mich an die wirklich grossen malerischen Schönheiten diesses Ortes erfreuen.

interesting to compare his solitary testimony with the "economic" practices and theories which other Germans declare to be a progress in the conduct of war.¹

§ 5. THE SEIZURES MADE BY THE GERMANS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CIVILIAN AS WELL AS THE MILITARY POPULATION SEEM TO BE INSTANCES OF THE APPLICATION OF MARITIME LAW TO CONTINENTAL WAR

It is well known that the right of capture, which has been consecrated from time immemorial by the customs of maritime war, was long ago eliminated from those observed by civilised armies in land warfare. There can be no doubt, then, that the German armies, in the course of the war of 1914-15, resolutely refused, in a great many cases, to conform on this point with the traditions finally consecrated by the Hague Regulations, and systematically applied to continental war the worst customs of ancient maritime law. Nothing could better demonstrate the practical influence exercised on the leaders of the German army—that is, of the German nation—by the most daring apostles of Pan-Germanism. At a time, in fact, when the lawyers of Germany were repeating, with the lawyers of the whole world, that, in land warfare, private property must be held sacred, we have seen that Tannenberg was loudly proclaiming the contrary principle, and calling upon his compatriots to apply henceforth to continental war (the speciality of Prussia) the right of capture existing in maritime war (the speciality of England).²

And it is this remarkable coincidence between a theory which at first was taken for mere bravado and the practices to which hundreds of examples bear the most tragic testimony at the present day which best

¹ See below, p. 195, the remarkable praise bestowed upon it by Ganghofer.

² See above, p. 143.

indicates the true significance of these German depredations, both in France and Germany. Although a few officers, less in touch with new ideas, have sometimes shown some hesitation in committing them, it is interesting to observe that individuals of high rank have not scrupled to lend their sanction to these captures of booty. The official Belgian and French reports mention by name several of these illustrious personages, and incredulity is scarcely possible when, for instance, after the departure of the German troops, the names of the officers were found written on the doors of the rooms which they had occupied in a château which had been absolutely stripped.¹ We have not yet had an opportunity of reading diaries of generals or of princes, but in those which we possess belonging to officers the only general or particular measures referred to as having been taken by the superior authorities on the subject of pillage are orders destined rather to regularise and localise than to suppress it.

For instance, Major B——, whom we have already quoted, notes on September 2—

“The villages of Laisson, Eton, etc.,² burnt and abandoned. Where the inhabitants have remained, the houses are still standing. At Laisson, there was written on a door: ‘Pillage strictly forbidden.’ From now onwards, all the objects requisitioned must be delivered

¹ For instance, the château of Verdelot, at the time of the Battle of the Marne, was plundered, while it was the quarters of the staff of the 3rd Army Corps: General von Lochow, Colonel von Seeckt, Majors von Wetzel and von der Hude, Captains von Lindequist, von Winterfeld, von Beitz, von Pertellz, von Waldow, Kunzell, Steffert, Gotze, First Lieutenants Hatschon and Borchardt; doctors, Oberarzt Baron von Maltzahn, Karl Hilspach and Paul Lehmann; assistant commissary of stores Erick Kurtzius; privy councillor Lange. (French War Office (Direction du Contentieux), No. 202, D. 78.)

² Between Etain and Soincourt. It is interesting to compare the evidence of Major B—— with a view of Eton which has been popularised by a publisher of German picture postcards, the *Kunst und Verlagsanstalt Schaar Datke Komm. Ges.* of Trêves, card No. 71. This demonstrates also that the sight of French ruins is pleasing to the German public.

to the Division, with the exception of oats, hay and straw.”¹

This document is doubly instructive. In the first place, it illustrates the extraordinary mentality which confers as a favour on certain inhabitants and on certain houses the right to escape pillage! In 1870-1, in the German army, and in every European war since that date, pillage has been regarded as an exceptional act, and has been more or less severely punished when the delinquents have been discovered by their superior officers. Respect for property is the rule, the transgression of which constitutes a crime, recognised and punished by the military code, both in Germany and elsewhere.² The German newspapers, since the outbreak of the war of 1914, desirous of ascribing to their enemies the example and the responsibility for their own actions, have made a great clamour about a record of an order given by the French General Dubail, which they discovered in quarters abandoned by our troops.³ Now, this order, after stating that certain acts of pillage at the expense of the inhabitants had been committed by the French soldiers, expressly reminded the troops that such conduct would be severely punished, whatever the circumstances; and, in fact, the leaders of the French army have not failed to punish, even with death, such depredations as have, after investigation, been proved against their subordinates.

If, therefore, the exception proves the rule, it is the same for the German army, but in the inverse sense. The exception duly established is the exemption from pillage conferred on certain properties in a very large number of villages and towns in Belgium and France. This exception is generally due to the goodwill of some

¹ Die Dörfer Laisson, Eton pp. verbrannt und verlassen. Wo die Bewohner geblieben sind stehen die Häuser. In Laisson stand an einer Tür: Plündern streng verboten. Von jetzt ab müssen sämtliche Sach an die Div. abgeliefert werden, ausser Hafer, Heu u. Stroh.

² See above, p. 151.

³ See *Vossische Zeitung*, September 17, 1914.

inferior officer or even quartermaster, who writes in chalk on a door: "Gute Leute. Bitte schonen" ("Good people. Please spare them"). This was written on the door of a house at Senlis by a non-commissioned officer of the third squadron of the 15th Hussars. But the fact that the general pillage, from which certain favoured individuals were thus exempted, was well known to, if not actually ordered by the leaders of the German army, is proved by the fact that some of the recommendations for exemption emanate from officers of high rank: for instance, the following certificate was handed to the staff of the French army by a householder, whose name cannot for certain reasons be mentioned here—

"Herewith I certify that the staff of the 2nd Division of Infantry has been very well received here to-day, and I beg that these premises shall not be plundered.

(Signed) Von M—— C—— II. I. D." ¹

Surely this entreaty, whether expressed by a subaltern or the staff of a Division, is very remarkable, since it amounts to securing the observation in a particular instance of an article which actually forms part of the Prussian military regulations. And what are we to think of those officers, ordinarily so strict, so dogmatic, so *schneidig*, who merely express entreaties, when it would be sufficient for them to give orders? It is hardly likely that these experienced commanders hesitate to annoy their troops. It is, therefore, far more likely that their cautious language is due to the fear of disobeying, even by way of exception, instructions emanating from still higher sources, which enjoined as a general system the spoliation and devastation of the occupied territory.

This system of general spoliation is also illustrated

¹ Hiermit bescheinige ich dass der Stab der II. I. D. am heutigen Tage sehr gut aufgenommen worden ist und spreche ich die Bitte aus dieses Quartier nicht auszuplündern. Von M——C II. I. D. (French War Office (Etat-Major général de l'Armée, 2^e Bureau).)

by the second part of the passage quoted above from the notes of Major B——, for the collection by the Division of the various articles requisitioned by the units under its control is scarcely likely to have been made with the object of restoring them to their legitimate owners. It will be noted that it is only the forage which is left at the disposition of the commanders of the corps, and evidently it was not a question of food, consumed on the spot. Therefore the articles (*Sachen*) which the commanders order to be collected at one spot evidently do not belong to the category of those described in the regulations as indispensable in order to satisfy “a temporary necessity of the troops.” This document, then, proves by implication the systematic organisation of pillage,¹ and thus confirms the indications from French or Belgian sources regarding the regular operation of this strange organisation, which would appear to be connected with a regular department of the public service, known as the Department of Booty of War (*Kriegsbeuteamt*).

This expression, *Beute* (booty), is, in fact, constantly used in German documents of every kind to denote articles, or even cash, which have been requisitioned, and no distinction is made between the levies made on the property of the inhabitants, in the course of those huge collective operations which, under the pretext of repression, end in the burning of villages and towns, and the goods taken without any pretext from those who have not offered any resistance. The mere expression “booty” offers yet another proof of a collective and premeditated contempt for the laws of land warfare, and the substitution, in conformity with the advice of Tannenberg, of the customs of maritime war. Other

¹ The almost official or at any rate recognised character of this pillage is strikingly confirmed by the fact that German soldiers have allowed themselves to be photographed in the exercise of these unusual functions. This is illustrated by the picture postcard above, No. 17, of a series published by N. Schumacher, Bad-Mondorf, and circulated in Germany.

documents, in fact, afford unquestionable evidence that the German troops in many cases shared their booty, just as formerly the crews of pirate boats shared the money and goods found on the vessels which they captured.

We still lack any precise information in regard to the manner in which the objects acquired or the products from their sale were generally distributed. We know, to be sure, that these "requisitions" frequently furnished the German troops with objects of no military value, such as pianos, sewing machines, silver plate, works of art, etc., the destination of which is unknown.¹ But we possess precise information regarding the confiscation of cash which was practised systematically by the German armies on the French—on the dead as well as on the prisoners and wounded, without any regard to the provisions of the Hague Conventions. The official French reports furnish positive evidence of this entirely unprecedented German practice. The files of the Direction du Contentieux of the French War Office contain the depositions of peaceable French inhabitants—especially women and girls, who have been summoned by the German commanders to bury the dead on the battlefield, and have been ordered to hand over to them all the money and valuables discovered on the bodies.² This precaution in itself would have been only normal and in conformity with International Law, if the German commanders had taken care that the families of their fallen enemies were placed in possession of what was, and ought to remain, their private property. But this was not the case; no such restitution was made; and, moreover, numerous French prisoners of war were also compelled to give up the money and valuables in their

¹ This is the kind of booty which the soldier, Johannes Thode, quoted by J. Bédier (*Les Crimes allemands d'après les Temoignages allemands*, p. 23), saw pass on a motor lorry.

² For instance, at Gerbeville and Lamath, where about 7000 francs were confiscated upon 247 corpses (French War Office (Direction du Contentieux), 260 D. 91, 404 D. 184, etc.).

possession on the very field of battle.¹ The case of Lieutenant Lahoulle, of the 25th French Dragoons, has frequently been quoted. Wounded and unhorsed during a charge against the German cavalry, he was approached by a German officer, who, finding him stunned, but still breathing, did not blush to snatch from him his revolver and shoot him in the stomach, and then with his own hands to strip him of his pocket-book and objects of value.² But from this individual instance, the sequel to which is unknown, it would be impossible to deduce such grave conclusions in regard to the general practice as result from the two following documents.

The first is a page of the diary of Lieutenant M——, of the 20th Regiment of Infantry.³ It is concerned with a battle not far from Péronne, in which the 1st battalion of his regiment, with a company of machine guns, surprised a body of French cavalry composed of two Arab squadrons, two squadrons of chasseurs and two of cuirassiers. The surprise was terrible—

“Opened fire with the machine guns at 500 metres. It is appalling! One might be at a circus. After a few minutes the ground looked as if it had been freshly manured. A colonel, four captains and about 200 captured cavalry fell into our hands. The two Arab squadrons escaped; the four others wiped out.”⁴

¹ French doctors and stretcher-bearers, who have been taken prisoner, contrary to International Law, have been deprived, in many cases of their money, and even of their surgical instruments. See Part III. of this work.

² French War Office (Direction du Contentieux).

³ Diary of Lieut. M——, 20th Regiment of Infantry (Prince Rupprecht). Bound in black moleskin, red pencil, 63 numbered pages + 23 blank pages + 5 pages of notes = 91 pages in all. Gothic writing. Date, July 31 to October 1, 1914.

⁴ Rückmarsch weiter auf die Höhen südwest. Péronne. 1/20 mit M.G.K. (Maschinengewehr Kompanie) ueberrascht ein fdl. Kavallerie Rgt. bestehend aus 2 Arabischen Schwadronen, 2 Schasseurs, u. 2 Kuirassierschwadronen, Feuerueberfall auf 500 m. ! Mit Maschinengewehren ! Es ist grässlich, man konnte glauben ein Zirkus. Wie frisch gedüngt sieht das Feld nach wenigen Minuten aus. 1 Oberst., 4 Kapitäne, ungef. 200 Gefangene Reiter in unsren Händen. Die

And, after the words "into our hands" (Händen), there is an asterisk referring to a note at the bottom of the page, in which the writer has added subsequently the following calculation, doubtless to aid him in drawing up his report: "More than 3000 francs booty seized and handed over to the battalion."¹ This money, taken openly, and in a manner officially, from prisoners of war, was therefore regarded as booty, from which we may suppose that it was not seized as a measure of prudence and with the intention of restoring it to the owner later, as is sometimes done in modern war. It is, in fact, very probable that, in this instance as in others, the money thus collected and delivered to the officer in command of the troops engaged (in this case the commander of the battalion) was considered as prize, and either paid over to some higher authority or, more probably, distributed to the men in one or more instalments, either immediately or at a later date, on some occasion of rejoicing. A second document affords a singular commentary on this capture. It is the notebook of Lieutenant C—, of the 69th Regiment of Infantry.² The notebook in this case is not a diary of the march, but rather a sort of little memorandum book, in which the officer entered orders received or the accounts of his company. On August 29, 1914, there is entered the following remarkable transaction, which we reproduce here in full.

On the left-hand page figures first of all a calculation of the money "taken from French soldiers." Then

2 Arabischen Schwadronen entwischten, die vier anderen sind vernichtet. Mittags Vormarsch ueber Biaches Dompière. Unsre Kolonne 20 No. 1 Inf. Regt. 4 Feld Art. Rgt. (Fürher gen. v.) Linke Kolonne, abw. auf Gegner bei Fouconcourt gestossen! Greifen von Rechts her ein. Fouconcourt genommen, Nachts 2 Uhr Tagesverpflegung in einem Holweg, nördlich Fouconcourt in Schützenlinie. Keine Ruhe.

¹ Ueber 3000 frcs. erbeutet u. an Batl. Abgeliefert.

² Notebook of Lieut. C—, 3rd Company, Reserve Battalion, 69th Regiment. Notebook in red leather, with two inside pockets and pencil-holder; dark grey end-papers, red edges, size 121 × 78 mm., gothic and Roman writing, black and red pencil, 28 leaves.

follows a calculation of the prisoners themselves, who seem to have been taken on several different occasions, for there are several items. The right-hand page commences with some notes of addresses. Then we read distinctly the sums of money "paid to the company"—

Fr. 5,220—gold	Captain Krupper-Couvent
3,140—paper	
1,500—silver	Bruns
800—mostly silver	
100—mostly copper	1st house behind the bridge
10—odd copper	
Frcs. 10,770	
520 common soldiers/	Paid to the Company—
11 officers /349	Fr. 390—Lieut. Winterhoff
126 common soldiers/421	2,310—Sergeant Major
1 officer /211	460—1st Lieut. Caspari
	380—2 deputy officers
658	981
981	
1,639	

A comparison of these two calculations of receipts and expenditure scarcely leaves any doubt as to the origin of the funds thus distributed by the officer to his subordinates. We may observe the graduation of the amounts according to the rank of the recipients, the sergeant-major evidently representing here the soldiers and officers of inferior rank, among whom he would continue the distribution. Now, these sums would seem to represent gratuities, and not distribution of pay, for the figures do not agree with those of the regular monthly allowances made to the various grades of the German army in the field. We do not know what became of the balance of the sum received and entered in the accounts of Lieutenant C——, for the diary is not continued any further, and the following page contains merely this joyous effusion—

“Wie schön ist die Franzosenjagd
Wenn laut der Korch der Flache kracht !”
(“How fine it is to hunt the French
When loudly the cork pops from the bottle !”)

Perhaps the surplus of the funds were handed over to the exchequer of the regiment or the Division? But the fact of the conferring on officers and common soldiers of cash bounties derived from the booty of war is no longer open to doubt. A third document, of the same nature as the others, serves to confirm them and to establish their full significance. It is a page of orders noted on the report (*Besprechung*)¹ of December 4, 1914, by some officer or non-commissioned officer of the 2nd Battalion of the 22nd Infantry. At this date, it appears, they were busy with preparations for Christmas, a fête peculiarly dear to Germans; and the first paragraph of the decisions taken on that day run as follows—

“Christmas 24/25 in winter quarters. Each man got five silver marks of prize money. Dec. 15 sent a man to Germany to make purchases.”²

Thus, in Christmas 1914—that is to say, four months after the distribution made at Maissain by Lieutenant C——, gratuities were distributed among the German troops from the funds described as *Beutegeld* (prize-money). This represents an exact application to the land army of maritime customs, according to which the crews received their share of the prize money taken from the enemy in privateering warfare. Thus, all those depredations of which the French and the Belgians complain so bitterly are erroneously regarded by the latter as a sign of lack of discipline on the part of the German armies in the field. These armies are obeying a premeditated plan, which they carry out systematically; for the rules hitherto observed by the civilised nations in land warfare—rules, moreover, officially accepted by the Germans themselves at the Hague Conference and reproduced in their military regulations

¹ The page quoted, found in a trench among papers stained with mud, is preserved in the Direction du Contentieux of the French War Office.

² Weihnachten 24/25 in den Winterquartieren pero Mann 5 MR Beutegeld. Dec. 15. Mann nach Deutschland schicken zum Einkauf.

—they have substituted customs until recently regarded as peculiar to maritime warfare; in fact, they have effected upon various pretexts and by various methods a sort of systematic spoliation of the countries which they have invaded, both by carrying off the greatest possible amount of property capable of transportation, and by destroying, without any military necessity, the greatest possible amount of property which could not be carried off.

And if any one still felt any doubts concerning the system thus systematically applied, no demonstration could be more convincing than the description of it to be found in the German authors themselves. It will be sufficient to select for quotation here, from many others of the same kind, a very characteristic page by Dr. Ludwig Ganghofer,¹ the well-known novelist, whose age, and the high reputation which he enjoys in Germany, ensured for this distinguished contributor to the *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten* both the goodwill of the authorities and the attention of the German public. We are, therefore, justified in concluding that his point of view has the approval of both, and, indeed, his impressions of his *Journey to the Front*, published at the commencement of the year 1915, would seem to have almost an official character. Whatever astonishment it may arouse in us, we cannot suspect any irony in his enthusiastic admiration for the easy triumphs effected by the German army over the property of an unarmed population. Yet it was the spectacle of these vast spoliations which evoked from him the following amazing lyrical outburst—

“For two weeks I have been afoot, day after day, merely that I might cast a superficial glance over all that is being produced, in the case of a single army, by the tranquil and incessant labour of that skilfully con-

¹ This writer, born at Kaufbeuren in 1855, is highly esteemed in Germany, where his complete works, issued in twenty volumes between 1906 and 1908, already exceeded their eighteenth thousand in 1909.

structed mechanism—the German service of supplies. What I have seen here in a limited space is being similarly enacted, with all its fruitful consequences for the Fatherland, at every point of the western front.

“The whole of the work is carried out in accordance with the following principle: For meeting the needs of the army, it is important to take as little as possible from Germany, and to obtain as much as possible from the conquered territories of the enemy. Moreover, everything which is not indispensable to the army and which would be of value to the Fatherland ought to be transported into Germany. In the course of three months, it has been possible to satisfy about four-fifths of the necessities of the army from the produce of the occupied territory. And, now that the resources of that territory are diminished, they none the less still supply two-thirds of the necessities of the German armies in the West. From this it may be estimated that the German empire, during the last four months, has saved, on an average, from three and a half to four million marks a day. Moreover, the gains from the German victories are still further and very considerably increased by the results of the economic war conducted against the conquered territories in accordance with the principles of International Law¹—that is to say, by the utilisation of the property of the State, transported into Germany in enormous quantities from Belgium and the north of France, such as booty of war, supplies taken from fortresses, cereals, woollens, metals, hard woods and other things, not including all the non-requisitioned private property, which have been taken in case of necessity, in order to increase the German supplies, but have been paid for at their full value. What Germany has saved and gained in this economic war, conducted with a quite commercial efficiency, may be reckoned at about six or seven millions of marks a day; so that the total gains reaped by the German

¹ We may note the singular confusion, purposely contrived, if not by Dr. Ganghofer, at any rate by his informers, between the supplies contained in fortresses, which might doubtless be booty of war, and the stocks of woollens, metals, hard woods, etc., which certainly did not belong to the State. There is evidently a confusion here between the concepts “State” and “Society,” in accordance with the ideas of Naumann concerning war expressed above, p. 136.

empire behind her western front since the commencement of the war may be estimated at more than two thousand million marks—an immense victory for Germany, whose economic strength is thus husbanded and increased! An overwhelming defeat for the enemy, thus deprived of all financial profit from the territories which we have conquered.

“I shall have occasion to revert to the subject of the conduct and ramifications of this economic war. It will convince us that the phrase ‘unpractical Germans’ has to be consigned to the rubbish heap of the past. An illustration of the blessed transformation which has been accomplished to our advantage in this respect was furnished me by a German officer of high rank, who said to me: ‘It is curious what men can learn! I am really an officer of the Guards, from Potsdam, but at present I am trading in timber and wool, and with success!’”¹

It would be difficult to offer any comment which would not detract from the effect of the narrative of Dr. Ganghofer, and the remarkable conclusion to it furnished by an officer of the Guards! But, for the benefit of those who might accuse Dr. Ganghofer of having allowed himself to be too much carried away by the lyric ardour of his romantic imagination, we judge it worth while to add two further testimonies to the same effect. The first is from the notebook containing the orders of a *Feldwebel* (sergeant-major). In it we read, among other things—

“It should be very specially enjoined on all that, even in abandoned houses, nothing must be destroyed, and that, in the case of property already partly demolished, no fresh damage should be inflicted. On the contrary, we must try to spare these habitations as much as possible, for the sake of the Germans who shall come after us. Destruction as punishment for a crime

¹ “Ich bin doch eigentlich ein Potsdamer Gardeofficier. Jetzt handle ich mit Holz und Wolle. Sogar erfolgreich!” *Reise zur Deutschen Front*, von Dr. Ludwig Ganghofer, Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, Freitag, Febr. 26, 1915, Vorabendblatt, Nr. 103, p. 4, col. 2.

must only be executed by the orders of an officer, who shall be responsible for it.”¹

This moderation in devastation is only ordered for the advantage of the Germans who may come later, and not simply in accordance with the old military regulations and out of consideration for the innocent proprietors of the occupied estates. This interesting commentary on the orders given by the German commanders to their troops accords admirably with the general plan, revealed by publicists like Dr. Ganghofer and, better still, Dr. Gustav Streseman, member of the Reichstag. The politician is less lyrical but more brutal than the man of letters in his reply to the complaints of the Paris Chamber of Commerce on the subject of the seizures by the Germans in Belgium of raw materials and merchandise, seizures which were described as pillage. “This pillage,” says Dr. Streseman, “has also been effected in France, in the domain of textile and mechanical industries. . . . At this moment the economic losses inflicted on France amount to several thousand millions.”² And he anticipates that the ruthless exploitation (*rücksichtslose Ausbeutung*) of the territories occupied in France, especially as regards raw materials and articles of food, may result in their ruin. Moreover, he jests on the subject, and congratulates German industry on thus being rid of a formidable rival! It would surely be difficult to exhibit with more candour the motives of the German war and its economic methods.

However, all these German actions and observations, the authenticity of which it would be difficult to refute,

¹ This document, discovered at Chailly-en-Brie, is in the possession of the French War Office, Direction du Contentieux, Cote 593, D. 299. It is a little notebook consisting of 16 written pages, unbound, measuring 10 × 16 cm., checkered blue, 8 mm., gothic writing, black pencil. It contains only copies of orders, the first of which is dated 15/8/14, the others undated. It is anonymous.

² *Das Deutsche Wirtschaftsleben im Kriege*. Leipzig (Hirzel), 1915, 8vo., p. 50.

are only revealed in their full worth and significance when they are compared with the almost prophetic words which we have quoted at the beginning of this chapter. And the conclusion which is obviously to be drawn from this comparison is that, from the military point of view, and even, in general, from the point of view of the relations of Germany with foreign countries, Germanism during the last few years has become more and more identified with Pan-Germanism. The most violent ideas and formulæ expressed by the latter are henceforth seen to be, if not those professed by all the Germans of the present day, at any rate those which determine their actions. We have just seen how the German army applies these Pan-Germanist principles to the property of their enemies. It might have been foreseen that no greater measure of respect would be shown to their persons.

CHAPTER IV

GERMAN TERRORISM

*Keine Zuchtlose Grausamkeit,
Manifeste des 93.*

§ 1. INTERNATIONAL LAW ADMITS THE RIGHT OF CIVILIANS TO FIGHT OPENLY AGAINST THE INVADER

ONE of the most constant preoccupations of all those who, in varying degrees, have contributed towards the improvement and establishment of International Law, has undoubtedly been the endeavour to confine the dangers and burdens of war to belligerents only. Hence, in the first place, it was, above all, important to define the term "belligerent," with a view to determining by elimination what classes of individuals ought, under any circumstances, to be immune from the dangers of modern war. The limitation of the term "belligerent" to men who are armed and organised for military purposes—that is to say, who are actually part of the enemy troops—ought to be regarded as one of the most remarkable achievements accomplished by bellicose humanity in the course of the last twenty centuries. Pagan antiquity did not dream of it. Christianity and chivalry for the first time laid it down as a principle. The professional armies of the old school had observed it more or less, and had admitted its legitimacy. In the age of levies *en masse* and of nations in arms, it was important to establish more precisely just what it was that conferred on men the designation of soldiers, and the particular risks and privileges to which this designation rendered them liable in time of war. And, since the majority of modern States had embodied in their

legislation the principle that all men capable of bearing arms are under an obligation to defend their country, it was important to define in universally accepted formulæ by what means an invading army was to distinguish, among the male population of the country invaded, between belligerents who might be suspected, fought against and placed under constraint, and peaceful civilians who were to be protected.

It is clear, of course, that the protection accorded in modern warfare to the civilian population implies an obligation on the part of the latter to commit no act of hostility against the enemy. Ever since Christian conceptions of humanity and respect for others have impelled the conqueror to safeguard the lives of defenceless human beings, any local or individual act of aggression on the part of the latter became logically equivalent to an act of treachery, an infringement of a tacit agreement, a sort of crime under common law. Whatever plea of patriotism might be put forward in extenuation of attacks of this nature, they can hardly be too severely censured.

First, because they are acts of disloyalty towards an adversary who has spontaneously refused to make use of his strength in order to render them impossible *a priori*, by at once subjecting all the citizens to the whole rigour of his armed force.

Secondly, because, by depriving this adversary of all sense of security in his relations with the civilian population, they justify him in employing the most severe measures of coercion, as well as the most sanguinary reprisals. Assuredly, in spite of warnings, cases of this kind have occurred in European wars of modern times, and they have inflicted cruel losses on the enemy, and, in return, exposed the population to terrible repressions. The most famous example of this disregard of long-recognised principles is furnished, perhaps, by the Napoleonic wars in Spain, during which greater losses were inflicted on the French army by guerilla warfare

than by pitched battles; and this example is frequently quoted by military authorities, above all in Germany, to illustrate the obligation incumbent upon any invading army in an enemy country of repressing from the outset and with the utmost rigour any attempt at civilian resistance, in order to prevent the war from assuming of necessity an atrocious character of massacre and devastation.

From the time of the Franco-German War of 1870-1, the Prussian army had retained and applied this doctrine with the utmost severity to any elements of the civil population organised on a more or less military footing who, either individually or in company with regular troops, had from time to time attempted to oppose their passage by force. Under the French military laws of this epoch, a certain number of men who were eligible for the army were exempted from military service. Some of these formed themselves into little groups, known as "francs-tireurs," who generally adopted a more or less characteristic uniform, chose for themselves leaders (who were generally old soldiers) and armed themselves as best they could by the aid of all kind of expedients. These small units could only wage an irregular warfare. They waged it sometimes with great success, not only inflicting serious damage on the enemy's communications, but causing him still more serious anxieties. In addition to these francs-tireurs, properly speaking, some individual private citizens sometimes armed themselves spontaneously, either with the intention of defending their family and possessions, threatened by the German soldiers, or of ambushing themselves on the route of an enemy detachment, or even, in conjunction with a few neighbours, of attempting a daring *coup de main* or defending desperately some village or some difficult passage. It is incontestable that, however courageous and sometimes heroic their conduct, these individuals placed themselves, from the point of view of International Law, in an exceptional position, which justified the Germans in treating them

with harshness. Even if the irregular troops could claim to be considered as belligerents, on the plea that, as they had a uniform, weapons of war and officers, they were fighting openly on the same footing as the other corps of the national army, those ordinary civilians who, without orders and without uniforms, employed the most various means of injuring the enemy, both on the march and in their quarters, ran the risk of being considered and dealt with as criminals; and, indeed, this is what actually happened.

As a matter of fact, the German commanders for the most part refused to admit the distinction based on the possession of a uniform, and generally bestowed on both alike the generic designation of "francs-tireurs," who, in their opinion, ought to be shot as soon as they were captured. Moreover, in order to inspire the population with a salutary fear for their safety, they laid down as a principle that the latter must be made jointly and severally responsible for any individual attacks which might be made against the German army or its supplies. From this a whole system was developed, including the preliminary arrest of distinguished personages, who were retained as hostages, and who were to pay with their fortunes and their lives for crimes committed by unknown persons; also more or less heavy contributions, levied on the parishes in which attacks had been made, whether against persons, railways, or telegraph wires, etc.; finally, as a supreme penalty, the destruction by fire of the locality adjudged guilty, either because the inhabitants had forcibly opposed the German troops, or simply because it had been the scene of some act or some destruction committed by unknown persons to the serious prejudice of the German troops. The histories of the Franco-German War of 1870-1 abound in examples of this nature;¹ but the important thing to

¹ The most famous was the destruction of Chateaudun, whose obstinate resistance had exasperated the German commander to the highest degree. C. F. Lehautcourt (Pierre) (general Palat), *Histoire de la Guerre Franco-Allemande de 1870-1*. Paris, Berger-Levrault, 15 vols.

note is the part played by these precedents in the moral preparation of the German officers for the present war. Among the many practical manuals provided for the latter there is one which seems, from this point of view, to deserve quite particular attention: it is the little manual entitled *L'Interprète Militaire*, published at Berlin, in 1906, by Professor von Scharfenort, Librarian of the Kriegsakademie, and retired captain.¹ This little book, destined for use in an enemy country by an army in occupation, is methodically divided into six parts, and includes samples of letters, orders, conventions, documents of every kind, in French, designed to meet every contingency of military life in time of war. Now, it is very interesting to quote from this collection the models provided in case the German army should be compelled once again to take severe measures against the "francs-tireurs." It would appear that this question has engaged the very serious attention of the educators of the German army, since it forms the subject of no less than a dozen passages. We find, for instance, the following suggestions for orders—

"Since several assassinations have been committed by francs-tireurs who have concealed themselves in the neighbouring woods, I order as follows—

"(1) Any person discovered in the forests or woods will be considered as a franc-tireur, and dealt with accordingly. . . . (p. 51).

"I should not lay special emphasis on this circumstance, if it were not for the fact that it is now confirmed on all sides that the citizens of S—— participate as francs-tireurs in the defence of this place. By reason of this fact, the situation is entirely changed from my point of view. It has now become not only my right, but also my duty, to fight against the citizens of S——, which I would gladly have avoided in the interests of

¹ *L'Interprète Militaire*. Zum Gebrauch in Feindesland. Zum Selbstunterricht. 2 völlig umgearbeitete Auflage. Zusammengestellt von von Scharfenort, Professor, Bibliothekar der Kriegsakademie, Hauptmann a. D. Berlin, 1906, Verlag von A. Bath. W. 8 Mohrenstrasse 19.

humanity. But, further, I have to inform you that, in accordance with the instructions which I have received, the francs-tireurs will not be treated as soldiers but sentenced in accordance with martial law . . . (p. 76).

"I cannot, therefore, admit the interpretation, according to which the francs-tireurs are to be regarded only as irregular skirmishers . . . (p. 76).

"In view of the report which has been delivered to me by —, from which it would appear that, on the 4th of this month, a detachment of the 36th Dragoons, while entering the village of H—, for the purpose of collecting contributions, was attacked by francs-tireurs concealed in the village;

"Seeing that the mayor not only did not warn the commander of the presence of this band, but even conducted the troops in the direction of the ambushade;

"It is decreed as follows—

"Article I. The village of H— shall be subjected to a fine of — marks, to be paid within three days from the publication of this decree.

"Article II. The mayor who interviewed the commander of the detachment upon his arrival in the village shall be brought before the military tribunal . . . (pp. 132-3).

"On the 1st of October, the armed police stationed at A— were attacked by francs-tireurs. One policeman was killed, a second seriously wounded, and six others taken prisoner. The complicity of the inhabitants of these parishes being undisputed, the commander has taken the most rigorous measures to compel the parishes to safeguard German officials. Consequently, this parish has been subjected to a fine of 30,000 francs. Two members of the municipal council have been seized as hostages. The houses in which the crime was committed have been burnt (and demolished). The whole parish will be threatened with the same fate, if the police who were taken prisoner are not immediately set at liberty (p. 139)."

But this rigorous German tradition was by no means approved by the authorities on International Law. As early as 1870, the protests of the French awakened an

echo in neutral countries, and the doctrine became more and more firmly established that only those deserved to be treated with all the rigour of martial law, who, not forming part of any military organisation, had, either individually or in small groups, been guilty of treacherous attacks to the detriment of the enemy troops. Not only did a number of good authors refuse to admit that persons who, though not organised on a military footing, had openly taken up arms against the invader, were not entitled, since they incurred the risks of belligerents, to be treated as such; but, above all, enlightened public opinion in most of the civilised countries refused to admit that a peaceable and in-offensive population could be held responsible in their persons and in their property for an isolated act, the author of which might quite possibly have no connection with this population. The principle of collective responsibility, although frequently applied even in our day and by civilised Powers, in the case of colonial populations, was particularly repugnant to the spirit of justice and humanity of our epoch.¹ Therefore the measures recommended by *L'Interprète Militaire*, although based upon known precedents, were in formal contradiction with the tendencies generally admitted in modern armies.

Concerning this and other questions, it was reserved for the second Hague Conference finally to determine the as yet hazy conceptions, especially in regard to the classification as belligerents of armed individuals or groups, and also in regard to the penalty to be inflicted on those who, though not belligerents, should have none the less engaged in acts of warfare. The regulation

¹ We know what vigorous protests the application of this method to colonies has frequently evoked, even from the Germans themselves, when it was a question of criticising the conduct in Africa of the great colonising nations of France, Belgium or Great Britain. And these protests were often echoed in France, whether among the socialists, or among the societies without any political character, such as La Ligue des droits de L'Homme et du Citoyen.

annexed to Convention IV concerning the laws and customs of war on land removes any doubt concerning the possible interpretation of the definitions given on this head. It opens, in fact, with a chapter: *Concerning the quality of belligerent*, the two first articles of which are conceived as follows—

“Article I. The laws, rights and duties of war apply not only to the army, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions—

“(1) That they are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.

“(2) That they have a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance.

“(3) That they carry arms openly; and

“(4) That they conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

“In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army or form part of it, they are included under the denomination ‘army.’

“Article II. The population of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops, without having had time to organise themselves in accordance with Article I, shall be regarded as belligerents, *if they carry arms openly* and if they respect the laws and customs of war.”

It would have been impossible to frame a more absolute contradiction of the conceptions which had hitherto been applied to the subject by the staff of the German armies. Not only were the bands of francs-tireurs wearing a uniform or a visible emblem, as had been the case in 1870, to be classified henceforth with the regular troops (which is only logical, since it is not for the enemy to estimate the military value or the degree of organisation of the troops before him); but, further, the conferring of the quality of belligerent on the population of a territory not yet occupied, who should spontaneously take up arms, disposes of any argument concerning the more or less degree of regularity

of the armed bands whom circumstances might induce to enter into the conflict. In modern warfare, since the various provinces and localities of a country will not all have arrived at the same degree of perfection in preparing a rapid mobilisation of their respective fighting strengths, it is inevitable that, in the face of an enemy who has planned an overwhelming attack, some military improvisation will be made here and there, in order to retard the progress of the invaders, by sections of the population, equally brave and loyal, but not equally ready to pass from civil life to the official and external conditions of military life.

Thus the sole condition which was henceforth necessary and sufficient in order to justify an armed resistance and to ensure to those responsible for it the relative respect due to belligerents, was that these citizens in arms should fight openly, and in conformity with the laws and customs of war. An individual murder, a treacherous surprise, the burning of a cantonment in which the enemy is reposing unsuspectingly after having been well received, acts of violence against prisoners and wounded, thefts or destructions of military material by apparently inoffensive civilians, continue to be regarded as illegitimate actions, against which it is lawful to take severe measures so as to prevent their recurrence. But the putting of a village into a state of defence by its own inhabitants, male and female, who, having entrenched themselves in their houses, fire on the enemy troops, with all the arms at their disposal, is a perfectly legitimate act of war. Doubtless it exposes the inhabitants of all ages and of both sexes to the risk of being killed or wounded by the fire of the enemy or by the resulting conflagrations, but it does not in any case justify the conqueror in treating them differently from regular troops—that is to say, in failing to respect their property and their lives, in case they should surrender or be taken prisoners.

The same precautions were prescribed in the regula-

tions of the Hague in regard to spies; for a summary and severe repression of many acts denounced as espionage might result in time of war in the most deplorable abuse of power and in the most regrettable mistakes. A definition was therefore given. It was expressed in the following terms of the same regulation, annexed to Convention IV, of October 18, 1907—

“Article XXIX. A person can only be considered a spy when, acting clandestinely or on false pretences, he obtains, or seeks to obtain, information in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party.

“Thus soldiers, not in disguise, who have penetrated into the zone of operations of the hostile army for the purpose of obtaining information, are not considered as spies. Similarly, the following are not considered spies: soldiers and civilians carrying out their mission openly, entrusted with the delivery of dispatches intended either for their own army or for the enemy's army. To this class equally belong persons sent in balloons for the purpose of carrying dispatches, and, generally, of maintaining communications between the different parts of an army or a territory.”

From this explicit document we see that, in any case, it would not be just to consider or to treat as spies any enemy officers or soldiers who should have placed themselves far in advance or far in the rear of their troops for the purpose of observing the opposed army, and conveying information concerning its movements to their own leaders, by telephone or any other means. Even less does the description apply to small detachments of such observers, who, having been surprised in a village by superior numbers of the enemy, should present an obstinate and desperate resistance. Finally, in any case there could be no justification for treating as accomplices and as responsible for acts of espionage the civil population of villages in which either traces had been found of such military observers, or in which shots had been fired by them. Moreover, even if these

observers were civilians, acting at their own risk and peril, and exposing themselves as such to the rigours of martial law, there could be no question of rendering the whole population jointly and severally responsible for these actions, nor even of compelling them, by threats or otherwise, to denounce or to deliver up the alleged culprits. The regulation already quoted declares, in fact, in Section III: *Concerning military authority on the territory of the enemy state*—

“Article XLIV. A belligerent is forbidden to force the inhabitants of territory occupied by it to furnish information *about the army of the other belligerent or about its means of defence.*”

Under these conditions the culpability of civilians towards an invading army can only be allowed in the case of murders or other treacherous attacks (*Meuchelmord*) to which we have already referred. But, even in this case, the enemy is far from enjoying complete latitude in the choice of the most proper means of chastising these acts and preventing their recurrence. In the first place, it is important that a serious investigation should be made, for the purpose of establishing the justice of the charge, often very lightly made against such-and-such a group of civilians. Even in time of war, an investigation of this nature ought to be ordered at once and rapidly executed, but with some guarantee of justice; and it would be paradoxical that the fear of a judicial error, owing to these of necessity summary and expeditious methods, should result in the systematic neglect of the most elementary forms of legal procedure. Even when it is a case of a culprit seized in the very act, the Hague Convention has insisted on the necessity of observing certain formalities, and has decreed—

“Article XXX. A spy taken in the act cannot be punished without previous trial.”

As for the principle of the collective responsibility of localities in which offences are proved to have been

committed, the Hague Conference expressly refused to admit it. Indirectly, therefore, the Hague Conference protested against the practice of systematic incendiarism in punishment for individual acts charged against the civilian population, as prescribed in the extracts quoted above from *L'Interprète Militaire*, since, in Article XXIII § g, of the regulations already mentioned, we read—

“ . . . It is especially forbidden . . .

“(g) to destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.”

But, in addition, such measures are directly prohibited in Article L of the same regulation, which runs as follows—

“ Article L. No collective penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals, for which they cannot be regarded as collectively responsible.”

It would seem, then, that the civilian population of countries exposed to foreign invasion ought to be henceforth protected against the unnecessary tyranny and violence of leaders and troops, provided that they themselves maintain as a whole an attitude at any rate peaceable, if not indifferent. The solemn nature of the agreements signed at the Hague on October 10, 1907, by the forty-four principal states of the world ought to inspire them on this head with a sense of all the more security, since Germany, whose earlier theories were known to be opposed to so much humanity, none the less made no protest through her official representatives against these prescriptions, which are both perfectly clear and expressly contrary to her custom, confining herself to making some exceptions to Article XLIV of the regulation quoted above, but consenting none the less to accept it as a whole. And the entire civilised world experienced, as it were, a sense of relief when Germany

thus accepted, with a good grace, as it seemed, conditions which had long since been professed and practised elsewhere; and even those who were most sceptical concerning the dream of a universal and perpetual peace none the less felt confident that, in the contingency of an inevitable war, a definite and practical amelioration had been secured by the voluntary adhesion of all the great military nations to precautions of this nature.

It seems almost beyond question that, at any rate in the case of the enlightened inhabitants of Belgium and France, a genuine feeling of security was from this time propagated among the masses of the people. In France, especially, although recollections of 1870 had nourished a bitter resentment among the aged witnesses of that terrible year, the younger generation, on the contrary, however courageous and patriotic they might be, were too profoundly habituated to military discipline, and at the same time naturally pacific and loyal, not to expect a corresponding attitude in the case of a fresh invasion. The fact that military service was compulsory on all the citizens without exception rendered materially impossible the formation of bands, however small, of francs-tireurs or other volunteers, above all in the frontier regions, which were crowded with regular troops and in which all the able-bodied members of the civilian population were more or less requisitioned for the needs of the army. As for individual attacks, the French population, above all in these regions, knew very well that they would only be useless folly, inadequate either to arrest or even to retard a powerfully organised enemy, while exposing innocent persons to the danger of reprisals, even from the most humane enemy. The new Hague Convention, on the one hand, and the extension of the French military régime to almost the whole of the male population, on the other hand, ought to have ensured reciprocally entire security, both for the French villages of Lorraine, Champagne and Flanders and for the German armies themselves, who could be sure of not finding on

the routes of invasion any element materially or morally prepared for a guerilla resistance.

In Belgium, on the other hand, a population much less familiar with military regulations, ardently enamoured of liberty, traditionally brave, and, moreover, indignant at the unjust attack upon their country, might, in extremity, arm themselves spontaneously against the invader, since the leniency of the military administration allowed a great number of young, able-bodied men, perfectly capable of bearing arms, to remain in civilian life. Devotees of hunting and shooting, with an appreciation of good weapons and the means of procuring them from excellent makers, many young Belgians actually possessed guns, carbines, revolvers, and the corresponding munitions. It might have been foreseen that, in certain cases, these patriots, when their national honour had been insulted and their liberty menaced, might regard it as a sacred duty to make spontaneous use of these arms, either by attaching themselves to the regular armed force or by forming small local bands for the purpose of resisting the invaders. It seemed, moreover, as if the Hague Conference had foreseen this possibility by decreeing in advance, in Article II, quoted above, of the "Regulation concerning the laws and customs of land warfare," that spontaneous defenders of their native soil deserved in every respect the qualification of belligerents enjoyed by the regular troops.

To this definition Germany herself had appended her signature, and it is not to be supposed that she did this lightly; fearing, for her own part, the possibility of a surprise attack by France or Russia, Germany intended to secure the benefit of this clause on behalf of her own subjects on her western and eastern frontiers—that is to say, in Alsace-Lorraine and East Prussia. It is no secret for any one that the civil functionaries installed by the Prussian Government in the frontier regions of the Germanic empire are selected from the most ardent

patriots, preferably old soldiers of good reputation. Teachers, railway and post office employees, agents for estates, forests or public works, employees in the Treasury of the State or of societies or municipalities, purchasers of lots for colonisation, whether large or small, form, as it were, the advance guard of militant Pan-Germanism, and constitute a whole army who, although in the Reserves, never reach the age of retirement. And the duty most urgently enjoined on these ardent patriots by the nationalist Press, with the approval of those in high authority, was, even in time of peace, the constant practice of the most devoted espionage, and the local preparation of an obstinate defence, in case a surprise attack should result in the presence of enemy troops on German territory. *Kein Mann ohne Waffe* (No man without a weapon) was not only a trade advertisement displayed by gunsmiths on the sites reserved for the display of Pan-Germanist publications; it was also a reality for this class of devoted servants of the empire. The Russian armies had an experience of this in East Prussia, and also the French armies in Alsace; the German diplomats were certainly well aware of this state of things, and when they countersigned the articles designed both to safeguard the civil population who should oppose a hostile invasion and also in some degree to protect spies, these plenipotentiaries did so in the complete understanding of what the documents implied. They imagined, perhaps, that their country, in case of victory, could disregard these provisions, but they certainly intended, in case of invasion, to take advantage of them; and they did not hesitate to employ them as a rampart to be left in the rear and forgotten when attacking, but behind which to take shelter when on the defensive.

It is not for us here to animadvert on these covert intentions. It is sufficient to recall the fact that the documents which define the incontestable rights of civilian populations to resist an invading army openly

and weapon in hand are both precisely worded and universally accepted, even by Germany. It should be noted, moreover, that, although certain military publications and certain commentaries in the German Press have sometimes obscured, more or less consciously, this perfectly definite fact, the Imperial Chancellerie did not hesitate to refer to Articles I and II of the above-mentioned regulation, in the German White Book published in May 1915, in order to throw the responsibility upon the Belgians for the outrages to which they were subjected. By reproaching the unfortunate inhabitants of Dinant, Aerschott, Andenne and Louvain, as well as the Belgian Government, with not having conformed either to the letter or to the spirit of these Articles, the German Government confirmed implicitly their entire validity, thus obviating the necessity of any discussion except concerning what actually took place.¹

§ 2. THE GERMANS MAKE THE INNOCENT RESPONSIBLE
FOR CRIMES THE PERPETRATORS OF WHICH THEY
ARE UNABLE TO DISCOVER

It might be asked what, in the face of the very clear and precise documents elaborated by the Hague

¹ Equally impressive is the anonymous publication entitled *Der Franktireurkrieg in Belgien. Geständnisse Stuttgart und Berlin* (Deutsche Verlagsanstalt), 1915. 8vo., with 4 plates. The extracts from English and Belgian newspapers collected here prove at the most that, in the first week of the war, the Belgian population of certain localities opposed a desperate resistance to the invaders. But this fact in no way justifies the mode of procedure or the indiscriminate repressions ordered by the leaders of the German army; and still less does it justify their excesses. As for France, it will be sufficient here to indicate the puerility of an argument, which, in the absence of any document proving the participation of civilians in actual warfare, endeavours to establish this participation by animadversions on the cover of a school exercise book, on which is depicted a Frenchwoman of 1870, avenging her brother by killing a Prussian general! It seemed worth while to emphasise this point before comparing the pretensions and the actions of the German army in the course of the present war.

Conference, would be the attitude of the military authorities of Germany, so anxious hitherto to defend on every occasion the principle that "what appear to be the most merciless may prove in the end the only truly humane proceedings,"¹ because, by inspiring the enemy with terror of the invading army, they facilitate the victory of the latter, diminish their risks and curtail for all parties the sufferings inherent in a state of war. This theory, questionable *a priori*, and the application of which results in the most terrible outrages, was expounded by some of the most respected German authorities on military science. Without going back any further, it is sufficient to recall here certain famous remarks of Prince von Bismarck,² and, still more recently, certain no less famous speeches of Emperor William II. Among the latter we may recall the scandal created in the civilised world in general, and among the cultivated classes of Germany in particular, by a certain astounding address which the Kaiser delivered in 1900 to the expeditionary corps about to set out for China.³ Whatever may have been the exact terms and expressions of this improvisation, which gave rise

¹ "... dass die scheinbar grösste Rücksichtslosigkeit immerhin die einzige wahre Humanität sein kann." Nicolai-Hein, *op. cit.*, p. 220. This proposition, or others like it, are to be found, moreover, in the works of all the German military authors.

² See, in particular, Dr. Moritz Busch, *Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of His History* (Macmillan, 3 vols.), where there are some fierce expressions, such as the following: "Give me the post of Commander-in-Chief for twenty-four hours, and I will take it upon myself. I would then give one command only: 'Commence the bombardment'" (vol. i. p. 332).

³ The official text of this speech differs materially from the reports of it originally published by the Hamburg newspapers, and, since then, frequently quoted. Notably the phrase which appeared to hold up as an example to the youthful representatives of Germanic culture the redoubtable memory of Attila was not reproduced in the official reports. But, even in the chastened form in which it is presented by the latter, this imperial outburst did not fail to scandalise considerably not only the outside world, but also certain of the more moderate elements in Germany. It would seem that fifteen years of Pan-Germanism have singularly allayed the scruples of these belated representatives of Christian gentleness in the German empire.

to heated discussion at the time, the fundamental idea which had inspired it was disputed neither by its imperial author nor by the leaders of German thought; and this idea was: that the duty of the Germanic soldier was, above all, to inspire such terror in foreign populations that, in future, "none should dare to look him in the face." Prophetic words, the dreadful meaning of which has since then assumed a more tragic significance than was doubtless foreseen by the imprudent son of the wise Emperor, Frederick III! Cruel words, which seem henceforth the terrible prologue to sanguinary dramas, enacted among the flaming ruins of the towns of France and Belgium, by the youthful champions of Germanic Kultur!

It seems, indeed, that until the very eve of the war, anxiety to inspire in all ranks of the enemy population, from the outset of military operations, a terror which, so they reasoned, should be the beginning of wisdom, occupied the educators of the German army, who, on this point, were in deliberate opposition to the Hague Regulations. In fact, while the remarkable suggestions of the *Kriegsbrauch* of 1902 in regard to the relative and almost optional character of the humane provisions of International Law had disappeared from most of the manuals drawn up for the German army subsequently to 1907; in regard to the repression of acts of aggression attributable to the civil population, no change had been made. The *Interprète Militaire* does not seem to have been re-edited since 1906. As for the little manuals already quoted by Michaelis (1908) and Nicolai-Hein¹ (1912), they appear only to have derived inspiration from the Convention of 1907, in so far as they concern the wounded, prisoners, and the property of inhabitants. In so far as they concern the possible participation of foreign civilians in military operations, the articles from the *Kriegsbrauch* which these writers quote always include the traditional dogma that—

¹ Nicolai-Hein, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

“Against rebellion and treachery on the part of the inhabitants of the invaded country, the only remedy is to employ the most relentless measures. By rebellion is understood : *the taking up arms by the inhabitants of the country* against the troops in occupation ; by treason, on the other hand, is understood, any risks or losses inflicted on the invaders by deceiving them or by conveying news concerning them to their own army. The act of intentionally misdirecting the enemy enters into the same category.”

Henceforth it was to be expected that the German army, in the repression of acts of hostility imputed to the civil population in the course of the war of 1914-15, would apply not the letter of the articles quoted above from the Hague Regulations, but the spirit of the theories of indiscriminate harshness, the most recent exposition of which was included up to 1912 in the practical instructions for the use of German officers. And in fact, from the first days, one might even say the first hours, of the war of 1914, not only did the staff of the Germanic armies never admit the right of the population of the invaded countries to take up arms spontaneously against them, but there can be no doubt that they gave orders to all their subordinates to suppress, upon the smallest suspicion and with the utmost rigour, any attempts, whether individual or collective, to oppose in any way the passage of the German troops. It is equally certain that not only did the instructions given to the troops insist on the immediate punishment, without investigation and without trial, of any action or lightest word which might lend itself to a hostile interpretation, but also these punishments were to be applied upon the principle—which had none the less been strongly condemned—of collective responsibility, even when the culprits, or alleged culprits—were personally known, and had paid for their supposed attempts with their lives. *Brand und Mord* (“burning and murder”), this is said to have been the order given to

the armies which invaded France and Belgium. In any case, this terrible motto was applied without distinction whenever the most insignificant subaltern saw fit to inspire any members of the civil population who had survived this tragic epoch with the fear of "ever looking Germans in the face."

And it must not be supposed that we are putting a too general interpretation on isolated or local occurrences. The examples are so numerous that it would be tedious to enumerate them. It will be sufficient to mention a few more or less notorious instances, in which indisputable acts of repression have been explained by the Germans themselves as having been rendered necessary by such-and-such an act of local hostility. It is not a question of lamenting the ruin and the mourning resulting from war, but of proving that many of these disasters, regarded by Germanic apologists as military necessities, were in reality only monstrous abuses of power, in contradiction not only to the moral sense of the nations, but also to the formal engagements of Germany. For we have seen that it was on the initiative of Germany herself that the States signatory to the Hague Convention had agreed to consider themselves responsible, materially as well as morally, for any misdemeanours which their subjects might be led into committing. Doubtless a few local or momentary excesses, due to the over-excitement of enervated troops or to the personal brutality of some inferior officer, would not involve a serious degree of culpability. But what are we to think of general orders given by the responsible commanders of the German armies, in which, far from recommending prudence and humanity to the officers placed under them, they exhort them, on the contrary, to treat the enemy population as collectively responsible for the smallest individual offences and to proceed against any expression of hostility with the most merciless severity. Of this nature, among many other instances, are the instructions given to his troops

by General von Fabeck, on August 13, 1914, when crossing the French frontier, and this document deserves to be quoted in full—

Gfm. 53

Gross. Hettingen 15.8.14. Nachm.

Inf. Brig. Nr. 73 Kr.

ABSCHRIFT

Gen. Kdo. 13 Vom 14. 8. 14. Ia Nr. 433 K.

Besondere Anordnungen

Bei einem Vormarsch ueber die Grenze ist damit zu rechnen, dass die Marschkolonnen auf zahlreich Wegsperren stossen. Die Vorhut und Vortruppenführer müssen Gegenmassregeln treffen. Die Vorhut. Kav. muss sofort, wenn sie auf Sperren trifft, die Gelegenheit zu Umgehung erkunden und zurückmelden. Bei der Spitzenkompagnie marschiert ein besonders auszurüstender Zug Pioniere, der sofort mit Aufräumen beginnt, während ein anderer Zug der Pion. Kp. der Vorhut zur Spitzenkompagnie vorangeht um beim nächsten Aufenthalte vorne zu sein (: die Vorhut Pion. Komp. marschiert ohne Gepäck und lässt ihre Tornister bei der gr. Bagage nachführen). Demnächst sind Arbeiter in der nächsten Gemeinde für die Aufräumungsarbeiten auszufordern. In dem einmal betretenen Gebiet sind die Einwohner für Erhaltung der Verkehrswege verantwortlich zu machen. Hierzu wird dem Vorhutführer eine starke Feldgendarmerie-Patrouille zum Gen. Kdo. eingegliedert werden zur Verwendung innerhalb des von unseren Truppen geschützten Raumes.

Gegen jeden Einwohner, der versucht uns schaden zuzufügen oder Schaden zufügt, ist mit rücksichtsloser Strenge zu verfahren.

Vert. Plan.

(gez.) v. FABECK.

123, 124 je 17 = 34

F.A. 49

11

Für die Richtigkeit der Abschrift :

Brig.

1

BAESSLER.

—

Oberlt. und Brig. Adjutant.

46

“In the advance across the frontier, it is to be expected that the columns will frequently find the roads

dem neuen bethenen Geldes sind die Forderungen für die
 Zahlung der Kassenlohnveranschlagung zu versehen.
 Diese mit dem Kassenlohnveranschlagung zusammen
 gebundene neuen Geldes sind ungehindert werden zu lassen.
 Ich empfehle das neue Geldes Kassenlohnveranschlagung
 Kassenlohnveranschlagung

Gegen jeden Forderung, der Kassenlohnveranschlagung
 gegen den Kassenlohnveranschlagung, ist mit Kassenlohnveranschlagung
 zu versehen.

gez. v. Fabeck

Im die Kassenlohnveranschlagung.

Kassenlohnveranschlagung

Abtheil. v. Kassenlohnveranschlagung.

Von den

113. 124 4 17. 34
 14. 44 11 11
 11 11 11 11

46

obstructed. The vanguard troops and their leaders must take the necessary counter-measures. The advance cavalry, as soon as they encounter barricades, must investigate whether there is any way round and come back to report. The first company is to be accompanied by a specially equipped section of engineers, who shall begin to clear the way immediately, while another section of the company of engineers with the vanguard, shall go forward to the first company, so as to be on the spot to deal with the next obstruction (the company of vanguard engineers marches without baggage, leaving their kits to be brought on with the big baggage). Moreover, workers are to be requisitioned in the nearest parishes, to help with the work of clearing. As soon as a district has been entered, the inhabitants are to be made responsible for preserving the ways of communication. To secure this, the chief commander shall put at the disposal of the vanguard a strong force of field police for service within the territory protected by our troops.

“Any inhabitant who does anything or attempts to do anything to our injury is to be treated with merciless severity.

(Signed) v. FABECK.

For the accuracy of the copy :

BAESSLER,

Oberleutnant and Brig. Adjutant.”¹

Thus the first troops to penetrate the enemy country proposed as ordinary and normal measures of safety—

(1) The requisitioning of the inhabitants, in order to employ them in military tasks, in which they would certainly be exposed to the fire of their own army;

(2) The collective responsibility of the inhabitants of the invaded district for purely military acts, which it would have been impossible for them to prevent;

¹ This document is an ordinary sheet of foolscap, cream-coloured, watermark at the foot of the page—R FABRIK R HELM 4. The writing is in the violet ink used when taking several copies. The figures at the foot of the page on the left-hand side indicate the number and distribution of the copies made for the brigade, namely, for the 123rd and 124th Regiments of Infantry, 17 each = 34; for the Company of Artillery 11, and for the staff 1, *i. e.* 46 in all.

(3) Measures of merciless and immediate repression against any civilian on the least suspicion of an act of hostility.

In regard to the first point, although the Hague Regulation does not expressly provide for this particular case, the spirit of it is none the less in clear opposition to such utilisations of civilian labour in an occupied country. We find, indeed, in Section III of this regulation—

Article 52. Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from localities or their inhabitants, save for the needs of the army in occupation. They shall be proportionate to the resources of the district, and shall be of such a nature as not to imply any obligation upon the population to take part in the operations of war against their own country.

Now it can scarcely be disputed that to demolish, on behalf of the enemy, the barricades constructed by the national troops who have retreated and are still at a little distance does constitute, for the inhabitants of a country, an unquestionable participation "in the operations of war against their own country." This labour is, in fact, contrary to the immediate interests and even to the security of the troops in retreat; and the latter are bound to oppose it by force, for the purpose of self-defence. Hence, peaceable civilians are confronted with this terrible dilemma: either to disobey the enemy, thereby exposing themselves and their families to the most terrible reprisals, or to obey the enemy, thereby exposing their compatriots to the danger of a more rapid advance by the enemy, and exposing themselves to the risk of being fired on by their compatriots. Since the outbreak of the war, German imperialism has refused to take any account of these scruples. We shall see later how subalterns pushed this terrible cynicism to the point of making an escort or a screen of enemy civilians or prisoners, even at the very hottest

point of the fighting; but it was necessary to give an example of the superior orders which served as a pretext for the callous cruelty of the troops. Such orders, imposing upon the population from the very outset the alternatives of disobedience, flight or treachery, were an invitation to employ those measures of sanguinary terrorism against the invaded population, to which it was apparently intended that they should be subjected.

We have seen above how the theory of collective responsibility was applied to the countries occupied by the enemy. The case is even more serious here than in the localities in which more or less numerous garrisons have been stationed for some time. In the actual zone of military operations, on the eve of or on the day following a battle, when detachments of the rearguard or even isolated stragglers belonging to the retreating army are still swarming in the villages, woods and other numerous natural shelters afforded by the country, it is manifestly absurd or criminal to attempt to compel an unarmed and patriotic population to guarantee the security of the enemy from their own compatriots. Not only was it practically impossible for the poor villagers to prevent any daring cyclists who might sally forth at night in order to venture a *coup de main*, or to blow up some military work, or to destroy telegraph wires, or even to burn a park or a convoy; but, even if they could, these peasants, in acting thus, would be traitors to their country; and, indeed, the most that could reasonably be demanded of them in such a case would be that they should take no part in these acts of warfare, and that they should keep as far away as possible from any points where they would risk becoming involved in them. The implacable logic of the Germans did not choose to perceive this very clear reasoning, which had nevertheless impressed the jurists of the whole world at the Hague.

The leaders of the imperial army did not hesitate to

demand from the Belgian and French populations a sort of collaboration in the struggle against their country. And, in every case of refusal, in every case of delay in obeying these paradoxical and odious exactions, they ordered immediate repressions, and loudly commended those who carried them out. A document of the same nature as the one which we have quoted above, and again emanating from General von Fabeck,¹ commander of the 13th Army Corps (Wurtembürger), furnishes an example of these official congratulations. It is contained in the orders of the day (Korps Tagesbefehl) of August 12, 1914, and reads as follows—

“Lieutenant Haag, of the 19th Regiment of Uhlans, being in command of a patrol, advanced promptly against some of the native population who had revolted, and, as the situation demanded, had resort to arms. I express my gratitude for his energy and promptness.”²

It could only have been expected that, with such encouragements to violence, given by officers of high rank to their subordinates from the very outset, the traditions of severity preserved in the Prussian army should have rapidly degenerated into an unrestrained and undiscerning brutality. The measures of coercion employed without warning by the Germans towards the population of the invaded districts possess, moreover, a twofold disadvantage of a very serious order: in the first place, they endow subalterns with a really excessive authority, a particularly grave mistake when, as in this case, it is a question of young men, little inured to war, and inclined moreover, by the very

¹ This officer had already rendered himself notorious in connection with the Zabern incident, in which, it may be remembered, he made an energetic intervention in the conflict with the civilian population provoked by the intemperate language of the young Lieutenant von Forstner.

² Lt. Haag von Ul. R. 19, ist als Patr. Führer gegen meuterische Einwohner energisch eingeschritten und hat in zweckentsprechender Weise von der Waffe Gebrauch machen lassen. Ich spreche ihm für seinen Schneid und seine Umsicht meine Anerkennung aus.

insecurity in which they are living, to lose all their sobriety and self-restraint on the smallest provocation. We know that the power of life and death over one's fellow-men is a heavy responsibility, which many even well-balanced minds have proved inadequate to support, when the hazards of a revolution or of a colonial career have suddenly transformed a man of mediocre and peaceable character into an absolute potentate.¹ It is not at all astonishing, then, that many of the German officers, both of superior and lower rank, perhaps naturally good-natured in their homes and in their everyday life, should have quickly lost all sense of justice and humanity, as soon as they found themselves at one stroke invested with absolute authority over a defenceless population, and without any other general instructions than to treat this population with unsparing (*rücksichtslos*) rigour. Moreover, the reaction in their case must have been so much the more violent in that hitherto they had been subject to a very severe discipline. For it is a matter of general experience that it is those who are most servile when it is a question of obedience, who are most brutal when it is a question of commanding.²

When, therefore, in their famous manifesto, the

¹ We know that many of the most violent terrorists who became pro-consuls of the French Revolution were insignificant people, simple, modest and pacific, in whom the sudden elevation to absolute power seems to have provoked an attack of bloodthirsty madness. This phenomenon, which has been abundantly studied by historians, has been verified recently in the case of young colonial officials of various nationalities. We have not forgotten certain startling "revelations," nor the periodical Press campaigns, from which the German colonies have been no less immune than the Belgian or British. The distressing Grand-Toqué incident in French Africa, of a few years ago, showed that, if the greater part of these accusations are largely fantastic and manifestly exaggerated, this despotic madness is unfortunately liable to attack the most civilised and otherwise well-balanced individuals. It seemed possible then that the German "atrocities" might be explained by mental pathology, in the same way as the actions of the celebrated tyrants of history.

² This is a fact which is frequently illustrated in history and in colonial life.

ninety-three intellectuals protested against the accusation of indiscipline brought against the German army, they were, to some extent, justified in affirming that the imperial troops could not have committed either in France or in Belgium any disorders properly so-called, or any "acts of undisciplined brutality" (*keine zuchtlose Grausamkeit*). Certainly this proposition is too absolute to be strictly exact, and, in many cases, unfortunately too well authenticated, individuals of all ranks belonging to the German army, have been guilty of actions which would be denounced by even the most energetic apologists of Pan-Germanism.¹ But these individual excesses, which, moreover, were frequently punished by the German military authorities, are less memorable than those collective and equally brutal actions, the responsibility for which has to be traced to a higher sphere of authority. Orders such as those we have just quoted and the general instructions contained in the *Kriegsbrauch*, carry an interpretation too serious in its consequences, to justify leaving it to men of so little experience, wisdom or self-control to decide when they are applicable. The oral tradition on which those entrusted with the accomplishment of the lofty tasks of Germanism could rely for deciding doubtful cases was, as we know, very remote from that "chivalrous spirit" and that "Christian sentiment" which Nicolai-Hein, by a singular anomaly, continued to recommend to the officers.

We have just seen that the theories professed by the leaders of the German army, from the very outset of the campaign, practically commanded them to transgress, in relation to civilian inhabitants accused of acts of hostility, not only the letter of the International Laws consecrated by the Hague Regulation, but also the ordinary sense of equity, prudence and humanity, which had hitherto been the pride of civilised nations. The

¹ We shall have occasion to quote a few characteristic examples towards the end of this work.



Zerstörung eines
Frankireur-Dorfes

Destruction of a Village containing Franks-Tireurs.

pretext of the necessities of war (*Kriegsnotwendigkeit*) was liable, in view of Pan-Germanist tendencies and the nervousness inherent in young soldiers, to result inevitably in the most flagrant judicial errors and the most serious abuses, in the course of these measures of repression. We have seen that the *Interprète Militaire* took as the criterion of the methods to be pursued in a future war, the most sinister precedents from the war of 1870-1. The same conception is to be found in the most popular German publications, as is proved, among other instances, by the postcard reproduced above. These lessons were certainly not in vain, and a brief examination of a few examples, furnished by actual documents, will enable us to estimate the disproportion between the destruction of human life and property, perpetrated by the German army upon the most trivial pretexts, and the gravity of the faults which they claimed to punish, a disproportion which convicts them before history with unpardonable and unprecedented crimes.

§ 3. THE PRETEXTS FOR THE GERMAN REPRESSIONS ARE ALWAYS INADEQUATE FOR THEIR JUSTIFICATION

An American journalist,¹ Mr. Powell, who travelled across Belgium at the very moment when the German troops were engaged in their brutalities, relates that General von Boehn, when questioned by him concerning the reasons for the destruction of Louvain, replied by incriminating the inhabitants, and, smashing his fist on the table, added: "Whenever civilians fire upon our troops we will teach them a lasting lesson. If women and children insist on getting in the way of bullets so much the worse for the women and children." This harsh expression was not, alas! the mere outburst of a soldier, exasperated by the insistence of a journalist;

¹ *Fighting in Flanders*, Chapter V.

it is exactly what was practised from the outset by the German armies, on their entry into Belgium and Lorraine ; and the proof of the incidents in question is revealed by the diaries of the campaign and by the German Press, in such a way as to leave no room for doubt.

If we admit, then, as historically authenticated, that, on certain occasions, certain inhabitants, especially in Belgium, did fire on the German soldiers, it is even more incontestable that the repression of such acts was everywhere effected in accordance with the following principles—

(1) When the “ guilty ” were identified and captured : immediate execution without any trial ; then destruction of their houses by fire ; then a collective penalty applied to the locality, either in the form of a fine or of a contribution of war, or else in the form of general pillage and burning, together with the deportation or even the massacre of the whole or a portion of the inhabitants.

(2) When the persons who had fired on the German troops were not discovered, a general application of the collective penalty, usually in the most expeditious and brutal form, that is to say, pillage, burning and the massacre of at any rate the male population.

There is no need to trace here once again the details of these terrible collective executions, which have been described many times in all their horror. It will be sufficient to refer readers to the official publications of the Belgian and French Governments, as well as to the books already quoted, by neutral witnesses, such as Messrs. Powell, Grondijs, etc. The excuses, even, with which the apologists of Germany seek to palliate or justify the conduct of the German generals and soldiers, constitute, from our point of view, the most terrible charges against them. And if we admit their theory (which is, none the less, as we have seen, contrary to the provisions of the Hague Regulation); and, if we suppose for a moment that, in order to ensure the

safety of the German troops, it was necessary to repress from the outset any attempt at revolt on the part of the population: we might possibly understand that, in exceptional circumstances, the German troops should refuse to treat civilians captured, weapons in hand, as prisoners of war; we might understand that a court-martial should, for the sake of example, punish, even by death, men who were convicted of having organised an armed resistance, above all, if this resistance had been subsequent to the arrival of the German troops; finally, we might tolerate that the Germans should levy heavy contributions on the locality, should demand the surrender and destruction of arms, should seize distinguished persons as hostages responsible for the maintenance of order, and, above all, should warn the population, by formal threats, of the fate which would befall offenders against its decrees. For instance, certain proclamations, posted by the order of the German generals in Belgian or French localities, might appear harsh, but the inhabitants, forewarned that the German military authorities were resolved to apply, instead of the principles of International Law, only those decrees which they themselves enacted, knew at least to what risks they exposed themselves by infringing these edicts. Such, for example, are the placards reproduced in the official Belgian Report, among which we will quote at random the one which the Mayor of Hasselt was compelled to post up on August 17, 1914—

“DEAR FELLOW-CITIZENS,

“In accordance with the superior German military authority, I have to recommend you once again to refrain from any manifestation liable to cause irritation and from any acts of hostility which might expose our town to terrible reprisals.

“You will refrain, above all, from maltreating the German troops and especially from firing on them.

“*In the case of the inhabitants firing on the soldiers of the German army, one-third of the male population will be shot.*

"I must remind you that meetings consisting of more than five persons are strictly forbidden, and that persons acting contrary to this prohibition will be arrested forthwith.

Hasselt,

"Le Bourgmestre :

August 17, 1914.

"FRED. PORTMANS." ¹

Of the same nature are the proclamations of General Goeringer, commander at Lunéville, notably that of August 28, 1914, which declared, for example—

(I) A state of siege is declared in the territory occupied by the German troops.

(II) The death penalty shall be inflicted on all those persons (1) who shall take up arms against individuals belonging to the German troops or forming part of their escort; (2) who shall destroy bridges, damage telegraph or telephone wires, railways, munitions, the provisions or quarters of the troops, or shall render roads impassable; (3) who shall tear down placards; (4) who shall enter into communication with the French troops.

(III) It is forbidden to all the inhabitants (1) to assemble in the streets; (2) to walk in the streets after 7 o'clock in the evening (French time); (3) to leave the town after 7 o'clock in the evening or before 5 o'clock in the morning without permission from the German authorities.

(IV) Any one who shelters soldiers of the French army must give notice of them. Any one in possession of arms and munitions must deliver them to the guard-house, rue d'Alsace, 39.

¹ CHERS CONCITOYENS,

D'accord avec l'autorité militaire supérieure allemande, j'ai l'honneur de vous recommander à nouveau de vous abstenir de toute manifestation provocante et de tous actes d'hostilité qui pourraient attirer à notre ville de terribles représailles.

Vous vous absteniez surtout de sévices contre les troupes allemandes et notamment de tirer sur elles.

Dans le cas où des habitants tireraient sur des soldats de l'armée allemande, le tiers de la population mâle serait passé par les armes.

Je vous rappelle que les rassemblements de plus de cinq personnes sont strictement défendus et que les personnes qui contreviendraient à cette défense seront arrêtées séance tenante.

Hasselt,

August 17, 1914.

Le Bourgmestre :

FRED. PORTMANS.

(V) The German authorities intend to look after the subsistence of the troops as well as of the inhabitants.

Therefore the interest of the population demands that the inhabitants should re-enter their houses, open the doors and shutters, and resume their work and their trade, in order to ensure the regular provisioning of the men.

(VI) The authorities of the town, the police and the gendarmes must place themselves at the disposal of the German military authorities.

These documents, reproductions of which might be multiplied indefinitely, openly attest the most cynically unjust demands, for, in the first place, they constitute a terrible moral constraint upon the inhabitants, with a view to compelling them to collaborate more or less directly in the German conquest; moreover, they exact penalties out of all proportion with the offences for which they are inflicted, and often, indeed, flagrantly unjust, since they are aimed deliberately at the innocent; finally, these warnings were not published until an interval of greater or less duration had elapsed after they had been put in force. There had, in fact, been no general notification either to the French or the Belgians, since the beginning of the campaign, of the very definite intention of the Germans to disregard international usage. The celebrated Proclamation of General von Emmich, distributed on August 4 to the Belgian population, contained no intimation of this nature, and, although this document has become notorious, it seems suitable to recall it here—

“ TO THE BELGIAN PEOPLE,

“ It is to my very great regret that the German troops have been forced to cross the Belgian frontier. They are acting under the constraint of an unavoidable necessity, the neutrality of Belgium having already been violated by French officers, who, in disguise, traversed Belgium in a motor car, in order to penetrate into Germany.

"Belgians! It is our greatest desire that means should be found of avoiding a conflict between two nations who have hitherto been friends, and formerly even allies. Remember the glorious days of Waterloo, when it was the German armies who helped to found and establish the independence and prosperity of your country.

"But we must have an unobstructed passage. Destructions of bridges, tunnels, railways, will have to be regarded as hostile actions.

"Belgians, you have to make the choice.

"Therefore, I hope that the army of the Meuse will not be compelled to fight you. A free passage in order to attack the enemy who wished to attack us. That is all we desire.

"I give formal guarantees to the Belgian population that they will not have to suffer any of the horrors of war, that we will pay in gold for any provisions that we may be compelled to demand from the country; that our soldiers will show themselves the best friends of a nation for whom we feel the highest esteem, the greatest sympathy.

"It will depend upon your wisdom and a rightly conceived patriotism to defend your country from the horrors of war.

"The General Commandant-in-Chief of the
Army of the Meuse,

"VON EMMICH." ¹

¹ AU PUEPLE BELGE.

C'est à mon plus grand regret que les troupes allemandes se voient forcées de franchir la frontière de la Belgique. Elles agissent sous la contrainte d'une nécessité inévitable, la neutralité de la Belgique ayant été déjà violée par des officiers français qui, sous un déguisement, avaient traversé la territoire belge en automobile pour pénétrer en Allemagne.

Belges! C'est notre plus grand désir qu'il y ait encore moyen d'éviter un combat entre deux peuples qui étaient amis jusqu'à présent, jadis même alliés. Souvenez-vous du glorieux jour de Waterloo, où c'étaient les armes allemandes qui ont contribués à fonder et établir l'indépendance et la prospérité de votre patrie.

Mais il nous faut le chemin libre. De destructions de ponts, de tunnels, de voies ferrées devront être regardées comme des actions hostiles.

Belges, vous avez à choisir.

J'espère donc que l'armée de la Meuse ne sera pas contrainte de vous combattre. Un chemin libre pour attaquer celui qui voulait nous attaquer, c'est tout ce que nous désirons.

Certainly this appeal, addressed "to the Belgian people," threatened them with acts of war, in case they should not allow "an unobstructed passage" to the German army; but these threats, addressed to the whole nation, were evidently addressed to its armed force, and there was not the least vestige of a phrase in this document which gave it to be understood that, contrary to the stipulations of the Hague, this armed force ought not in any case to include volunteers without a uniform. Less still did this document give it to be understood that an army, so anxious to save the Belgian population from "the horrors of war," would improvise against this same population the most terrible system of coercion recorded in history for centuries. Now, at the very moment when the notices from General von Emmich were being distributed at the Belgian frontier, orders had, beyond any doubt, been already given to the German army to employ against the civilian population, in all cases and with the most merciless brutality, the most terrible of the methods threatened in 1870-1.

In fact, when the interval necessary for the mobilisation and concentration of this army had barely expired, the first villages which it encountered beyond the invaded frontiers were already treated with this "merciless rigour," which, it would appear, is regarded by the German generals as the highest humanity. As early as August 8, Affleville ¹ in Lorraine had been burnt by

Je donne des garanties formelles à la population belge qu'elle n'aura rien à souffrir des horreurs de la guerre; que nous payerons en or monnayé les vivres qu'il faudra prendre du pays; que nos soldats se montreront les meilleurs amis d'un peuple pour lequel nous éprouvons la plus haute estime, la plus grande sympathie.

C'est de votre sagesse et d'un patriotisme bien compris qu'il dépend d'éviter à votre pays les horreurs de la guerre.

Le Général commandant en chef de l'armée de la Meuse.

VON EMMICH.

¹ The village of Affleville is situated in the canton of Etain, in the district of Verdun. On August 8, two Uhlans had been surprised there by French chasseurs. The next day, Sunday, August 9, just as the people were coming out from High Mass, a squadron of Uhlans arrived to burn the village, without any form of investigation.

the Uhlans, because one man belonging to a small advance reconnaissance party had been wounded by an ambushade of French chasseurs. As early as the 16th of August, Dinant had been consigned to the flames, and, at a lower point on the Meuse, Visé, two days afterwards, was razed to the ground. Perhaps some one may urge that, between the proclamation of General von Emmich and the events at Dinant, Visé or Aerschott nearly two weeks had elapsed, in the course of which the German army, in spite of all its moderation, had been driven to extremity by the attacks of the Belgian population.

Such, indeed, is the argument of the defenders of Germany; and we know that they have supported it with passion. Well aware, in accordance with the principle of the great Marshal von Moltke, that "to make war is to attack," these ardent polemicists have employed a defensive-offensive tactic, in their turn bringing the most terrible accusations against the Belgian civilians. Have they not asserted that Belgian women put out the eyes of the German wounded, tortured the prisoners, and thus merited the most severe reprisals? We shall have to return later to these multitudinous assertions, as terrible as they are unsupported by any proofs. But, even supposing that the German generals could have been sincere in giving unquestioning credence to such unlikely stories, how could a few crimes, necessarily individual, committed at a precise point of the theatre of war, justify collective brutalities at another point? How could the very doubtful mutilation of German wounded in Belgium, in the *second* week of the war, justify, for example, in the *first* week of the war, the destruction of Affleville? In order to render such explanations convincing to impartial minds, it would have been necessary to demonstrate first of all—

(1) The perfect correctness of the principles and the attitude of the German army towards the civil popu-

lation, judged by the provisions of the Hague, a correctness which this army ought, in any case, to have abandoned only after a certain time and as a result of numerous incidents, of a general character, and, above all, well substantiated.

(2) The authenticity of the attacks imputed to civilians, with details concerning the identity of the victims and the means of obtaining these details, as well as formal proofs,¹ leaving no room for doubt, that these crimes were committed callously, without provocation, by apparently inoffensive inhabitants, and that they were not anonymous accidents, which had occurred in the actual progress of the fighting. It is only too easy to attribute gratuitously to criminal conspiracies violent deaths or mutilations which were in reality caused by acts of warfare. Now, so far from having furnished the civilised world with these convincing proofs of their good faith, we are forced to take note that, here again, German apologists have only offered gratuitous assertions, which are rendered open to grave suspicion in view of the general recommendation to merciless severity reproduced above.

Hence nothing is less proved, nothing even is less probable, than the justification for the accusation of cruelty brought by the Germans against the civil population of Belgium, and, even if a single incident of this nature could be actually proved, this proof would in no sense excuse the orders given in Lorraine² and their tragic execution.

¹ It is only fair to admit that the majority of these allegations have since been officially contradicted by the German authorities; but there is no doubt that they were first of all circulated in Germany, as well as among the troops in the field, with the full knowledge of these same German authorities.

² Apart from Affleville, we know that a very large number of localities—even important localities—of that unfortunate frontier region, suffered a similar fate. The archives of the French *Ministère de l'Intérieur* and the *Contentieux du Ministère de la Guerre* already contain terribly detailed reports concerning these events, furnished by the officials of the invaded department. It will be easily understood that there are reasons which for the present forbid the publication of these documents with all the personal allusions which they

The upshot, then, of all this Germanic argumentation is the pretended necessity of repressing, energetically and from the outset, any hostility manifested by civilians to the invading army, and of chastising in a terrible manner, by collective executions, certain isolated attacks. This is the explanation which the majority of German witnesses of these tragic scenes give for their systematic rigour. According to the evidence of Lieutenant K., of the 49th Infantry (6th Pomeranian),¹ such was the veritable pretext for the terrible brutalities practised by the German army in Belgium, and we may accept the statements of this officer, whom no one will suspect of partiality for the enemy. It was August 14 when his regiment crossed the Belgian frontier on the way from Aix-la-Chapelle to Gemmenich. The very next day, this officer writes—

“The road passed through a charming and richly contrasted country, with continual ascents and descents, forests and pasture-land. Arrived at Fourn-Saint-Martin about two o’clock. The place is completely abandoned. In the farmstead assigned to us, we find two Belgians who have been shot. Already at Grindolles we came across burnt farms, from which shots had evidently been fired on our troops. In the course of searching these farms, we found a single-barrelled fowling-piece and munitions, which we destroyed immediately. In the forest we saw some more civilians, who had retreated there. It is necessary to use precautions, and strong guards will be posted. Early this morning, we loaded our guns for the first time. Yesterday it had not been necessary.

contain. They will be made available to the public when the time comes; that is to say, when these territories shall have been freed from the German occupation. On the other hand, it has seemed worth while to reproduce here some postcards actually published in Germany, apparently for the purpose of popularising these tragic events.

¹ French War Office: Diary of Lieut. K. Notebook bound black moleskin, red edges, size 202 × 132 mm., checkered blue 5 mm., gothic writing, red pencil or black ink. 25 numbered pages + 34 blank pages = 59 pages. Date of narrative, August 1 to October 3, 1914.

"*August 16.* Yesterday morning the row began. At dawn, some civilians fired on a sentinel of the 4th Company. Consequently a strong force of sentries was posted round our quarters. This tract of country seems made for a surprise attack, thick hedges, ditches, gardens. We had just lain down to sleep when, about half-past nine, the fireworks began all round us. Pistol-shots, small-shot, and now and then a shot from our sentinels. And with this a dense black night. It was uncanny. We thought every moment they would come and settle us. But no one came. They contented themselves with shooting. So we lay down again, of course weapon in hand. At three o'clock it began over again. It sounded as if machine guns were firing. But we did not let it disturb us. So passed the night. When it was light, all had vanished. Our sentinels had fired six rounds, but had not hit any one.

"About 7.25 departure from Fouron-le-Comte, Mouland, Visé, Lixhe, Lanaye, over the Liège canal, through Eben, Emael, Sichen, Riempst, to Herderen. Arrived at three o'clock. Quarters. Friendly inhabitants. Our columns of wagons were fired at several times on the road. Fouron-le-Comte and Mouland had been almost entirely burnt, because some of the civilians had fired on our troops. The first terrible pictures of the war presented themselves to our eyes. At Visé it was still more frightful. Here, the night before, an officer of the Engineers and six men had been assassinated in their quarters by their host. The culprit was immediately put to death. After this, shots were fired from all the houses. The Engineers replied to it (in reality they must have directed their shots at random and in some cases fired upon each other). Because of these shots having been fired on the troops, the whole village was burnt. Moreover, 375 men were shot, and the remainder transported to Aix-la-Chapelle. Thus a whole town of over 12,000 inhabitants had to suffer for the fault of a single fanatic. However, these people were warned both by the German and the Belgian Governments. It was terrible to see the procession of people fleeing from the town. Only women, some of advanced years, and children. Truly, war is something appalling. And yet, up to the present, we have only seen a small proportion of its horrors; but we have at least the moral consolation that it was

not we who started it. Between Visé and Lixhe, the Engineers had made a bridge; the iron bridge had been blown up. After we crossed the Meuse, the signs of devastation ceased. The population (Flemish) on the other side of the river seem to be more hostile than the Walloons on this side. The villages were all in good condition and intact, although our second corps had passed through them. It depends completely on the population themselves.”¹

¹ Der Weg ging durch wunderschöne, abwechslungsreiche Gegend, allerdings immer bergauf, bergab. Wald und Weideland. Ankunft in Fouron-St.-Martin gegen 2 Uhr. Der Ort ist völlig verlassen. In den uns zugewiesenen Gehöften fanden wir zwei standrechtlich erschossene Belgier. Schon in Grindolles stiessen wir auf niedergebrannte Gehöfte, aus denen offenbar auf unsere Truppen gefeuert worden war. Bei der Durchsuchung der Gehöfte fand sich noch eine einläufige Schrotflinte und Munition, die sofort vernichtet wurden. Im Walde wurden noch Civilisten gesehen, die Bevölkerung, die sich dorthin zurückgezogen hat. Vorsicht ist daher geboten, es werde starke Wachen ausgestellt. Heute früh wurde zum ersten Male scharf geladen, gestern war das noch nicht nötig.

August 16. Gestern abend ging der Rummel los. Als die Dämmerung einbrach, wurde von Civilisten auf einem Posten der 4 Comp. geschossen. Infolgedessen wurden starke Posten rings um unser Revier gestellt. Das Gelände war wie geschaffen zu einem Ueberfall: dichte Hecken, Gräben, Gärten. Wir hatten uns eben hingelegt, als um $\frac{1}{2}$ 10 Uhr es von allen Seiten anzuknallen anfang. Pistolenschüsse, Schrotschüsse, dazwischen hin und wieder ein Schuss von unseren Posten. Dabei stockfinstere Nacht. Es war unheimlich; wir dachten jeden Augenblick sie kämen und machten uns fertig. Es kam aber Niemand; sie schossen bloss. Wir legten uns deshalb wieder zur Ruh, allerdings Gewehr im Arm. Um 3 Uhr ging dieselbe Sache los. Es knallte als ob Maschinengewehre feuerten. Wir liessen uns aber nicht stören. So verging die Nacht. Als es hell wurde, war alles verschwunden. Unsere Posten hatten 6 Patronen 'rausgeschossen, aber Niemanden getroffen.

Um 7.25 Abmarsch ueber Fouron-le-Comte, Mouland, Visé, Lixhe, Lanaye, ueber den Lüttichkanal, durch Eben, Emael, Sichen, Riepst nach Herderen. Ankunft hier 3 Uhr. Ortsunterkunft. Freundliche Bewohner. Unsere Wagen-Kolonnen wurden unterwegs vielfach beschossen. Fouron-le-Comte und Mouland waren fast gänzlich niedergebrannt, weil aus ihnen von Civilpersonen auf Truppen geschossen worden war. Die ersten schrecklichen Bilder des Krieges boten sich uns dar. Noch schrecklicher war es in Visé. Hier sind in der letzten Nacht, ein Pionieroffizier und 6 Mann von ihrer Quartiergeber ermordet worden. Der Täter wurde sofort getötet. Im Anschluss an dies Attentat wurde aus allen Häusern geschossen. Die Pioniere erwiderten das Feuer. (Allerdings sollen auch sie blindlings drauflos gefeuert und sich teilweise gegenseitig angeschossen haben.) Wegen der Beschiessung der Truppen wurde die ganze Stadt in Brand gesetzt. Ausserdem sollen 375 Männer erschossen und die uebrigen nach Aachen

What are we to gather from this very clear and precise narrative? In the first place, that, until Visé, neither in the devastated villages nor in the night attack which the writer describes, are the inhabitants accused of anything more than open and perfectly legitimate acts of war. On the other hand, even this accusation is not based on very certain evidence, since no one in the German troops was hit and no civilian was captured weapon in hand. The nocturnal alarm, then, however unnerving it may have been, was not very serious, and imagination may have contributed something to it. But, even supposing that civilians were involved, the legitimacy of their action is expressly guaranteed by the Hague Regulation. To shoot two peasants, because a fowling-piece and munitions were found on their premises, to burn farms and villages for similar reasons: these are acts contrary to International Law, beyond any possible discussion.

The second conclusion which results from the same diary is that expressed by the Pomeranian officer himself at Visé—the terrible disproportion between the isolated action “of a fanatic” and the destruction of “a whole town of more than 12,000 inhabitants.” And was the attack by the fanatic ever made? Lieutenant K——, arriving on the scene the day after this tragic night, remarks that the German engineers, by their random shooting in the darkness, killed each other.

gebracht worden sein. Um eines einzigen Fanatikers willen muss so eine ganze Stadt von ueber 12,000 Einwohnern leiden. Dabei sind die Leute gewarnt, sowohl von der Deutschen wie auch von der belgischen Regierung. Scheusslich war es, den Zug der aus der Stadt Fliehenden anzusehen, alles Frauen, zum Teile in hohem Alter, und Kinder. Der Krieg ist doch etwas schreckliches. Dabei haben wir erst einen kleinen Teil der Schrecknisse gesehen; aber wir haben wenigstens die moralische Beruhigung, dass wir ihn nicht entfacht haben. Zwischen Visé und Lixhe hatten die Pioniere eine Brücke geschlagen; die eiserne war gesprengt worden. Jenseits der Maas hörten die Zerstörungen auf. Die Bevölkerung (Vlämen) scheint dort feindlicher zu sein als die diesseits der Maas wohnenden Wallonen. Die Dörfer waren alle wohl im Stande und unversehrt, obwohl das ganze II. Korps vor uns durchmarschiert war. Es liegt eben ganz an der Bevölkerung selbst.


But what was the cause of this alarm? Did it actually happen that an officer and six men of the German Engineers were killed by their host without any reason? And, if it did happen, was it a callous murder, or the result of a quarrel or of some domestic drama, in which some outraged husband or father tried to defend by force of arms his property, his honour, or that of his family? Of this we are ignorant, and doubtless we shall always be ignorant, since the "culprit" paid for his daring with his life, there and then, without any trial. In evidence which has since then been collected by the Belgian Government, it is denied that this individual crime was ever committed. Perhaps it will be thought that this nocturnal assault in any case merited investigation before any punishment was inflicted, even on the one man supposed guilty. But, from the moment he was dead, it might surely be imagined that justice had been done, and that, before pushing the matter any further, it would have been only reasonable to investigate it calmly? Nothing of the sort, however, seems to have occurred to the military authorities, or even to German public opinion. Lieutenant K—— declares that, only a few hours after the initial incident in this affair, the collective execution took place, and this simple statement is given without comment. As for the opinion of cultured Germany concerning the massacre of 375 men and the destruction of a town of 12,000 inhabitants, under the simple pretext of an isolated murder, it does not seem to have been in the least excited—at any rate if we are to judge by the considerable publicity which the Press and the photographer have given to these events. Is it conceivable that, if the whole of Germany had shuddered with horror at such news, postcards would have been published there like that reproduced above, which was addressed to a German soldier by his family, without any malicious intention? ¹

¹ Cf. above, p. 227.

Obj. Foto Schauen
Neuwert (Bild)
v. H. Gladbach

Visé · Maastrichter Strasse

Der Ort wurde wegen meudlerischer Überfälle
auf deutsche Soldaten zu Anfang August 1914
gänzlich zerstört.



Ruins of Visé.

We know that, two days after Visé, the unfortunate town of Aerschott suffered the same fate under the pretext of an outrage, of equally doubtful origin, which resulted in the death of General von Stenger. Three contradictory versions were current concerning this affair. Only one fact was certain—the death of the general, who was hit by a bullet, but, as he died on the spot, investigation was difficult. But who fired the shot? According to the official Belgian reports, and, especially, the deposition of the widow of the unfortunate mayor, the bullet which killed General von Stenger must have been a random shot fired at a venture by some soldier under the influence of drink. According to the version accredited by the German authorities, the general was shot by the son of the mayor, at whose house he had alighted. Finally, according to certain rumours collected by Mr. Powell, this young man was actually responsible for the death of the general, but only committed this murder, destined to have such terrible consequences, for the sake of defending his own sister from insult.¹

These conflicting stories, as well as certain improbabilities in the two last versions, which are positively contradicted by the widow of the Mayor Tielemans, prove how much circumspection ought to be exercised in such a case by those who are temporarily endowed with formidable powers over the life, honour and property of thousands of defenceless human beings. When peace has restored to men the power to give their evidence freely, history will be able to clear up certain obscure details concerning these tragic deaths. But no more at Aerschott than at Visé, no more at Louvain than at Termonde, will history be able to qualify the brutal fact that, in order to avenge the murder, real or supposed, of a single leader, or of a small group of men, German generals in the twentieth century, did not hesitate to command forthwith such

¹ *Fighting in Flanders*, Chap. IV.

systematic massacres and devastations as were thought to have been finally banished from the domain of human possibilities.

And this is such a grave statement that in itself it constitutes the most formidable of accusations against the Germanic civilisation of the present day. The fact that, in a given locality, some impulsive general should have been able, in a fit of anger, to order a terrible and unprecedented revenge, this alone would be very reprehensible, and little to the credit of the army in which such leaders were admitted. German historians have not failed to make accusations of this nature, above all in connection with enemies of non-Germanic race, and the executions perpetrated in the seventeenth century in the Palatinate, by the French troops, are wonderfully useful in connection with their favourite declamations.¹ But even in the seventeenth century, France had protested against these measures, which were, in fact, quite exceptional. In 1914, on the contrary, brutalities infinitely more widespread, more cruel, and more summary, evoked no objection, either from the army, or from German public opinion, and were, in fact, regarded not as a momentary relapse, but as an actual step forward in the progress of humanity!

To the postcard view of Visé, it would be possible to add many others, and to add to the testimony of Lieutenant K—— hundreds of similar records. And it was not only in Belgium that these repressions were practised. The general instructions of the commanders were carried out over the whole immense front of attack with equal rigour. *Brand und Mord* was applied, so to speak, automatically to villages and towns alike, and witnesses of every department and every rank of

¹ We know that, in order to perpetuate the memory of these melancholy events, the Germans, contrary to their taste for excessive restoration, allowed the ruins of the Castle of Heidelberg and a few old castles of minor importance to remain in ruins.

the army are agreed upon this point. A great deal of the evidence of these witnesses, extracted from diaries of the campaign, has been quoted so often already that it would be unnecessary to repeat it here, if it were not that its authenticity had been contested. No doubt, however, is possible, in the face of documents such as those reproduced here and described in detail. For instance, a superior officer, Major B——, of the 19th Infantry, records as follows¹—

“The village of Ethes is in flames, because the inhabitants took part in the fighting. One hears the most blood-curdling stories: priests, peasants, signals given by the bells. Terrible devastation!”²

Again we find a private soldier, H. B——, of the 134th Regiment of Infantry declaring³—

“Many prisoners were brought out of the village, twenty-one out of the church. The village of Hargnies is to be destroyed by fire, because of the hostility of the inhabitants.”⁴

And the soldier K. B——, of the 1st Regiment of Engineers,⁵ confines himself to summing up the operations of several days in this general formula—

“The inhabitants are possessed with the national hatred. The Germans set fire to the villages in which the inhabitants were not nicely behaved.”⁶

¹ For the notebook of Major B——, see above, p. 177, note 1.

² XIII. A. K. schwere Verluste auch durch preuss. Granatfeuer. Das Dorf Etthe brennt, da die Einwohner sich am Kampf beteiligt haben. Man erzählt sich die schauderhaftesten Dinge, Priester, Bauern, etc., Glockensignale pp. — schauderhafte Verwüstung.

³ French War Office: Diary of the soldier H. B——. Notebook bound in black moleskin, red edges, size 165 × 110 mm., checkered grey, 4 mm., gothic writing, black and red pencil, 21 written leaves + 21 blank leaves = 42 leaves. Narrative from Aug. 4 to Sept. 3, 1914.

⁴ “Aus dem Dorfe werden viele Gefangene gebracht. Eben aus der Kirche 21. Das Dorf Hargnies soll der feindsel. Einwohner wegen abgebrannt werden. Viele Flaschen Wein sind gefunden worden und auch etwas davon wurde an die Mannschaften verteilt.”

⁵ See above, p. 165.

⁶ Sie haben die Nationalhass. Die Deutschen setzten die Dörfer in Brand in denen [*sic*] die Civilisten nicht artig waren.

Doubtless, without more emotion than if it had been a question of correcting children !

But others, less philosophic perhaps, or more studious of literary effect, have sometimes described these punishments with all the detail that could be desired. For instance, the soldier H——, who belonged to a machine gun company of the Guards.¹ On his arrival in a village, of which he does not give the name, he learns that a crime has been committed, and, in punishment—

“ The whole village was to be burnt. The company was already prepared. One house began to burn. Two villages further matters went even more merrily. There, the male inhabitants had assembled and armed themselves and had tried to fight against us. This morning they had shot from behind a lieutenant and three dragoons. The punishment had already been put into effect. One company was employed for it and demolished all the houses. The soldiers had driven all the inhabitants together in the market-place. About fifty men stood before the court-martial and were surrounded by infantry with fixed bayonets. Before them lay all the firearms and munitions. A case had just been broken open by dint of powerful blows. Our lieutenant told us that all these men must be shot. The female population were shut up in the inn, and were gazing sadly from the windows. The other soldiers were plundering busily. One soldier ran out of the house with his arms full of bottles of wine. We received five bottles, and every one got his share. That is to say, no one was supposed to notice it. When we left the village, it was already burning at various points; when the sun rises to-morrow, of a beautiful village there will be left only a heap of ruins. That is war. We marched on till 4.30 and made a halt here. The remainder of the population in these villages has made

¹ Diary of Th. H——, reservist of the Guards. Notebook bound in grey cloth, grey back, edging of sewn red leather, inside pocket, pencil-holder, elastic, grey end-papers, red edges, checkered blue, 4 mm., size 150 × 85 mm., 56 pages + 38 blank pages = 94 pages. Written with red pencil. Date, Aug. 6 to Sept. 8, 1914.



Ruins of Senlis.

off. The smoke of the neighbouring villages gives them legs ! . . .”¹

Is this the result which the German army were seeking, in their anxiety to clear every barrier from their path? That is a question to which we shall have to come back later; but from facts already known it seems justifiable to conclude that the pretexts alleged by the German authorities, even if they were well-founded, would not serve to excuse their conduct, either from the point of view of International Law, or from that of military necessity, or still less of military traditions. We are, therefore, placed under the necessity of asking whether, indeed, these pretexts were not themselves imaginary, and whether the leaders of the German army, did not, of set purpose, on every occasion, seize the opportunity afforded by some trivial incident to execute repressions which had been planned in advance and were designed to exercise on the whole international conflict an influence of a political character. It is unnecessary, in a work written strictly from the

¹ (drum) wird das ganze Dorf niedergebrannt. Die Kompagnie stand schon parat. 1 Haus fing an zu brennen. 2 Dörfer weiter wurde die Sache noch heiterer; hier hatten sich die männl. Bevölkerung zusammen gethan u. bewaffnet u. wollten gegen uns kämpfen. Sie hatten bereits heute Morgen 1 Oberleutnant u. 3 Dragoner rücklings ueber den Haufen geschossen. Die Strafe wurde bereits vollstreckt. 1 Komp. war dabei und dämmolierte sämmtliche Häuser; auf dem Marktplatz hatten die Soldaten die Bevölkerung zusammen getrieben. Die Männer standen etwa 50 auf dem Platz vor dem Kriegsgericht und waren umstellt von Infantr. m. aufgepl. Bajon.; vor ihnen lagen die ganzen Schusswaffen u. Munition. Eine Kiste wurde gerade mit Kreuzh. aufgebrochen. Die Männer sollen alle standrechtlich erschossen werden, sagte unser Leutnant. Die weibl. Bevölkerung war in die Wirschaft gesperrt u. sah traurig aus den Fenstern; die uebrigen Soldaten räuberten tüchtig. Ein Soldat kam aus dem Hause gesprungen u. hatte den ganzen Arm voll Wein; wir bekamen 5 Flaschen u. so ein jedes Fahrzeug sein Teil, das heist merken durfte es keiner. Als wir aus dem Dorfe raus marschierten brannte es bereits an verschiedenen Stellen. Wenn Morgen die Sonne aufgeht, wird von einem schönen Dorf nur noch ein Trümmerhaufen geblieben sein. Das ist der Krieg. Wir sind noch bis 4.30 Uhr marschiert u. haben hier halt gemacht. Die andere Bevölkerung in dies. Dörfern ist wieder andern. Der Rauch macht ihnen Beine. . . .

point of view of International Law, to animadvert on such intentions. After Visé, Aerschott, Louvain, Senlis seems to have been among these condemned towns, for even if, in this latter locality, after the arrival of the German troops, a few shots were fired from somewhere or other, can any one believe that mere concern for the safety of a victorious army, which already imagined itself so near to a definite triumph, should have necessitated the brutal destructions which were perpetrated? Here the ruins are the most eloquent witnesses, since they are the result—not of a fight, but of an operation carried out calmly and without opposition. They would suffice in themselves to place the question of right on the most undebatable ground.

§ 4. THE GERMAN PLEA THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY LIES WITH THE POPULATION IS ONLY A PRETEXT FOR GERMAN ACTS OF VIOLENCE

In the quotations which we have just made at random from the mass of documents consulted, the civil population are formally accused of open resistance, and certain details lead us to suppose that there is a grain of truth in these accusations. But these cases are exceptional, for the witnesses almost always confine themselves to asserting that shots were fired on the German troops, without having taken the trouble or perhaps had the means of verifying whether these shots were fired by civilians or by soldiers in ambush. For, in the course of the desperate resistance which the Belgian and French armies offered to the invader, at all the stages of their long retreat from the Meuse to Antwerp and from the Ardennes to the Marne, numerous small skirmishes occurred daily between the enemy's scouts and the extreme rearguard of the defenders, whose mission it was to observe the enemy and delay him as much as possible. Obviously, these small detachments, in contact with superior forces, could only accomplish their mission by

combining stratagem with daring, and by concealing themselves as much as possible, in order the better to watch the enemy and harass him by every means that the circumstances offered. To blow up bridges, cut telegraph wires, ambush themselves in hamlets, woods, haystacks, so as to allow the heads of the columns to pass them, and then throw confusion in the mass of the troops by opening on them a violent and unexpected fire; then to disappear suddenly, after having, if possible, warned their artillery, by means of agreed signals or even of a field telephone, which there was not always time to take away. Such were the classic methods at the disposal of the rearguard; and there can be no doubt that the Belgians and the French employed them with great skill. Horsemen, and, above all, cyclists, with a thorough knowledge of the country, which, to be sure, was their country and in which they had often been garrisoned before the war, aided, moreover, by a native skill and ingenuity enhanced by the passionate interest which this kind of warfare owes to its element of "sport," these regular soldiers, for a period of three or four weeks, and with an incredible heroism and daring, made incessant and deadly attacks on the front, on the flanks, and even on the rear of the enemy.

And it seems that these daring attacks, which were none the less perfectly legitimate and correct, drove the German troops to such a pitch of exasperation that, either from want of reflection or from impotent rage, they laid the responsibility on the inhabited localities which they traversed, and even on inoffensive civilians encountered on the road. The formula most frequently met with in the German diaries records purely and simply the devastation of property "from which shots had been fired on the troops," without stating to whom these shots were to be imputed. For instance, a non-commissioned officer—Sch—— of the 69th Reserves¹—notes during the first days of his entry on the campaign—

¹ For the description of this notebook see below, p. 174, note 4.

“The Belgians fired at our troops from houses, haystacks, etc. Two soldiers were killed. In one village, four men were shot from a single house. All those houses from which any act of hostility was made against us were burnt. In the evening, we saw many villages in flames.”¹

Similarly the Reservist H. S——, of the 10th Battalion of Chasseurs²—

“A village entirely destroyed because one officer and five men were killed there. One house only was spared by orders. Then we went down to Ottignies on the Dyle. There, also, many houses were burnt, windows smashed, shops looted, many bottles of wine. A drunken foot-soldier was picked up in the street. Further on, along the railway from La Basse-Laloux-sous-Val to Genappes, the people so polite that they went down the whole column with their hats off, distributing cigars, and everywhere giving up their weapons.”³

The sense of terror which it had been desired to inspire in the population had evidently been obtained! But let no one suppose that this was a punishment imposed intentionally on Belgium alone. The examples are equally numerous and equally unjustifiable in the French campaigns.

¹ Die Belgien schiessen aus den Häusern, aus Strohhaufen u.s.w., auf unsere Truppen. Es waren 2 Soldaten getötet. In einem Dorfe waren aus einem Hause 4 Männer erschossen. Alle Häuser aus denen auf uns etwas feindliches unternommen wird werden angezündet. Am Abend sieht man viele Dörfer brennen.

² Diary of the soldier H. S——, of the 10th Chasseurs, Reserves, 4th Company. French War Office. Black cloth notebook, with pencil-holder, red edges, grey end-papers, size 148 × 83 mm. Gothic and Roman writing, red pencil, 36 pages + 32 blank pages = 68 pages, checkered blue 4 mm. Date, Aug. 4 to Sept. 16, 1914.

³ Ein Dorf völlig zerstört weil 1 off. 5 Mann dort getötet waren. Nur ein Haus auf Befehl geschont. Dann hinunter nach Ottignies an der Dyle. Auch hier viele Häuser ausgebrannt, Fenster eingeworfen, Läden geplündert, viele Weinflaschen, ein betrunkenener Infant. von der Strasse aufgelesen, Weiter an der Bahn La Bassé Laloux-sous-Val bis vor Genappes die Leute so höflich dass sie *chapeaux bas* die ganze Colonne herunter gehen, Cigaretten verteilen ueberall Waffen stellen.

In Lorraine, Lieutenant M——, of the 20th Bavarian Infantry,¹ reports—

“At Nonhigny some inhabitants fired from behind on the troops entering the village; some shots were fired at our company; no one was hit. Nonhigny was burnt; also Montreux, Parux.”²

The non-commissioned officer H——, of the 170th Regiment of Infantry, notes similarly—

“From 9 o/c onwards, fierce engagement of Infantry and Artillery. Burning of the village of Sainte-Barbe because the evening before shots had been fired on us. A frightful spectacle!”³

And, at another point, the Reservist H——, of the 178th Regiment of Infantry,⁴ relates on August 22nd—

“March to Fauvillers and Aulier. At 9 o'clock one killed and several horses wounded. The two villages fired on the German troops. As a punishment, they were burnt. Here also there was fighting, forty-five killed and many wounded.”⁵

These expressions occur so frequently that often the authors of the German diaries record these terrible acts

¹ See above, p. 191, note 3.

² In Nonhigny schiessen Einwohner von rückwärts auf die Durchmarsch. Truppen. Komp. beschossen, keiner getroffen. Nonhigny in Brand gesteckt, desgleichen Montreux, Parux.

³ Diary of non-commissioned officer, Dr. F. H——. Notebook bound black moleskin, red edges, size 166 × 98 mm., checkered grey 4 mm. Gothic writing, red and black pencil, 15 pages + 5 blank pages + 9 various notes = 29 pages. Date, July 31 to Sept. 23, 1914.

Von 9 Uhr ab starken Infanterie u. Art. Gefecht. In Brand stecken des Dorfes St. Barbe weil abends zuvor daraus geschossen wurde. Schauerliche Anblicke.

⁴ Diary of Reservist J. H——, 118th Reserves. Notebook bound in grey cloth, with flap, edged red leather, dark grey end-papers, red edges. Size 140 × 98 mm.; ruled in blue, 7 mm., 18 lines, black and red pencil, 47 pages + 7 various = 77 pages. Gothic writing. Date, 31 July to Aug. 17, 1914.

⁵ 22 Aug. 14. Marsch nach Fauvillers u. Aulier. 9 Uhr 1 Tode mehrere Pferde verwundet. Beide Dörfer haben auf deutsche Truppe geschossen, zur Strafe in Brand gesteckt. Hier hat auch Schlacht statt gefunden. 35 Tode viele Verwundete.

of repression as a commonplace occurrence which is not worth dwelling on and has left them with far less vivid recollections than a good meal or the discovery of a wine cellar that had been overlooked. Hence, often they do not even mention the name of the village which was summarily destroyed before their eyes. This is the case, for instance, with the Reservist K., of the 154th Infantry,¹ who records after a lapse of two days ²—

“August 20th. Marched 30 km. On the way, about 9 o/c in the morning, three houses were set on fire by the artillery, because shots had been fired from them. In the evening, about 9 o/c, we set a village on fire, because we had been fired on there. No one was hit, I myself undertook the searching of the first house. . . .

“At 12 o'clock the fight began. It lasted about four hours. The officer commanding my section was shot twice, once in the upper part and then in the lower part of the thigh. One man in my company had his cooking utensils shot through. Two wounded. At 7 o/c in the morning we set fire to the village because we had been fired on. Moreover, we made two Frenchmen prisoners.”

We may notice that, in this case, not only is there no evidence of the culpability of the civilians, but there are strong presumptions that, in the circumstances indicated, that is to say, in the course of a battle, the shots alleged as a pretext for burning French villages

¹ Diary of the Reservist K—— Brown notebook, black back, size 168 × 100 mm., ruled for accounts, red edges, 19 blue lines, 7 mm., gothic writing, black pencil, 21 pages + 36 blank pages + 3 various notes = 60 pages. Date, Aug. 1 to Sept. 12, 1914.

² 20 August. 30 km. Marsch. Unterwegs vormittag gegen 9 Uhr wurden 3 Häuser von der Artillerie in Brand gesteckt, weil daraus auf dieselbe geschossen wurde. Abends gegen 9 Uhr setzten wir ein Dorf in Brand, weil auf uns geschossen wurde. Getroffen wurde keine. Ich selbst habe die erste Haussuchung durchgenommen. 12 Uhr kommen wir ins Gefecht. Es dauerte ungefähr 4 Stunden. Angeschossen mit 2 Schüssen wurde mein Zugführer, Ober- und Unterschenkelsschuss. Einem Mann meiner Kompanie, wurde das Kochgeschirr durchschossen 2 Verwundete. Um 7 Uhr morgens setzten wir das Dorf in Brand, weil auf uns wieder geschossen worden. Ausserdem haben wir noch 2 gefangene Franzosen.

were actually fired by soldiers. This was probably the case with Lunéville, where we know that, on two several occasions, August 24 and 27, the shots fired on the German troops served as a pretext for burning property, shooting inhabitants, and, finally, for the heavy contributions to which we have already referred. A non-commissioned officer, R. W——, of the 166th Regiment of Infantry,¹ describes the burning on the 24th as follows—

“In the evening our detachment received orders to burn Lunéville, because the wounded had been fired at. Formed up immediately. We were fired at on the bridge and we replied in group-columns! I set fire on the right to the boiler-room of a factory. Lieut. Kriegbaum set fire to a private house. After the fire had started, a few French soldiers appeared, coming out of the factory.”²

Thus the shots had actually been fired by soldiers. They might, as an extreme measure, have been shot, if it had been proved by a court-martial that they had not respected the Red Cross flag, but a problematic crime of this nature furnished no justification whatever for punishing the owner of the premises in which these soldiers had intrenched themselves. Three days later, Lieutenant I., of the Prussian Guard,³ records an equally unreasonable proceeding, provoked, it would appear, simply by the irritation of the German generals at the enormous losses suffered by their troops. In the telegraphic style which is peculiar to him, this officer

¹ Diary of the Reservist R. W——, 166th Regiment Reserves. Notebook of 34 pages (the first and last four plain, the others ruled in mauve, 9 mm.), sewn by hand with black thread; p. 3, name and address, pp. 4–6 narrative from Aug. 3 to Sept. 4, 1914.

² 24 August. Am Abend erhält unsere Abteilung den Befehl Lunéville anzuzünden, da auf Verwundete geschossen wird. Sofort antreten; auf der Brücke Feuer erhalten das aus der Gruppenkolonne! erwidert wird. Ich zünde rechts im Kesselhaus einer Fabrik, der Leutnant Kriegbaum das Wohnhaus an. Beim Brande erscheinen einige frz. Soldaten, die aus der Fabrik kommen.

³ See description above, p. 174, note 2.

notes in fact briefly but expressively on the 27th of August—

“In front of us the 6th Army Corps, the 2nd Bavarian Reserve Corps. Enormous losses. Company has still 4–8 men. Surprise attack on the columns at Lunéville, burning of the town. Shooting of 60 inhabitants.”¹

And, on the same day, August 27, at Villers-sur-Meuse, the non-commissioned officer H. F——, of the 117th Infantry,² described an execution no less unjustified in the following terms—

“As we approached the Meuse, we were exposed to a very fierce fire from infantry and machine guns posted at the edge of the wood on the other side of the river. The enemy retired. *The village was burnt.*”³

Two days earlier, occurrences of the same nature had, as we know, provoked the fearful devastation of Gerbeviller. There some sixty French chasseurs had succeeded in retarding for some time the progress of the Bavarian troops at the passage of the Mortagne. The official French reports have described in detail the savage repression which was visited upon the unfortunate little town, and we shall have to refer later to certain details of this day of blood. Sermaize, Clermont-en-Argonne, and many other towns seem to have been destroyed on pretexts no better founded. And it would be vain to argue that the obstinate resistance of the French in the end so exasperated the German com-

¹ Vor uns das VI. A. K. das II. Bayr. Res. Korps. Enorme Verluste. Kp. um noch 4–8 Mann, Kolonnen-Anfall in Lunéville; niederbrennen der Stadt, Erschiessen von 60 Einwohnern. Nancyer Forts in Tätigkeit. Wir hoffentlich Morgen vor.

² Diary of non-commissioned officer, H. F——. Notebook black mole-skin, red edges, size 135 × 77 mm., ruled in blue, 6 mm., 22 lines. Gothic and Roman writing. Black and red pencil, 10 pages + 15 blank pages + 9 pages various notes = 34 pages. Narrative from Aug. 2 to Sept. 8, 1914.

³ 27 Août. Villers. Beim Heranmarsch an die Maas sehr heftiges Infanterie und Maschinengewehrfeuer aus dem jenseitigen Waldrande. Feind zieht sich zurück. Dorf in Brand gesteckt.

auch wir wieder zurück auf Linsville zu.
Am Abend erhält unsere Abteilung den Befehl,
Linsville anzuzünden, da auf Kanonade ge-
schossen wird. Sofort angeht man; auf der
Zurück Feuer erhalten, das aus der Gasse
herkommt! erwidert wird. Ich sehe nichts im
Kesselhaus einer Fabrik, der Leutnant Kriegl
das Wohnhaus an. Beim Brand erscheinen
einige 100 Soldaten die aus der Fabr. kommen.

Facsimile 2.

Vor uns das II. A. K., das
II. Bataillon des Korps infolge
berufen. Kps. nun noch 4-8
Mann, Kolonnenbefehl in
Linsville, Mischkolonne der
Stadt, beschreiben von der An-
sicht. Nachher Forts in
Tätigkeit. Wir hoffen die Mis-

Facsimile 3.



mander that he lost all restraint, for we have seen that the general application of this cruel method is to be traced back to the first days of the war: Badonviller, for instance, a few kilometres from the frontier, was burnt as early as August 12 by Bavarian troops, who had received their baptism of fire the day before, and were now engaged in their first really serious encounter. A very detailed letter, written to his brother, from Germany on November 26, 1914, by a non-commissioned Bavarian officer,¹ who was wounded in this engagement, explains very fully the various incidents of this affair.

This young man set out with eight others, as a patrol, on the night of August 11-12, to find out whether Badonviller was occupied by the enemy. Not finding any one in the locality, and wishing none the less to bring back some positive information to their leader, they went right on to the end of the place. Now the last house was occupied by a French advance guard. The latter opened fire at short range, but, in the darkness, only slightly grazed one of the Bavarians. Unfortunately the non-commissioned officer who was marching in front was hit by a bullet fired by one of his own men, which had probably rebounded, for it broke in the upper part of his thigh. He fell, and his men took flight "before the numerical superiority of the French (about 100)" and returned without accident. It was not until the morning that the French soldiers perceived the wounded man, disarmed him, and promised to send him a doctor, who, however did not come, a very violent struggle having developed between the Bavarian soldiers and the French troops who had returned in force. This engagement of musketry and artillery lasted some hours, and the wounded man sheltered himself in a ditch as best he could. Towards evening, a lull having intervened, and the French having

¹ This letter is preserved in the Direction du Contentieux of the French War Office.

been forced to retreat, some civilians appeared, including the inhabitants of the house from which the first shots had been fired in the night. The latter took the wounded man into their house and soon his comrades joined him. Then, information having been given to Captain von Bothmer, the latter had the wounded man lifted up to carry him to the ambulance. "But," writes the latter—

"Before this, I heard my captain give orders to these people to leave the house, which was to be burnt, because shots had been fired from it during the night. It was, in fact, in this house that the French advance guard had been installed. When these people heard the words 'Sortirez la maison' [*sic*], the girl threw herself at my feet, and implored me with tears to ask my captain to spare the house. Conscious of the kindness which they had shown to me, I made a request to my captain, and he did actually spare the house, so he told me, and noted on the order that it was because they had taken in a wounded German soldier. The success of my entreaty moved these people to tears."

Unfortunately, in the rest of the locality, counter-orders had doubtless not been given, and the fire soon assumed such proportions that it was necessary to empty the hospital, from which an ambulance carriage conveyed the German wounded at full gallop in the night "through the burning streets, in which every house seemed about to collapse." Thus the whole population of this little town was punished not even "for the fault of a single fanatic," but for an act of war duly recognised as such by its first witnesses; and, curiously enough, the only exception made, by a formal exemption,¹ to this general execution was, in fact, the very house from which shots had been fired in the night, and this at the request of the only victim of the nocturnal attack. Nothing could better illustrate the emptiness of the pretexts pleaded by the German military

¹ Cf. p. 188.

kam

mich in ein französisches Lazarett.
Vorher war ich noch Ohrenzeuge,
wie mein Hauptmann den Leuten
befahl, das Haus zu verlassen; es
sollte angezündet werden, weil in
der Nacht aus demselben geschossen
worden war. In diesem Hause war
nämlich die französische Feldwache
untergebracht worden. Als die Leute
das: „*Torturez la maison*“ hörten, fiel
mir die Tochter vor die Füße und
bat flehentlich, ich solle meinen
Hauptmann bitten, das Haus zu schonen.
Gingedenk der Wohltat, die sie mir
erwiesen, legte ich bei meinem Hptm
ein bittendes Wort ein und richtig,
Herr Hauptmann verschonte das Haus,
wie ^{er mir} sagte und auf dem Bon ver-
merkte, weil sie einen verwundeten
deutschen Soldaten aufgenommen hätten.

authorities, in order to explain acts of brutality, doubtless prompted by quite other considerations.

Perhaps the excitement of the conflict may be pleaded in excuse for this violence, but there are some who justify it by pretexts even more strange. The German troops, for example, do not allow the civil authorities or the French nuns to hold communications with the army which is defending their country, even *before* and up to the very moment of the arrival, of these troops. Any priest, any mayor, convicted of having signalled from a distance the approach of the enemy by ringing the bells, is accused by them of espionage and shot. Now we know that it is one of the duties most strictly incumbent upon a mayor, to exact, in such a case, from the priest of this parish, the use of the bells to sound the tocsin.¹ It is one of those rare cases in which, even after the law separating Church and State, the municipal authority has the right to interfere in the ringing of the bells, and there is every evidence that, in circumstances fraught with such tragedy for their country, mayors and priests acted together in perfect agreement. These mayors and priests whom the Germans executed on the road because they rang the church bells (though it would have been treason for them to have done otherwise) were therefore veritable martyrs for the sake of the duty of their office no less than of their patriotism.

This, however, was the reason for certain acts of violence. For instance, in Lorraine, the Reservist L. W——² notes—

“A mayor near Remilly was arrested and put under supervision by us. He betrayed our approach

¹ The Municipal Law of 1884 (Art. 100 and 101) conferred on mayors this right of requisition in case of pressing public danger, and by this was understood fire, flood, or hostile *invasion*. These powers were conferred by Art. 27 of the Law of Dec. 9, 1905.

² Diary of the Reservist L. W——. Notebook bound in black mole-skin, red edges, ruled in blue, 7 mm., 20 lines, 17 × 10 cm. Gothic writing, black pencil, 14 pages + 10 blank pages + 2 blank + 3 written + 1 blank + 5 written = 35 pages, several torn. Date, Aug. 6 to Oct. 30, 1914.

to the French by ringing the church bells. He was shot.”¹

And a lieutenant in the Reserves, Theodore Str., confirms this testimony²—

“Behind Stoncourt the news spread that six enemy army corps had been surrounded; but later it was discovered that the French had retreated, warned by the Mayor of Flocourt (arrested and to be shot).”³

And it would be only too easy to multiply these melancholy examples. Could anything be more tragic than the case of those two Belgian priests, to whom the non-commissioned officer of the Landwehr, Sch.—, is referring, when he notes⁴—

“On the way I learnt that the most rigorous measures were being employed against any civilians who were lending assistance to the enemy. Recently, for instance, two priests who had buried arms had been shot, others arrested and kept as hostages.”⁵

Thus, without any form of trial, poor country parish priests were put to death—not for having carried or distributed arms, but for having buried them, though

¹ Heute 21. viii. rückten wir wieder vor bis Herlingen. Ein Bürgermeister bei Remili ist verhaftet und wird von uns bewacht. Er verriet den Franzosen unser kommen dadurch, dass er mit den Kirchenglocken läuten liess er wird erschossen, desgleichen weitere 4 Zivilpersonen.


² Diary of Lieut. of the Reserves Th. Str.—, 40th Battalion of the Reserves. Notebook of grey cloth, chiné, edged stitched red sheepskin. 12·7 × 8 cm., title “Notes” in white on the cover, pencil-holder and inside pocket at the end, ruled blue, 6 mm., 19 lines, red edges, black pencil, gothic writing. 100 pages notes (right-hand pages), 1 torn page, 1 page notes, 20 blank pages, 8 pages notes and various sketches, *i. e.* 83 pages in all. Date, Aug. 17 to Sept. 30, 1914.

³ “Die Leute fallen wie die Fliegen. Hinter Stoncourt wird Nachricht verbreitet, 6 fdl. Armeekorps sollen umzingelt sein. Später stellt sich aber raus dass die Franz. abgezogen sind, gewarnt von Bürgermeister von Flocourt (verhaftet, soll erschossen werden).

⁴ For description, see above, note 2.

⁵ Unterwegs erfahre ich dass gegen alle Zivilpersonen die dem Feinde Vorschuss leisten mit äussersten Strenge vorgegangen wird, *z. B.* neulich wurden 2 Geistliche welche Waffen vergraben haben erschossen, andere werden arrestiert, und als Geiseln zurückbehalten.

Sernaize.



no doubt this was the only way of putting out of sight on the approach of the enemy these compromising weapons, which they had perhaps induced their parishioners to give up after having won them to a calmer state of mind. Elsewhere, without even possessing any certain knowledge, the Germans punished a whole population merely because they had found in the locality an abandoned telephone; and the same Lieutenant Str—— declares ¹—

“Return by Mazerfulles, which was burnt by the Engineers, because a telephone was found there connected with the French.” ²

Finally, and this is perhaps the most terrible pretext of all, the simple fact of finding some weapon or cartridge in the possession of a civilian, or merely in his house, exposes the unfortunate man to a sentence of death, and suffices to justify the destruction of his dwelling. The volunteer, F. T——, of the 237th Infantry, describes a scene of this kind as follows: (An engagement is in progress with some English, who are entrenched in a farm. To right and left lie the dead and wounded)—

“Now my section marches under fire to a farm from which shots are being fired. We come up to it with lightning speed. A hasty search, but the English are dead or severely wounded. At this moment, Hans comes up to me, with a carbine and a bayonet in his hands. Hans also found a fine pair of field-glasses, which he handed over to the Battalion as proudly as a Spaniard. The owners of the house—rich distinguished people, groan and call upon God pitifully; they are searched, and a revolver is found on a young man of 21. Shrieking with fear, he is dragged into the courtyard and shot before the eyes of his parents and sisters. I cannot look at it. Then a match to the beautiful barns, and everything is destroyed. We went on till we were 300

¹ See above, p. 171, note 1.

² Rückzug ueber Mazerulles, das noch unserem Durchmarsch von Pionieren angesteckt wird, da Telefonenverbindung mit den Franzosen aufgefunden ist.

metres from Moorslede. Blood red, as though aflame with denunciation, the sun set over the villages, the silhouettes of a large convent and of several windmills standing out against the sky. . . .”¹

Evidently this young man, while not disputing the orders of his chiefs, none the less shuddered at such instructions. We even find instances of officers hesitating in such a case and demanding further and more precise instructions, so as to relieve them of any share of the responsibility. This is the case with Lieutenant I——, whose laconic and picturesque notebook we have already quoted several times²—

“ Arrest of two dangerous-looking peasants; handed over to the police. Cartridges were found in a house. Informed the brigade. Order to burn the house. Executed. It is burning. Booty, some fowls.”³

Thus a stray packet of cartridges, doubtless left there by some soldiers who had made a precipitate retreat, was found by the invaders. The officer in command had doubtless received general instructions to burn any houses in which munitions or weapons should be found. But, in view of the insignificance of this

¹ Rechts und links liegen Tote oder Verwundete. Jetzt geht mein Zug unter Feuer auf ein Gehöft zu, aus dem geschossen wird. Mit Blitzes Schnelle sind wir da, ein schnelles Durchsuchen, aber die Engländer sind tot oder schwer verwundet. Hierbei fällt Hans zu, eine Karabine und ein Seitengewehr in die Hände. Hans erbeutet auch ein feines Ferninstrument, welches er stolz wie ein Spanier beim Bataillon abgibt. Die Bewohner des Gutes, feine reiche Leute, jammern Gott erbärmlich, werden durchsucht, und bei einem jungen Mann von 21 Jahren findet man ein Revolver. Brüllend vor Angst wird er vor den Hof geschleppt und vor den Augen der Eltern et Geschwister erschossen. Ich kann nicht hinschauen. Dann ein Streichholz an die wunderschönen Scheunen u. alles ist verloren. Weiter geht bis auf 300 M. vor Moorslede. Blutrot wie anklagend geht die Sonne ueber den Ort unter, aus der die Sillheuten [*sic*] eines Grossen Klosters und verschiedene Windmühlen sich abheben.

² See pp. 174 and 251.

³ Festnahme von 2 gefährlich aussehenden Bauern, Gendarmes abgeliefert. In einem Haus werden Patronen gefunden. Meldung an Brigade. Befehl Haus anzuzünden. Geschieht. Es brennt. Hühner werden erbeutet.

find, he dares not take on himself the responsibility for an execution, which is repugnant to his natural humanity. In his uncertainty, he asks for fresh orders, and the brigade confirms the merciless instructions, which perhaps really emanated from a higher quarter. What commentaries could demonstrate more convincingly than this brief passage that the blame for all the unnecessary suffering inflicted by the German troops is to be traced back to the supreme heads of the German army?

Moreover, all the officers had not the same scruples as Lieutenant I——; and the precipitation of the subordinates of all ranks in obeying without discrimination the general instructions given over the whole Front to exercise merciless severity, was bound to result, and did, in fact, frequently result, in the most deplorable mistakes. We know that the destruction of Louvain has been attributed by the Belgians to an error of this nature. A German detachment entering the town in the night is said to have been mistaken for the enemy by the sentinels on guard at the entrance; the reciprocal and deadly fire which ensued is said to have been attributed to civilians; and the whole town was held responsible for the disaster. These facts have been so often related and discussed that it is needless to return to them here. If we adopt the Belgian theory, which is strikingly confirmed by the narratives of neutral witnesses, such as Messrs. Powell, Grondijs, etc., the destruction of Louvain stands out as one of the most terrible judicial errors in history.¹ But, even if we adopt the German theory, that is to say, even if we suppose that some civilians did actually fire a few shots, and that others may have intended to fire still more on the troops in occupation, it is none the less certain that the cruel repression of these isolated acts and of these vague

¹ We shall have to revert to it later on, when we come to speak of the systematic destruction of objects of art and science by the German army.

conspiracies is out of all proportion with the alleged crimes, without any historical precedent in modern times, and without any possible excuse, either from the point of view of right or of humanity. And, here again, as at Visé, as in Lorraine, since the whole of Germany, and in particular intellectual Germany, have been united in their approval of the destroyers of Louvain; since the editors of illustrated papers and picture post-cards have not hesitated to popularise in Germany views of the ruins of that unfortunate city, in which young officers have had themselves photographed among the débris: we may take it that this brutal repression is a logical reflection of the type of German Imperialism, which has been fostered in our time by Pan-Germanist activities, to which we paid too little heed.

Apart from Visé, Aerschott, and Louvain, other towns were consigned to the flames, and the only excuse which the German army could invent was that these were mistakes of the same kind. Termonde, which was deliberately set fire to and then furiously bombarded, was, by the Germans' own confession, guilty of no very definite crime, beyond that of being near to the intrenched camp at Antwerp, which was then being attacked by the German army. And the crime which Dinant had to expiate so bitterly seems also to have been in reality her topographical position, which, in the course of the battle of August 23, led to a misunderstanding, destined to prove fatal to its peaceful inhabitants. This charming town is, in fact, confined between the Meuse and a steep cliff, and is traversed lengthways by the principal road, which runs parallel to the course of the river, so that the smaller roads crossing it may be swept by the fire of troops posted on the opposite bank of the river. Now, whilst the Germans were entering the town by the principal road, some French chasseurs in ambush on the right bank raked them with fire as they passed each of these transverse roads, so that the Germans, not seeing the enemy, and being swept at



Ruins of Rethel (1.)

intervals by a violent fire directed on their flank, might quite genuinely imagine that this fire came from the houses situated along the road which they were following. Without further investigation, they flung themselves right and left on the nearest houses, smashing doors and windows in order to seize inhabitants whom they supposed guilty; and there is scarcely need to describe yet again the scenes of horror which ensued. A terrible sketch of it is given by the soldier Ph——, of the 178th Regiment of Infantry, which arrived in the devastated town the same evening ¹—

“A horrible, blood-curdling, beautiful sight. At the very entrance lay about fifty civilians, who had been shot because they had fired treacherously on our troops. In the course of the night, many more were shot; we counted over 200. Women and children, lamp in hand, were compelled to look on at this fearful spectacle. We then ate our rice in the midst of the corpses; we had eaten nothing since the morning. As a result of searching the houses, we found a great deal of wine and liqueurs, but no eatables.” ²

To be sure, the troops may really have believed in the attack by the civilians, but was it not for the leaders to see that such murderous consequences should not result from a misunderstanding? Perhaps it may be suggested that, in the course of a very fierce conflict, both had lost their self-control. In that case, the weight of responsibility lies upon those who gave

¹ Diary of the soldier Ph—— 178th Regiment of Infantry. Notebook bound black moleskin. Red edges, size 160 × 97 mm., checkered 5 mm. Gothic and Roman writing. Black pencil, 17 pages + 69 blank pages + 2 pages various notes, = 88 pages in all. Date, Aug. 5 to Sept. 13, 1914.

² Ein entsetzlich schaurig schöner Anblick. Gleich am Eingange lagen ca. 50 erschossene Bürger, die meuchlings auf unsere Truppen gefeuert hatten. Im Laufe der Nacht wurden noch viele erschossen, sodass wir ueber 200 zählen konnten. Frauen und Kinder, die Lampe in der Hand, mussten dem entsetzlichen Schauspiele zusehen. Wir assen dann inmitten der Leichen unsern Reis, seit Morgen hatten wir nichts gegessen. Beim Durchsuchen der Häuser fanden wir viel Wein und Likör aber keine Lebensmittel.

general instructions which a lack of self-control could interpret so brutally. In many other cases, equally terrible repressions were due to even less excusable errors. This was certainly the case with Rethel, of which we give here a German photograph and the brief and impressive narrative of the same Saxon soldier.¹

The latter writes on August 31—

“First of all, we pushed back the enemy, who retired precipitately, and, while we were marching to Rethel, the 23rd Division caught up the enemy troops, and completely wiped them out. At five o'clock we arrived at Rethel; the alarm was immediately sounded, but we stayed there and regaled ourselves on excellent wines and liqueurs.”² . . .

“At Rethel the inhabitants fired on us several times: some were hidden in the neighbouring woods and were firing from these. The result was that some houses were set on fire and soon a large part of this pretty little town was reduced to ashes. A grenadier who went to search a house was found dead. That night we camped on the open ground in the middle of the town.”³

This narrative is characteristic, in the sense that it explains very clearly a proceeding which may have been general—

(1) The German troops arrive in a peaceful French locality, after a long day of marching and fighting; their first thought naturally is to find refreshment;

¹ Cf. above, p. 261, note 1.

² Cf. the evidence of Lieut. von H—— above, p. 173.

³ Wir vertrieben den Gegner zunächst weiter der schleunigst abrückte und während wir bis Rethel marschierten, hatte die 23 Division den Gegner gefasst und ihn vollständig vernichtet. Um 5 Uhr in Rethel angekommen wurde sofort Alarm geblasen. Wir bleiben aber noch da und labten uns an den köstlichen Weinen und likören. . . .

In Rethel schossen wiederholt Einwohner auf uns; einige hatten sich im nahen Walde versteckt und schossen von da aus. Die Folge war das einige Häuser in Brand gesteckt wurden und bald war ein grosser Teil des schönen Städtchen eingeäschert. Ein Grenadier der eine Haussuchung vornahm wurde tot gefunden. Des Nachts biwakierten wir inmitten der Stadt auf freiem Felde. . . .



Ruins of Rethel (2.)

they find an abundance of "excellent wines and liqueurs," and they regale themselves; and, if they do so to excess, this is perfectly comprehensible, and, perhaps, even excusable!

(2) Some shots are fired from no one knows where. Who fired them? It is suggested that they were fired by the inhabitants. It is true the fire comes not from the town, but from the woods near it; and we know that the enemy is not far off, although in retreat. The enervated troops have no very clear idea who it is they have to deal with. They institute searches in this house and that; they fire at random. In this way a soldier is killed in a house which he has entered.

(3) The result is that "some houses" are set on fire, not by the artillery, since the locality is occupied, but by the infantry or the engineers accompanying them. There is no investigation, nor court-martial nor orders from headquarters. It is the regular thing, and no one feels any concern about the consequences. It is a Saxon officer, of the same regiment as the soldier Ph——, who informs us, a few days later, that the excess of these massacres and unjustified destructions finally moved even the German generals—

"The Division has, thank God, taken energetic measures to stop this burning and massacre of civilians. The charming village of Gué d'Hossus was burnt down for no reason whatever. A cyclist had a tumble and his gun went off. Immediately they opened fire on him. The male inhabitants were simply thrown into the flames. It is to be hoped that such horrors will not occur again. At Leppes, about 200 men were shot. There an example was necessary: that innocent people should also suffer was inevitable; but an investigation into the supposed offences ought to be insisted on, in order to check this practice of shooting men indiscriminately."¹

¹ Die Division geht jetzt Gott sei dank einmal energisch gegen die Brennerei u. Schiesserei von Civilisten vor. Das wunderschöne Dorf Gué d'Hossus soll ganz in Flammen aufgegangen sein. Ein Radfahrer soll gestürzt sein, u. dabei sein Gewehr losgegangen. Gleich ist auf

Thus, this level-headed officer distinguishes between what he calls "a necessary example"—that is to say, the putting to death of 200 men in a locality in which the hostile conduct of a few civilians had been proved,¹ and the "indiscriminate" shooting which the higher command deigns to reprove, although rather late in the day. We have seen that the first case, even, is contrary to International Law; but what are we to say of the second, which was, alas! of such frequent occurrence? We have already indicated the danger of bestowing these excessive powers on young soldiers. This danger is all the greater in the case of the German army, because, contrary to all appearances, the German temperament is commonly characterised by an excessive nervous impressionability.² Soldiers who went through the Chinese campaign of 1900, in that expeditionary force in which representatives of the principal armies of the world found themselves side by side, have not forgotten that fatal habit peculiar to the German sentinels of shooting at random during the night in order to keep themselves awake and to keep up their

ihn geschossen w. Man hat männliche Einwohner einfach in die Flammen geworfen. Solche Scheusslichkeiten kommen hoffentlich nicht wieder vor. In Leppe sind etwa 200 Männer erschossen worden. Dort war ein Exempel am Platz; dass auch unschuldige litten war unvermeidlich; ebenso ist aber eine Prüfung des Schuldverdachttes erforderlich, auf dass dieses wahllose Niederknallen von Männern unterbunden wird.

¹ The affair of Leppes was only an incident in the Battle of Dinant. In May 1915, the German Government published some very detailed reports accusing the Belgian civilians of having fired on the troops, both at Leppes and at Dinant. Apart from the fact that it is a practical impossibility that troops entering a locality in the night should be able to distinguish whether the fire opened on them from transverse roads is to be attributed to civilians or soldiers, even supposing that the inhabitants had entrenched themselves here and there in their houses, this would not in any case justify this "indiscriminate shooting" (*wahllose Niederknallen*).

² The very large number of sanatoria devoted especially to the cases of neuropathy or insanity must strike any one who knows modern Germany. Cases of sudden insanity, and especially of serious nervous shock, seem to have been extraordinarily frequent among the German troops in the course of the present war.

courage (*sich Courage schiessen*). This deplorable readiness to pull the trigger was in this case also the occasion of numerous accidents, and these stray bullets let off in the night were often attributed to imaginary attacks. It is not our purpose here to set forth the list of these injustices, but only to explain their nature, and we will, therefore, be content with the example quoted by the Saxon officer, which in itself indicates that there were others like it, for the new orders to which he refers had certainly not been given without serious reason !

§ 5. TERRORISM IS THE NORMAL CONSEQUENCE OF GERMAN IMPERIALISM

Unfortunately for Germany, the instructions to exercise moderation which were given by certain German generals to their troops after the end of August and, above all, of mid-September, could not wipe out the remembrance of the remarkable unity of method with which, during the first weeks of the war, the German armies had devoted themselves everywhere to the systematic terrorising of the population. Even from the few examples already quoted, in preference from the actual confessions of German combatants, we obtain this uniform impression : that the extent and severity of the repressions ordered in France and Belgium were absolutely out of all proportion with the pretended necessity of ensuring unhampered communications for the German army in its forward progress. If a civilised nation deliberately violates engagements into which she has entered, it must be concluded, at any rate, that she perceives an interest superior to the common laws of morality, which she pretends to respect. Now we have seen how the Hague Conventions formally refute, both in principle and in substance, even the least brutal of the German claims concerning the prohibiting of civilians of the invaded countries from bearing arms ;

and we have seen how, even before the war, and from the very first days of the war, the German authorities were fully resolved to disregard this fact, and to apply in every case their traditional theory concerning such prohibitions.

But the measure might have been adopted under a comparatively legitimate form, which, while not rendering it acceptable in itself, would none the less have avoided the particularly odious character which it assumed, and the most bloody of its consequences, without in any way compromising the success of the German arms. If Germany had, from the very first day, notified to belligerents her repudiation of the Hague Conventions, or, at any rate, of the articles which she intended to disregard in the *Regulations Concerning the Laws of Land Warfare*, she would doubtless have been censured by lawyers and philosophers, but, at any rate, the belligerent nations would have known what to expect. If, moreover, this notification having been made, the German army had confined itself in every case to finding out which civilian inhabitants had made use of their arms, or were even convicted of possessing them; if these civilians had been arrested, tried before a court-martial, and even, according to the circumstances, imprisoned, transported, or shot without mercy, this example would have been sufficient to inspire the rest of the population with a fear of German justice and the desire not to provoke it.

In 1870-1, a few executions of this nature were sufficient to secure the German troops from molestation after their victory. Burning was rare—exceptional we may say—and pillage barely tolerated. However, a general terror of the Prussian troops became firmly established in the course of the French campaigns, because a few notorious examples made more impression on the memory of the inhabitants than the general conduct of the troops, which was, on the whole, equitable, though severe. Now, in the campaign of 1914, such

formidable masses of troops were employed that they literally submerged the country; and the strategic points, and even the smallest villages, were occupied by such powerful forces, that any local resistance would have been sheer madness, and any individual assault a mere accident, without significance in the great conflict which was unfolding. The terror of the population—a salutary terror according to the Germans—at the conduct of the military operations, was produced in the first place by the mere size of the invading armies, whose immense numbers and formidable array could not fail to produce a profound impression on a peaceful population. It is with the utmost surprise, then, that we ask ourselves for what hidden reasons the German army, though stronger than in 1870, thought it necessary to employ, from the outset of the campaign, a violence which is ordinarily the last resort of weakness or fear. When the Conquistadores of Central America massacred the Incas or the Aztecs, and burnt their capitals, it was because they realised that they were a mere handful of men isolated at the other end of the world, among a population more than a hundred times superior to them in numbers : and they knew that they could only secure from the latter obedience and respect for their own lives by such a rule of terror as would rob them of all power of reflection. But, in the case of the helpless populations of France and Belgium, faced with an enemy concerning whose strength, numbers and equipment, they were well informed, reflection was bound to enjoin prudence. And that the motive was fear is scarcely likely, in the case of leaders of an army which, if it has not always conquered, has, at any rate, shown that it knows how to die !

It is, therefore, entirely inadmissible that the educators of the German army and the generals responsible for the final orders given to that army before the opening of the campaign, could have seriously imagined for a single moment that a few isolated acts of aggression, a

few unorganised bands, who might here and there disturb for a moment the perfect order of the immense German mobilisation, could only be repressed and incapacitated for giving further trouble by a series of burnings, bombardments and systematic massacres, involving the destruction of thousands of millions' worth of private property, and the death of thousands of innocent people by fire or the sword. And, as we have seen, it is certainly with these leaders of the army that the responsibility lies. The German soldier, save for such exceptions as may be found in any nation, is not by nature a criminal. Many of their diaries evince a moral delicacy : they show us good husbands, good sons, good fathers, who, in their civilian life, were doubtless good citizens and good fellows. But Prussian military life has moulded them to habits of passive, unquestioning and even unreflecting obedience; and the general education which they have received from infancy, and which is continued after they have arrived at manhood by the most disciplined Press in the world, have bred in them an almost mystical faith in the infallibility of Germanism, a faith which finds material expression in the hierarchy with all its gradations, from the insignificant sergeant up to the emperor; and, as a result of this double education, with its tendency to repress personality, their individual aversions disappear from the moment that they are ordered to participate in some collective undertaking. The same honest peasant, who, under his spiked helmet, will at first feel pity for the poor abandoned cattle and the beautiful farms that are being devastated, after a few days of the campaign, will record the burning of villages with as little emotion as if they were mere accidents on the road. The same Saxon grenadier, who, as a prisoner, will be on such admirable terms with his "French comrades," will have taken part, without any apparent repugnance, in the destruction of a village in which women and young girls have been shot, as well

as men. All these things they regard simply as *la guerre*, since the orders have been given them by their leaders.

Moreover, as a kind of incentive to their men to harden themselves in the face of the most odious tasks, the German military leaders, no less than the newspapers, have been diligent in inventing the most revolting legends, calculated to rouse the hatred of their men against the Belgians and the French. We shall have occasion to revert to these fabrications, which were circulated among the troops, and were sometimes so clumsy that the men themselves perceived them to be a stratagem devised to prevent them from fraternising with the enemy. There were only too many, however, who believed or pretended to believe them, and acted accordingly.

It can hardly be disputed, moreover, that when once and by order those instincts of violence and rapine had been unloosed—instincts which are latent in every man, above all when he is one of a crowd—these disciplined soldiers, men inspired by neither anger nor hate, committed without hesitation, without even reflection, the most terrible brutalities that it would be possible to conceive. By nature simple, credulous, impulsive and as obedient as children, these Germans tortured the defeated population with the callous cruelty of children torturing a captive animal. Then, when from time to time they, too, are taken prisoner, we find them again, like children, pleased to get good food and a good sleep, feeling neither anger nor shame, and genuinely unconscious of the enormity of the actions in which they have been compelled to participate. There is something primitive in the German peasant, just as there is something primitive in the dogmatism of Germanic education in all its gradations.

These young men, with stunted souls, violent appetites and minds like carefully constructed machines, were just the rude, docile and impersonal instruments, that must have been longed for by the fierce aristocracy of

youthful German Imperialism, as implements for their implacable acts of destruction.

For it is evident that destruction, both of property and of human life, was part of their plan of campaign. They had pondered it, and they had foreseen and systematically prepared it in all its details. And we are not referring here to the destruction of the enemy combatants by weapons of more or less effectiveness. That is actually war; we are referring to the systematic devastation of towns and villages, which it had been proposed long beforehand to reduce to ruins at some future date. If this is not the case, how are we to explain the abundance and variety of those contrivances for starting conflagrations, of which the German army made undisputed and terrible use in 1914? We hear from eye-witnesses of the destruction of Belgian and French villages and towns of the systematic cutting of water-pipes, so as to remove the means of extinguishing the fire. Are we to think that this was accidental? We hear of hand-pumps, or even of motor-pumps, by means of which an inflammable liquid is sprayed over the property which is to be destroyed. Are we to see in this the local and momentary use of instruments found on the spot and not previously designed for that end? It is possible, of course, that reservoirs of water may have been damaged accidentally by the artillery. It is possible, of course, that some zealous engineers may have hit upon the idea of facilitating their task by utilising supplies of oil found in some motor garage, in order to fill pumps which they had "requisitioned" from horticulturists, or even from the municipality.

But would any one venture to maintain that all these local utilisations had not themselves been planned beforehand, and that the German engineers had not long been prepared to turn them to systematic account? If the general and methodical destruction by fire of an inhabited area, either a town or a village, had not been anticipated by the German engineers as a part of their

duties, they could not have executed it in every case with that rapidity, order and method, which soldiers only exhibit in the performance of operations which have been foreseen and practised beforehand. Moreover, apart from petrol and other combustibles, which may, of course, have been found on the spot, we know that the regulation war-equipment in Germany, which the troops took with them on mobilisation, included some special incendiary instruments, which could have no other object. Doubtless it will be objected that the incendiary projectiles used by the Artillery (*Brandgranaten*) are admitted in all armies when it is necessary to reduce by fire an enemy force who have been too obstinate in defending a village. These are implements of war, to be employed in definite circumstances, for the purpose of overcoming an armed force, and such fires as they may occasion are directed not against property, but against the defenders of the position.

It is altogether different with those incendiary materials which have to be placed by hand on the property which they are intended to set on fire. These can clearly be employed only when the property is not defended. They have no direct military purpose; they are implements not of warfare, but of pure material destruction, calmly executed by men who are not exposed to any danger. The mere fact of the manufacture of such instruments and of their distribution to the engineers of the German army constitutes, beyond any possibility of doubt, the most serious of all the charges which prove that Germany had planned in advance the systematic devastation of invaded districts. These tell-tale instruments are of various types. Sometimes they are more or less fragile vessels containing either a composition which is inflammable in contact with air and which is dispersed merely by the rupture of the vessel, or else a detonator which the shock causes to fire a train of gunpowder. These are what is known as incendiary bombs or grenades (*Bomben*).

Sometimes they take the form of pastilles, or of little bags filled with various powders, very convenient little objects, since a man may carry a pouchful of them without any danger; he has only to throw a few handfuls of them, or place them judiciously on the desired spots, and then to set light to them with a match or a shot fired from his gun, in order to kindle into flames very rapidly the whole structure in which they have been scattered.

It is scarcely necessary to recall here yet again the articles of the Hague Conventions which formally condemn any destructions of property not strictly demanded by urgent military necessities. We have already shown that the security of the German army was in no way dependent on these immense collective devastations, which involuntarily bring to mind the famous saying : *Ubi solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant!* The general instructions of the educators of the German army, the orders of the German generals, and, most of all, the mere fact of the previous existence of the incendiary materials mentioned above, prove that these devastations were premeditated, although of no military utility. And, what is even more serious, the reception accorded by the German Press to the news of these executions, bears witness to the fact that by the whole, or, at any rate, the immense majority, of the German public, they were regarded in advance and are regarded to this day as mere incidents, possibly sad in themselves, but indispensable for the purpose of securing the triumph of Germanism.

Hence, those who have followed for the last twenty years the evolution of German thought, and the progressive influence upon this evolution exercised in every direction by the most alarming theories of Pan-Germanism, are compelled to make a comparison, strange as it may appear, between the theories of the publicists of yesterday and the collective actions of the German soldiers of to-day. Indeed, the pages of a Tannenberg

or a Frymann would almost seem to have been prophetic. The fact is, however, that the significance of these authors in modern Germany is less that of pioneers of what was to come than of resultants and echoes of what was already existent. We have seen that the cult of Might as the source of Right has really been observed in Prussia all through its history; and that it has been defended on philosophic grounds by Treitschke, and on the grounds of military science by General von Bernhardi. As a result of the rigorous development in every practical domain of the logical consequences of principles supported by such distinguished patronage, the exponents of Pan-Germanism naturally arrived at those terrible conclusions which the world, in its ignorance, regarded as mere irresponsible outbursts, but which Germany, having been prepared for them for the last two generations at least by an education on the same lines, did not hesitate to accept as being in conformity with the "biological" necessities of life.

As a result of this mentality—a mentality utterly opposed to the general tendencies of the evolution of modern civilisations, we have seen German statesmen deliberately prepare for the Great War, not with a view to self-defence, but in order to secure the expansion of the imperialism of their race. We have seen German statesmen as well as the leaders of the vast German armies, trample under foot international principles, both as a result of a brutally objective realism, blind to all but the immediate end to be attained, and also as a result of a curious species of mysticism, which leads them to regard any foreign morality as subject to the principles and destinies of a superior Germanism. Finally, in the conduct of the war, we have seen them coldly, systematically, and unscrupulously apply a "new International Law," by confiscating according to their fancy any private wealth encountered on their route, thus putting into practice the most daring theories of Tannenberg.

In face of the no less evident intention of destroying, on the smallest pretext, and even without a pretext, villages, towns and whole populations, from the moment of their arrival in an invaded country, it cannot but be questioned whether this system, which does not admit of any military explanation, is not also an offspring of the Pan-Germanist theories of evacuation? It cannot be disputed that such an explanation is logically coherent, and that it would fit almost all the events of the case. Since it was intended that Belgium and Lorraine should be preserved for Germanism, it would be important to clear as much space as possible in these territories for the installation of German colonists. Now it was actually in Belgium and in the French territories nearest to the German frontier that the worst brutalities were practised and the greatest number of inhabitants forced to take flight. The exodus of the inhabitants, far from being prevented, became a mode of conquest. If it were insufficient, it could be supplemented by arrests and deportations *en masse* into Germany, whence any useless individuals who were still living might be sent back to France at a future date.¹

The estates thus rendered vacant would be considered as ownerless and confiscated, after the fashion extolled by Bismarck. Was it not Bismarck who, as early as 1870, gave vent to this sinister threat—

“ If I were a soldier and in command, I know what I would do. I would treat those who were left behind with every possible care and consideration. But, in regard to those who had fled, I should consider their houses and their furniture as abandoned property, and

¹ We know that this programme was strictly carried out, and what pitiful processions of these deported inhabitants were despatched into Switzerland by the German authorities in the course of the winter of 1914-15. The wonderful charity displayed by the Swiss nation on this occasion, a charity which entitles her to the eternal gratitude of France, is only one more accusation, and what a terrible accusation, against the brutality of the treatment dealt out to an innocent population by the implacability of Haeckelian Germanism.

I should act accordingly. And, if I got hold of these fugitives themselves, I should take away their cattle and everything they had with them, on the pretext that they had stolen them and then concealed themselves in the woods.”¹

What was, perhaps, only a fiery outburst on the part of the Iron Chancellor, seems to have been adopted as a principle and a precept by the leaders of present-day Germany. In order to apply it on a large scale, it was only necessary to inspire the population with such a terror as would lead them to seek safety in flight. After that, it was very easy to treat their property as ownerless goods. And, after all the movable property had been taken away or sold, the immovable property could be distributed as a reward to old soldiers, or else sold to Germans, and the profits appropriated by the Treasury. As for the destruction of factories, houses and buildings of all descriptions, did not these mean repairs to be executed eventually by German labour,² and could the loss of the ancient treasures of a foreign country be compared with the advantages thus prepared for German national activities?

Compare the pages quoted above from Tannenberg and Frymann concerning the eventual “evacuation” of territories which were to be ceded to Germany and the theories of German economists such as Naumann with the actual events of the war of 1914–15, as they are revealed to us by German witnesses. It is impossible not to discover a logical connection between them and not to ask whether the German generals, when they armed their engineers beforehand with grenades and incendiary materials, had not the deliberate intention of putting into practice in the next war the methods of elimination proposed by Tannenberg?

¹ Busch (M.), *Bismarck: Tagebuchblätter*, Vol. 1, pp. 196-7.

² We know that, without waiting for the end of the war, numerous German contractors have already presented themselves in Belgium and Lorraine for the purpose of securing orders for the execution of future repairs.

Henceforth, terrorism makes its appearance in Prussian warfare, not as a defensive measure, for the purpose of securing the safety of the victorious army, but as an offensive measure destined to confirm, by means of the vacancies effected in the invaded districts, the future results of the conquest. The words of Tacitus would then become a reality, and as for any scruples which might agitate weak natures concerning this infliction of merciless suffering on the innocent, Tannenberg replied to this objection in advance that : " their crime is so great [their wish to hamper German expansion], that the harshest measures are scarcely adequate for their chastisement ! " ¹

Doubtless it was with a view to the punishment of this " crime " that the German generals laid waste the private house of the President of the French Republic and of the French Resident-General in Morocco ! The little villa of M. Poincaré presented no military character such as could justify a bombardment ; and

¹ It is worth while to remark here that the most formidable of these Pan-Germanist theories were very far from being modified in the course of the war. We may call to mind the celebrated manifesto addressed to the Chancellor of the empire on May 20, 1915, by the " League of Agriculturists," the " League of German Peasants," " Association of Westphalian Peasants," " Central Union of German Manufacturers," " League of Manufacturers," and " Union of the Middle Classes of the Empire." In addition to a detailed account of the annexations which were considered indispensable in Belgium and France, we read that : " All the property which may serve the cause of German economic power in these territories, including both medium-sized and large estates, shall pass into German hands : France shall indemnify the owners and shall give them hospitality." After a year of war, the *Berner Tagwacht* published information of a new manifesto, emanating from such celebrities as Professors Meinicke, Seeberg and Schäfer, of Berlin ; Oncken of Heidelberg, Schumacher of Reichenau ; Dr. Kürdorf, Director of Mines at Gelsenkirchen ; the Imperial Minister, von Schwerin, the President of the Municipal Council of Frankfort. The latter also maintain that, in the territories to be conquered in France and Belgium : " It is the duty of the authorities to place in German hands any property belonging to the enemies of Germany ! " After this, there can be no question that the so-called " phantasies " of a Tannenberg were in harmony with the profoundest tendencies of that " modern " Imperialism, which has been propagated throughout the German empire.

the simple family vault which he had constructed in order that he might some day repose near his ancestors on the soil of Lorraine, ought at any rate, to have been respected in a war between civilised nations. As for the family residence, in which the sister of General Lyautey thought that she was safe from the invasion of a modern army, it contained, to be sure, a few military trifles and souvenirs, relics of ancient glories, or of remote colonial events. But this pretext was not even hinted at by the engineers who proceeded callously, according to their orders, to burn this dwelling. Just as M. Poincaré, although the temporary representative of a democracy, symbolises French patriotism to the Germans, idolaters of despotism, so General Lyautey represented in their eyes the whole glory of that French expansion which they had proved themselves equally incapable of accepting or of rivalling. Both had to expiate in their most treasured possessions the heinous "crime" of not having made themselves the instruments of Germanism. This is an honour so natural to Frenchmen that they would feel shame to hear it praised. But this example is in its turn significant of the hidden reasons which made terrorism an instrument of German Imperialism.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
RICHARD CLAY & SONS, LIMITED,
BRUNSWICK ST., STAMFORD ST., S.E.,
AND BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.

